On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions
Authors:
- 18 September 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-13
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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