Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance
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Open Access
- 7 January 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 221-238
Abstract
Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.Keywords
Funding Information
- Narodowe Centrum Nauki (2022/47/I/HS4/03170)
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (525707184)
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