On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
Open Access
- 4 December 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 84 (1) , 83-97
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2014-52616-R)
- Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación (SEV-2015-0563)
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2014-53051)
- Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (SGR2014-515)
- Fundación Séneca (19320/PI/14)
- Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte (PR2015-00408)
- CONICET (PIP 112-200801-00655)
- Universidad Nacional de San Luis (319502)
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