The Partition Lattice Value for Global Cooperative Games
Authors:
- José María Alonso-MeijideJAJosé María Alonso-Meijide
- Mikel Alvarez-MozosMAMikel Alvarez-Mozos
- M.G. Fiestras-JaneiroMFM.G. Fiestras-Janeiro
- Andrés Jiménez-LosadaAndrés Jiménez-Losada
Preprint
- 10 April 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We introduce a new value for global cooperative games that we call the Partition lattice value. A global cooperative game describes the overall utility that a set of agents generates depending on how they are organized in coalitions without specifying what part of that utility is each coalition responsible for. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to this family of games that may imply a big loss of information. Here we take an alternative approach motivated by how the Shapley value distributes payoffs in unanimity games. More precisely, we consider that each link in the lattice of partitions represents a contribution and use them to define our value. We provide three characterizations of the new value by means of five properties. The difference between the three characterizations is restricted to one property.Keywords
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