Social Information and Consumer Heterogeneity
Preprint
- 10 September 2018
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these communication channels, whereas the network gets revenue only through advertising. We characterize the equilibrium level of network diffusion of social information and the firms' expenditure on advertising. We show that depending on consumers' heterogeneous response to advertising, social information can compete with or complement display advertising. Moreover, in every equilibrium each consumer almost surely purchases the superior product with a strictly higher probability, and that receiving social information almost surely further increases such probability. Finally, social information almost surely raises social welfare, thereby establishing the existence of a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- Curation Algorithms and Filter Bubbles in Social NetworksMarketing Science, 2020
- A model of biased intermediationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2019
- Homophily in Social Media and News PolarizationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
- Peer Effects in Product Adoption2019
- Whether or not to open Pandora's boxJournal of Economic Theory, 2018
- In Google we trust?International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015
- Integration and search engine biasThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2014
- Identifying Influential and Susceptible Members of Social NetworksScience, 2012
- Paying for ProminenceThe Economic Journal, 2011
- What do the Papers Sell? a Model of Advertising and Media BiasThe Economic Journal, 2009