Laura K. Gee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Laura K. Gee has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amanda Agan
Department of Economics and Jeb E. Brooks School of Public Policy Cornell University Ithaca New York USA
2 shared publications - Anoushka Kiyawat
Department of Behavioral Science, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
1 shared publication - Bo Cowgill
Columbia Business School, New York, New York 10027
1 shared publication - Bo Cowgill
Rutgers University Columbia University Tufts University Rutgers University Columbia University Tufts University University of California University of California Santa Cruz University of Connecticut University of Missouri University of Pennsylvania Law School University of Texas at Dallas, and Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)
1 shared publication - Christine L. Exley
Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163
1 shared publication Gregory DeAngelo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (5) , 1571-1588
The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that nondisclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6–8 percentage points. Funding: This work was supported by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholars Program). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384 .
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (5) , 1571-1588
The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that nondisclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6–8 percentage points. Funding: This work was supported by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholars Program). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384 .
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 219, 404-413
Pivotal or popular: The effects of social information and feeling pivotal on civic actions
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 219, 404-413
Pivotal or popular: The effects of social information and feeling pivotal on civic actions
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market, and we measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features hundreds of recruiters reviewing more than 2, 000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as job candidates’ disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about nondisclosing candidates, and that they anticipate positive selection into disclosure. Recruiters view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than about worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly paid candidates) yield higher salary offers; however, they are negative signals of the value (net of salary) that a worker brings to the firm, and thus they yield fewer callbacks. While disclosures (especially of high amounts) generally increase recruiter beliefs about quality and competing offers, male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher-paying firms or being well paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and thus they punish women less than men for silence. When we simulate the effect of salary history bans using our results, we find muted effects on callbacks. Gender inequality in salary offers is reduced; however, equality comes at the expense of lower salaries overall (and especially for men).
- 1 January 2024
- Published by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Open AccessSalary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market, and we measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features hundreds of recruiters reviewing more than 2, 000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as job candidates’ disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about nondisclosing candidates, and that they anticipate positive selection into disclosure. Recruiters view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than about worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly paid candidates) yield higher salary offers; however, they are negative signals of the value (net of salary) that a worker brings to the firm, and thus they yield fewer callbacks. While disclosures (especially of high amounts) generally increase recruiter beliefs about quality and competing offers, male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher-paying firms or being well paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and thus they punish women less than men for silence. When we simulate the effect of salary history bans using our results, we find muted effects on callbacks. Gender inequality in salary offers is reduced; however, equality comes at the expense of lower salaries overall (and especially for men).
- Open Access
- 31 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 558-565
24. The Altruism Budget: Measuring and Encouraging Charitable Giving
- 31 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 558-565
Open Access24. The Altruism Budget: Measuring and Encouraging Charitable Giving
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 210-227
Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 210-227
Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
- 20 April 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (5) , 2077-2094
The More You Know: Information Effects on Job Application Rates in a Large Field Experiment
This paper presents the results from a 2.3-million-person field experiment that varies whether or not a job seeker sees the number of applicants for a job posting on a large job-posting website, LinkedIn. This intervention increases the likelihood that a person will finish an application by 3.5%. Women have a larger increase in their likelihood of finishing an application than men. Overall, adding this information to a job posting may offer a light-touch way to both increase application rates and alter the diversity of the applicant pool. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2994. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- 20 April 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (5) , 2077-2094
The More You Know: Information Effects on Job Application Rates in a Large Field Experiment
This paper presents the results from a 2.3-million-person field experiment that varies whether or not a job seeker sees the number of applicants for a job posting on a large job-posting website, LinkedIn. This intervention increases the likelihood that a person will finish an application by 3.5%. Women have a larger increase in their likelihood of finishing an application than men. Overall, adding this information to a job posting may offer a light-touch way to both increase application rates and alter the diversity of the applicant pool. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2994. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 107, 282-297
Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 107, 282-297
Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory
- Open Access
Anger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate emotions could decrease the use of punishments while keeping welfare high, possibly depending on pre-existing levels of aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation called cognitive reappraisal, decreases the use of punishments and makes a statistically insignificant improvement to both net earnings and self-reported emotions compared to a control condition (natural). Although the interaction between the emotion regulation treatment and level of aggression is not significant, only low aggression types reduce their punishments; the results are of the same direction, but statistically insignificant for high aggression types. Overall, our findings suggest that pairing emotion regulation with punishments can decrease the use of punishments without harming monetary and mental welfare.
Open AccessAnger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate emotions could decrease the use of punishments while keeping welfare high, possibly depending on pre-existing levels of aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation called cognitive reappraisal, decreases the use of punishments and makes a statistically insignificant improvement to both net earnings and self-reported emotions compared to a control condition (natural). Although the interaction between the emotion regulation treatment and level of aggression is not significant, only low aggression types reduce their punishments; the results are of the same direction, but statistically insignificant for high aggression types. Overall, our findings suggest that pairing emotion regulation with punishments can decrease the use of punishments without harming monetary and mental welfare.
- 14 March 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 154-171
Gunning for efficiency with third party enforcement in threshold public goods
When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equilibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a mechanism used successfully in continuous public goods games, the Hired Gun Mechanism (Andreoni and Gee in J. Public Econ. 96(11–12):1036–1046, 2012), to see if it can successfully get subjects across the threshold. When we use the mechanism to eliminate only inefficient equilibria, without addressing coordination, there is a modest but statistically insignificant improvement with the mechanism. However, when we hone the mechanism to eliminate all but one of the provision-point equilibria, thereby addressing the coordination issue, the mechanism moves all subjects to the desired efficient outcome almost immediately. In fact, after only one round using the hired gun mechanism, all subject are coordinating on the chosen equilibrium. The mechanism can be applied in settings where a group (1) has a plan for public good provision, (2) can measure contributions, (3) can fine members and (4) has an agreed upon standard for expected contributions. In these settings simple punishments, when focused on solving coordination as well as free riding, can greatly improve efficiency.
- 14 March 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 154-171
Gunning for efficiency with third party enforcement in threshold public goods
When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equilibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a mechanism used successfully in continuous public goods games, the Hired Gun Mechanism (Andreoni and Gee in J. Public Econ. 96(11–12):1036–1046, 2012), to see if it can successfully get subjects across the threshold. When we use the mechanism to eliminate only inefficient equilibria, without addressing coordination, there is a modest but statistically insignificant improvement with the mechanism. However, when we hone the mechanism to eliminate all but one of the provision-point equilibria, thereby addressing the coordination issue, the mechanism moves all subjects to the desired efficient outcome almost immediately. In fact, after only one round using the hired gun mechanism, all subject are coordinating on the chosen equilibrium. The mechanism can be applied in settings where a group (1) has a plan for public good provision, (2) can measure contributions, (3) can fine members and (4) has an agreed upon standard for expected contributions. In these settings simple punishments, when focused on solving coordination as well as free riding, can greatly improve efficiency.