Subhasish Dugar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Subhasish Dugar has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Haimanti Bhattacharya
Department of Economics, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA
3 shared publications - Quazi Shahriar
Department of Economics San Diego State University San Diego California USA
2 shared publications - Arnab Mitra
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics Portland State University Portland OR 97201
1 shared publication - David Reiley
Reiley: Yahoo! Research, 2821 Mission College Blvd., Santa Clara, CA 95054. Phone 520‐237‐3236, Fax 408‐349‐2270
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1631-1647
BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS
This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)
- 8 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1631-1647
BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS
This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 79 (3) , 621-638
Contests for Ranks: Experimental Evidence
We use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance. In our experiment (i) rank is defined as subjects' relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and (ii) subjects' earnings are independent of their performance. We find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive, and this result is independent of the group size. In the large group, the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive, but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives. Finally, the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher “prestige effect.” In additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the status‐prize winners, we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes. The last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status. The results are important for managerial practices.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 79 (3) , 621-638
Contests for Ranks: Experimental Evidence
We use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance. In our experiment (i) rank is defined as subjects' relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and (ii) subjects' earnings are independent of their performance. We find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive, and this result is independent of the group size. In the large group, the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive, but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives. Finally, the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher “prestige effect.” In additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the status‐prize winners, we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes. The last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status. The results are important for managerial practices.
- 15 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1061-1081
Group Identity and the Moral Hazard Problem: Experimental Evidence
We experimentally examine how real group identity of parties (a principal and an agent) facing a moral hazard problem may attenuate the problem and thereby implement the efficient outcome. We find that, the frequency of the efficient outcome is significantly higher when both parties share the same identity than when they do not. However, when we induce a substantially weaker form of identity or increase an outside‐option payoff offered to the principal, the frequency of the efficient outcome diminishes considerably, even when the parties’ identities align perfectly. Our results have important implications for the design of nonpecuniary contract enforcement devices.
- 15 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1061-1081
Group Identity and the Moral Hazard Problem: Experimental Evidence
We experimentally examine how real group identity of parties (a principal and an agent) facing a moral hazard problem may attenuate the problem and thereby implement the efficient outcome. We find that, the frequency of the efficient outcome is significantly higher when both parties share the same identity than when they do not. However, when we induce a substantially weaker form of identity or increase an outside‐option payoff offered to the principal, the frequency of the efficient outcome diminishes considerably, even when the parties’ identities align perfectly. Our results have important implications for the design of nonpecuniary contract enforcement devices.
- 22 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 33 (7-8) , 549-563
Status Incentives and Performance
- 22 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 33 (7-8) , 549-563
Status Incentives and Performance
- 2 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (2) , 1374-1388
NON‐MONETARY INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY PUBLIC GOOD GAME
This study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free‐riding behavior. We use performance‐based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues. The treatments vary in terms of subjects' opportunities to anonymously assign(1)only the approval ratings to other group members, (2)only the disapproval ratings to other group members, and(3)either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members (but not both to the same group member), after they play a standard linear public good game. Despite the Nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments, the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points. The treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution. We discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations. (JELD03, H41, C72, C92)
- 2 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (2) , 1374-1388
NON‐MONETARY INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY PUBLIC GOOD GAME
This study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free‐riding behavior. We use performance‐based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues. The treatments vary in terms of subjects' opportunities to anonymously assign(1)only the approval ratings to other group members, (2)only the disapproval ratings to other group members, and(3)either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members (but not both to the same group member), after they play a standard linear public good game. Despite the Nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments, the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points. The treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution. We discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations. (JELD03, H41, C72, C92)
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 78 (3) , 954-975
Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience
Coordination games represent coordination problems that arise across social science disciplines. Focal points have been found to be an effective way to solve many of these coordination problems. We experimentally analyze the efficiency‐enhancing power of focal points in 2 × 2 Pareto‐ranked coordination games. We find that the power of focal labels, when attached to the Pareto‐efficient strategy, to promote efficiency critically depends upon the alternative strategy's label salience. When the relative salience of our focal labels is considerably weaker, focal labels mostly fail to raise expected efficiency beyond the mixed‐strategy prediction. But when the relative salience of our focal labels is markedly stronger, focal labels raise expected efficiency much beyond the mixed‐strategy prediction. Furthermore, we find that the efficiency‐enhancing power of focal labels decreases as a measure of risk‐dominance increases across games.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 78 (3) , 954-975
Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience
Coordination games represent coordination problems that arise across social science disciplines. Focal points have been found to be an effective way to solve many of these coordination problems. We experimentally analyze the efficiency‐enhancing power of focal points in 2 × 2 Pareto‐ranked coordination games. We find that the power of focal labels, when attached to the Pareto‐efficient strategy, to promote efficiency critically depends upon the alternative strategy's label salience. When the relative salience of our focal labels is considerably weaker, focal labels mostly fail to raise expected efficiency beyond the mixed‐strategy prediction. But when the relative salience of our focal labels is markedly stronger, focal labels raise expected efficiency much beyond the mixed‐strategy prediction. Furthermore, we find that the efficiency‐enhancing power of focal labels decreases as a measure of risk‐dominance increases across games.
- 29 June 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (2) , 534-550
CAN'T BUY ME LOVE? A FIELD EXPERIMENT EXPLORING THE TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN INCOME AND CASTE‐STATUS IN AN INDIAN MATRIMONIAL MARKET
A large body of literature depicts that status‐based discrimination is pervasive, but is silent on how economic incentive interacts with such discrimination. This study addresses this question by designing a field experiment in a reputable arranged marriage market that is prone to strong caste‐status‐based discrimination. We place newspaper advertisements of potential grooms by systematically varying their caste and income and focus on responses of higher‐caste females to lower‐caste males. The substantive finding is that despite the evidence of discrimination, discriminatory behavior of higher‐status females decreases with an increase in the advertised monthly income of lower‐status males.(JELC93, J12, J15)
- 29 June 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (2) , 534-550
CAN'T BUY ME LOVE? A FIELD EXPERIMENT EXPLORING THE TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN INCOME AND CASTE‐STATUS IN AN INDIAN MATRIMONIAL MARKET
A large body of literature depicts that status‐based discrimination is pervasive, but is silent on how economic incentive interacts with such discrimination. This study addresses this question by designing a field experiment in a reputable arranged marriage market that is prone to strong caste‐status‐based discrimination. We place newspaper advertisements of potential grooms by systematically varying their caste and income and focus on responses of higher‐caste females to lower‐caste males. The substantive finding is that despite the evidence of discrimination, discriminatory behavior of higher‐status females decreases with an increase in the advertised monthly income of lower‐status males.(JELC93, J12, J15)