Compass: Navigating the Design Space of Taint Schemes for RTL Security Verification
Open Access
- 22 March 2026
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 442-458
Abstract
Hardware information flow tracking (IFT) using taint analysis provides a methodology to check whether a hardware design satisfies certain security properties. Previous work has shown a broad trade-off space between precision and complexity when using different taint analysis schemes. A careful investigation of this space has led to the insight that applying different taint schemes to different components of a hardware design can improve overall efficiency. We present Compass, a systematic framework to guide users in designing appropriate taint schemes that are as lightweight as possible while still sufficient to accomplish their security verification goals. We first establish a unified terminology to comprehensively capture existing taint schemes. We then apply counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) for taint refinement to iteratively improve the taint scheme. We evaluated Compass on a set of open-source RISCV processors to verify the information flow properties for speculative execution vulnerabilities, and demonstrate that Compass significantly improves both simulation speed and formal-verification scalability of taint analysis.Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (CCF 2422052)
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (CCF 2422053)
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (CNS 2046359)
- JUMP 2.0, a Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) program (ACE Center)
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