Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
Authors:
- Alessandra CasellaACAlessandra Casella
- Aniol Llorente-SaguerALAniol Llorente-Saguer
- Thomas R. PalfreyTPThomas R. Palfrey
- 1 August 2012
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 120 (4) , 593-658
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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