Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
Authors:
- Gregory DeAngeloGDGregory DeAngelo
- Laura K. GeeLGLaura K. Gee
- 1 September 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 210-227
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Tufts IRB (1408019)
This publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
- What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and BeliefsJournal of the European Economic Association, 2017
- PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO‐STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCEEconomic Inquiry, 2017
- Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experimentsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016
- Gunning for efficiency with third party enforcement in threshold public goodsExperimental Economics, 2015
- Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental StudyAmerican Economic Review, 2012
- Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provisionJournal of Public Economics, 2012
- Combining Psychology and Economics in the Analysis of Compliance: From Enforcement to Cooperation11This paper is based on a keynote address at the conference “The Shadow Economy, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering” held in Münster, Germany at the University of Münster in July 2011.Economic Analysis and Policy, 2012
- Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humansProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidenceJournal of Economic Theory, 2009
- Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raisingJournal of Public Economics, 2004