SMStefania Minardi

Stefania Minardi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Stefania Minardi has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Consumption of Values

    by Stefania Minardi, Fan Wang, Itzhak Gilboa

    Consumption decisions are partly influenced by values and ideologies. Consumers care about global warming, child labor, fair trade, etc. We develop an axiomatic model of intrinsic values—those that are carriers of meaning in and of themselves—and argue that they often introduce discontinuities near zero. For example, a vegetarian’s preferences would be discontinuous near zero amount of animal meat. We distinguish intrinsic values from instrumental ones, which are means rather than ends and serve as proxies for intrinsic values. We illustrate the relevance of our value-based model in different contexts, including equity concerns and prosocial behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The authors acknowledge support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grants ANR-11-IDEX-0003 and 11-LABX-0047], the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1443/20], the AXA Research Fund [Chair for Decision Sciences], the Foerder Institute at Tel-Aviv University, and the Sapir Center for Economic Development (Gilboa). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01632 .


  • Time for memorable consumption

    by Stefania Minardi, Andrei Savochkin


  • Schumpeter Lecture 2023: Rationality and Zero Risk

    by Itzhak Gilboa ⓡ, Stefania Minardi ⓡ, Fan Wang

    We adopt a definition of “rationality” as robustness to analysis: a mode of behavior is rational for a decision maker if she feels comfortable with it once it has been analyzed and explained to her. With this definition in mind, is it irrational to violate continuity axioms in one’s stated preferences? Specifically, does it make sense to avoid any positive probability of a negative outcome, not matter how small? Or, if a decision maker states such a “zero risk” policy, does she mean what she says? We propose to study this question axiomatically, asking which modes of behavior correspond to such statements. The baseline model evaluates a lottery by its expected utility and an extra additive term that measures the cost of deviating from a “zero risk” choice. A generalized version allows for multiple sets of principles, where the cost of risking a set of principles is added to the expected utility of a lottery. Stronger assumptions imply that the cost of violating a set of principles is additive in the individual costs. We develop a comparative behavioral analysis that allows to make interpersonal comparisons about the relative importance of principles.


  • Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi, Larry Samuelson


  • Sources of Uncertainty and Subjective Prices

    by Veronica Cappelli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Stefania Minardi

    We develop a general framework to study source-dependent preferences in economic contexts. We behaviorally identify two key features. First, we drop the assumption of uniform uncertainty attitudes and allow for source-dependent attitudes. Second, we introduce subjective prices to compare outcomes across different sources. Our model evaluates profiles source-wise, by computing the source-dependent certainty equivalents; the latter are converted into the unit of account of a common source and then aggregated into a unique evaluation. By viewing time and location as instances of sources, we show that subjective discount factors and subjective exchange rates are emblematic examples of subjective prices. Finally, we use the model to explore the implications on optimal portfolio allocations and home bias.


  • States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged

    by Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler

    Models of decision-making under uncertainty gain much of their power from the specification of states so as to resolve all uncertainty. However, this specification can undermine the presumed observability of preferences on which axiomatic theories of decision-making are based. We introduce the notion of a contingency. Contingencies need not resolve all uncertainty, but preferences over functions from contingencies to outcomes are (at least in principle) observable. In sufficiently simple situations, states and contingencies coincide. In more challenging situations, the analyst must choose between sacrificing observability in order to harness the power of states that resolve all uncertainty, or preserving observability by working with contingencies. JEL Codes: D8.


  • Warm‐Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

    by Özgür Evren, Stefania Minardi