Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
- 29 November 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (2) , 376-401
Abstract
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single‐peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy‐free, but they differ on whether envy‐freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy‐freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy‐freeness on awards.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Universidad Nacional de San Luis (319502)
- Xunta de Galicia (ED431B 2019/34)
- Secretaría de Estado de Investigacion, Desarrollo e Innovacion (CEX2019‐000915‐S, ECO2017‐82241‐R, ECO2017‐83534‐P)
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (PIP 112‐200801‐00655)
- Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (SGR2017‐711)
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