IGItzhak Gilboa

Itzhak Gilboa

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Itzhak Gilboa has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Optimizing the application order under precedent-based decision-making

    by Rossella Argenziano, Itzhak Gilboa

    We study the decision problem of a Proposer who has a set of applications to submit for approval to an Authority and can choose an order of submission. The Proposer’s utility depends on the Authority’s rulings. The Authority has to be consistent with its past decisions, which we model using the nearest-neighbor criterion. If the Proposer’s utility increases with the set of approved applications, then any greedy strategy is optimal for her: She should submit any application that, given the current history, would be approved. However, if her utility increases with some approvals but decreases with others, the Proposer’s problem becomes significantly more complex. In the single-dimensional case, an optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time. In the general case, however, finding an optimal strategy is NP-hard. Thus, even in the absence of uncertainty or strategic behavior on the part of the Authority, evaluating the impact of current submissions on future outcomes can be computationally intractable.

  • Consumption of Values

    by Stefania Minardi, Fan Wang, Itzhak Gilboa

    Consumption decisions are partly influenced by values and ideologies. Consumers care about global warming, child labor, fair trade, etc. We develop an axiomatic model of intrinsic values—those that are carriers of meaning in and of themselves—and argue that they often introduce discontinuities near zero. For example, a vegetarian’s preferences would be discontinuous near zero amount of animal meat. We distinguish intrinsic values from instrumental ones, which are means rather than ends and serve as proxies for intrinsic values. We illustrate the relevance of our value-based model in different contexts, including equity concerns and prosocial behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The authors acknowledge support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grants ANR-11-IDEX-0003 and 11-LABX-0047], the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1443/20], the AXA Research Fund [Chair for Decision Sciences], the Foerder Institute at Tel-Aviv University, and the Sapir Center for Economic Development (Gilboa). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01632 .


  • Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility

    by Hervé Crès, Itzhak Gilboa, Nicolas Vieille

  • Schumpeter Lecture 2023: Rationality and Zero Risk

    by Itzhak Gilboa ⓡ, Stefania Minardi ⓡ, Fan Wang

    We adopt a definition of “rationality” as robustness to analysis: a mode of behavior is rational for a decision maker if she feels comfortable with it once it has been analyzed and explained to her. With this definition in mind, is it irrational to violate continuity axioms in one’s stated preferences? Specifically, does it make sense to avoid any positive probability of a negative outcome, not matter how small? Or, if a decision maker states such a “zero risk” policy, does she mean what she says? We propose to study this question axiomatically, asking which modes of behavior correspond to such statements. The baseline model evaluates a lottery by its expected utility and an extra additive term that measures the cost of deviating from a “zero risk” choice. A generalized version allows for multiple sets of principles, where the cost of risking a set of principles is added to the expected utility of a lottery. Stronger assumptions imply that the cost of violating a set of principles is additive in the individual costs. We develop a comparative behavioral analysis that allows to make interpersonal comparisons about the relative importance of principles.


  • Subjective Causality

    by Yotam Alexander, Itzhak Gilboa

    Dans quelles conditions les gens ont-ils tendance à croire qu’un phénomène x a été cause d’un phénomène ultérieur y ? Nous suggérons ici qu’un sens subjectif de causalité peut émerger si x explique y en tant qu’il correspond à une réduction par exemple de sa complexité au sens de Kolmogorov. Nous étudions également dans des configurations plus générales la relation existant entre l’explication et la prévisibilité entendues comme sources de ce sens subjectif de causalité.


  • Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games

    by Rossella Argenziano, Itzhak Gilboa

    A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x, y) . In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots. (JEL C72, C73)

  • Economic theories and their Dueling interpretations

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler

    The interpretation of economic theories varies along several dimensions. First, models can describe reality, illustrate a recommended state of affairs, or analyze the structure and implications of a theory. Second, theories can be used for prediction or for explanation. Third, theories can relate to reality in a rule-based or case-based manner. Fourth, theories can be statements about economic reality or about the act of economic reasoning itself. Fifth, theories can offer predictions or merely critique reasoning. We argue that theories are often open to multiple interpretations which can shift depending on the context in which the theory is applied, the surrounding economic literature, and the argument made by the interpreter.


  • Open Access

    What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson

    Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making-one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision-theoretic model. Indeed, in principal-agent settings, such justifications may be required-a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she used when valuing assets and a government may be asked whether a portfolio of rules and regulations is coherent. In this paper we ask which collections of uncertain-act evaluations can be simultaneously justified under the maxmin expected utility criterion by a single set of probabilities. We draw connections to the fundamental theorem of finance (for the special case of a Bayesian agent) and revealed-preference results.


  • Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler


  • No-betting Pareto under ambiguity

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson