QTQinhan Tan

Qinhan Tan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Qinhan Tan has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Compass: Navigating the Design Space of Taint Schemes for RTL Security Verification

    by Yuheng Yang, Qinhan Tan, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Hardware information flow tracking (IFT) using taint analysis provides a methodology to check whether a hardware design satisfies certain security properties. Previous work has shown a broad trade-off space between precision and complexity when using different taint analysis schemes. A careful investigation of this space has led to the insight that applying different taint schemes to different components of a hardware design can improve overall efficiency. We present Compass, a systematic framework to guide users in designing appropriate taint schemes that are as lightweight as possible while still sufficient to accomplish their security verification goals. We first establish a unified terminology to comprehensively capture existing taint schemes. We then apply counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) for taint refinement to iteratively improve the taint scheme. We evaluated Compass on a set of open-source RISCV processors to verify the information flow properties for speculative execution vulnerabilities, and demonstrate that Compass significantly improves both simulation speed and formal-verification scalability of taint analysis.


  • Open Access

    SecIC3: Customizing IC3 for Hardware Security Verification

    by Qinhan Tan, Akash Gaonkar, Yu-Wei Fan, Aarti Gupta, Sharad Malik

    Recent years have seen significant advances in using formal verification to check hardware security properties. Of particular practical interest are checking confidentiality and integrity of secrets, by checking that there is no information flow between the secrets and observable outputs. A standard method for checking information flow is to translate the corresponding non-interference hyperproperty into a safety property on a self-composition of the design, which has two copies of the design composed together. Although prior efforts have aimed to reduce the size of the self-composed design, there are no state-of-the-art model checkers that exploit their special structure for hardware security verification. In this paper, we propose SecIC3, a hardware model checking algorithm based on IC3 that is customized to exploit this self-composition structure. SecIC3 utilizes this structure in two complementary techniques: symmetric state exploration and adding equivalence predicates. We implement SecIC3 on top of two open-source IC3 implementations and evaluate it on a non-interference checking benchmark consisting of 10 designs. The experiment results show that SecIC3 significantly reduces the time for finding security proofs, with up to 49.3x proof speedup compared to baseline implementations.

  • Open Access

    DejaVuzz: Disclosing Transient Execution Bugs with Dynamic Swappable Memory and Differential Information Flow Tracking Assisted Processor Fuzzing

    by Jinyan Xu, Yangye Zhou, Xingzhi Zhang, Yinshuai Li, Qinhan Tan, Yinqian Zhang, Yajin Zhou, Rui Chang, Wenbo Shen


  • Open Access

    DejaVuzz: Disclosing Transient Execution Bugs with Dynamic Swappable Memory and Differential Information Flow Tracking assisted Processor Fuzzing

    by Jinyan Xu, Yangye Zhou, Xingzhi Zhang, Yinshuai Li, Qinhan Tan, Yinqian Zhang, Yajin Zhou, Rui Chang, Wenbo Shen

    Transient execution vulnerabilities have emerged as a critical threat to modern processors. Hardware fuzzing testing techniques have recently shown promising results in discovering transient execution bugs in large-scale out-of-order processor designs. However, their poor microarchitectural controllability and observability prevent them from effectively and efficiently detecting transient execution vulnerabilities. This paper proposes DejaVuzz, a novel pre-silicon stage processor transient execution bug fuzzer. DejaVuzz utilizes two innovative operating primitives: dynamic swappable memory and differential information flow tracking, enabling more effective and efficient transient execution vulnerability detection. The dynamic swappable memory enables the isolation of different instruction streams within the same address space. Leveraging this capability, DejaVuzz generates targeted training for arbitrary transient windows and eliminates ineffective training, enabling efficient triggering of diverse transient windows. The differential information flow tracking aids in observing the propagation of sensitive data across the microarchitecture. Based on taints, DejaVuzz designs the taint coverage matrix to guide mutation and uses taint liveness annotations to identify exploitable leakages. Our evaluation shows that DejaVuzz outperforms the state-of-the-art fuzzer SpecDoctor, triggering more comprehensive transient windows with lower training overhead and achieving a 4.7x coverage improvement. And DejaVuzz also mitigates control flow over-tainting with acceptable overhead and identifies 5 previously undiscovered transient execution vulnerabilities (with 6 CVEs assigned) on BOOM and XiangShan.

  • Open Access

    RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic

    by Qinhan Tan, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous evaluation of the ability of hardware designs to deal with speculative execution attacks is urgently desired. This paper proposes a formal verification technique called Contract Shadow Logic that can considerably improve RTL verification scalability with little manual effort while being applicable to different defense mechanisms. In this technique, we leverage computer architecture design insights to improve verification performance for checking security properties formulated as software-hardware contracts for secure speculation. Our verification scheme is accessible to computer architects and requires minimal formal-method expertise. We evaluate our technique on multiple RTL designs, including three out-of-order processors. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique exhibits a significant advantage in finding attacks on insecure designs and deriving complete proofs on secure designs, when compared to the baseline and two state-of-the-art verification schemes, LEAVE and UPEC.


  • Open Access

    RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic

    by Qinhan Tan, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous evaluation of the ability of hardware designs to deal with speculative execution attacks is urgently desired. This paper proposes a formal verification technique called Contract Shadow Logic that can considerably improve RTL verification scalability while being applicable to different defense mechanisms. In this technique, we leverage computer architecture design insights to improve verification performance for checking security properties formulated as software-hardware contracts for secure speculation. Our verification scheme is accessible to computer architects and requires minimal formal-method expertise. We evaluate our technique on multiple RTL designs, including three out-of-order processors. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique exhibits a significant advantage in finding attacks on insecure designs and deriving complete proofs on secure designs, when compared to the baseline and two state-of-the-art verification schemes, LEAVE and UPEC.

  • Open Access

    Security Verification of Low-Trust Architectures

    by Qinhan Tan, Yonathan Fisseha, Shibo Chen, Lauren Biernacki, Jean-Baptiste Jeannin, Sharad Malik, Todd Austin

    Low-trust architectures work on, from the viewpoint of software, always-encrypted data, and significantly reduce the amount of hardware trust to a small software-free enclave component. In this paper, we perform a complete formal verification of a specific low-trust architecture, the Sequestered Encryption (SE) architecture, to show that the design is secure against direct data disclosures and digital side channels for all possible programs. We first define the security requirements of the ISA of SE low-trust architecture. Looking upwards, this ISA serves as an abstraction of the hardware for the software, and is used to show how any program comprising these instructions cannot leak information, including through digital side channels. Looking downwards this ISA is a specification for the hardware, and is used to define the proof obligations for any RTL implementation arising from the ISA-level security requirements. These cover both functional and digital side-channel leakage. Next, we show how these proof obligations can be successfully discharged using commercial formal verification tools. We demonstrate the efficacy of our RTL security verification technique for seven different correct and buggy implementations of the SE architecture.