Climate Policy and Moral Consumers*
Authors:
Open Access
- 14 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 123 (4) , 1190-1226
Abstract
This paper analyzes climate policy (in the form of emissions caps) in a multi‐country game when consumers have preferences with different degrees of morality. In the absence of climate policy, the larger the consumers’ degree of morality, the lower the energy consumption and climate damage. Moral consumer‐voters elect either emissions caps (direct democracy) under majority rule, or policymakers who then choose emissions caps (representative democracy). If voters take prices as given, then election‐winning emissions caps are tighter, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. If voters seek to influence prices in their favor, then strong strategic price effects are generated and the election‐winning emissions caps are less stringent, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. We also show that the morality of election‐winning policymakers differs from the morality of median voters. It is possible that a moral median voter elects a policymaker with zero morality who then implements an emissions cap that might be larger than emissions in the absence of climate policy.Keywords
This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
- Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental PolicyJournal of Political Economy, 2012
- Regulatory Environmental FederalismAnnual Review of Resource Economics, 2010
- Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open EconomiesEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 2010
- Kantian EquilibriumThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010
- Cross-Border Pollution, Terms of Trade, and WelfareEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 2008
- GREENHOUSE‐GAS EMISSION CONTROLS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY*International Economic Review, 2006
- International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting*The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2005
- Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approachJournal of Public Economics, 2003
- Cross-Border Externalities and Trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of PollutionCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1994
- Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: An Introduction to Kantian EconomicsEconomica, 1975