BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS
- 8 March 2016
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1631-1647
Abstract
This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)Keywords
Funding Information
- Killiam Research Enhancement Award
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