Misato Sato
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Misato Sato has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hiroshi Kitamura
Kyoto Sangyo University
1 shared publication - Noriaki Matsushima
Osaka School of International Public Policy, University of Osaka, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 219-242
How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 219-242
Open AccessHow Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.