Stuart Glennan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Stuart Glennan has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carl F. Craver
Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
2 shared publications - Mark Povich
University of Rochester
2 shared publications - Erik Weber
CLPS-Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, UGent
1 shared publication - Federica Russo
Utrecht University
1 shared publication - Meinard Kuhlmann
Institute of Philosophy, Bielefeld University
1 shared publication - Phyllis Illari
University College London, London, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (2) , 50
A recipe for causal selection
Philosophers often hold that causes are things that make a difference to their effects, and on most versions of this view, any event has countless causes. Such a view counts the oxygen in the air as much as the lighted match as a cause of the fire, and counts the big bang as a cause of everything. In practice though most of these causes are ignored and only a few are mentioned. I take the causal selection problem to be that of identifying the principles that justify selecting some few factors as causes of an effect. In this paper I will argue for a set of principles, packaged as a recipe for constructing causal explanations. This recipe will show how causes must be selected as part of explanations, and that appropriate selections depend upon the audience and their goals. These parameters determine not just what causes are selected, but also what effects are identified as explanatory targets, and how causes are represented in models. I shall illustrate how the recipe works by applying it to the investigation of two aircraft accidents.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (2) , 50
Open AccessA recipe for causal selection
Philosophers often hold that causes are things that make a difference to their effects, and on most versions of this view, any event has countless causes. Such a view counts the oxygen in the air as much as the lighted match as a cause of the fire, and counts the big bang as a cause of everything. In practice though most of these causes are ignored and only a few are mentioned. I take the causal selection problem to be that of identifying the principles that justify selecting some few factors as causes of an effect. In this paper I will argue for a set of principles, packaged as a recipe for constructing causal explanations. This recipe will show how causes must be selected as part of explanations, and that appropriate selections depend upon the audience and their goals. These parameters determine not just what causes are selected, but also what effects are identified as explanatory targets, and how causes are represented in models. I shall illustrate how the recipe works by applying it to the investigation of two aircraft accidents.
- Open Access
- 19 January 2026
- Published by University of Victoria Libraries in KULA: Knowledge Creation, Dissemination, and Preservation Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-10
Conversation About Writing and Citing with Justice and Charity
Citational injustice often refers to the underrepresentation or misrepresentation of the work of members of marginalized populations within academic publications. The literature emphasises how these unjust practices reproduce and perpetuate known hierarchies and colonial power structures. While these are global trends that impact all academic disciplines, a full understanding of them requires considering how these practices play out within specific disciplinary contexts. In this conversation, Stuart Glennan and Federica Russo draw on their experiences as philosophers of science in the Global North to reflect on sources of citational injustice in their field. The conversation highlights how technologies have changed norms and habits regarding citational practices and points to charity as a key value to foster just practices, both in author and in reviewer roles. The authors consider how a path to more just citational practices may hinge on reconceiving what counts as a “good” philosophy paper.
- 19 January 2026
- Published by University of Victoria Libraries in KULA: Knowledge Creation, Dissemination, and Preservation Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-10
Open AccessConversation About Writing and Citing with Justice and Charity
Citational injustice often refers to the underrepresentation or misrepresentation of the work of members of marginalized populations within academic publications. The literature emphasises how these unjust practices reproduce and perpetuate known hierarchies and colonial power structures. While these are global trends that impact all academic disciplines, a full understanding of them requires considering how these practices play out within specific disciplinary contexts. In this conversation, Stuart Glennan and Federica Russo draw on their experiences as philosophers of science in the Global North to reflect on sources of citational injustice in their field. The conversation highlights how technologies have changed norms and habits regarding citational practices and points to charity as a key value to foster just practices, both in author and in reviewer roles. The authors consider how a path to more just citational practices may hinge on reconceiving what counts as a “good” philosophy paper.
- Open Access
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (5) , 1-22
On mechanisms, pathways and their models
Lauren Ross has recently argued that the current philosophical enthusiasm for mechanisms poses a threat to a proper understanding of the diversity of causal structures found in biology, and of the diversity of ways in which biologists explain biological phenomena. Ross argues that new mechanists have collapsed a variety of distinct causal structures within the confining analytical strictures of mechanism, and in so doing have failed to appreciate the diversity of concepts and strategies needed to describe and explain biological phenomena. Ross grants that mechanisms are important in biology, but argues that there are other causal structures, like pathways and cascades, that are distinct from mechanisms, and that require distinctive treatments. In this paper I’ll argue that Ross’s worries arise from a failure to distinguish ontological questions about causal structure from methodological questions about modeling and explanation. I’ll argue that a mechanistic ontology is compatible with conceptual and explanatory pluralism, and along the way I will offer a new analysis of pathways and pathway models that draws on some of Ross’s insights.
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (5) , 1-22
Open AccessOn mechanisms, pathways and their models
Lauren Ross has recently argued that the current philosophical enthusiasm for mechanisms poses a threat to a proper understanding of the diversity of causal structures found in biology, and of the diversity of ways in which biologists explain biological phenomena. Ross argues that new mechanists have collapsed a variety of distinct causal structures within the confining analytical strictures of mechanism, and in so doing have failed to appreciate the diversity of concepts and strategies needed to describe and explain biological phenomena. Ross grants that mechanisms are important in biology, but argues that there are other causal structures, like pathways and cascades, that are distinct from mechanisms, and that require distinctive treatments. In this paper I’ll argue that Ross’s worries arise from a failure to distinguish ontological questions about causal structure from methodological questions about modeling and explanation. I’ll argue that a mechanistic ontology is compatible with conceptual and explanatory pluralism, and along the way I will offer a new analysis of pathways and pathway models that draws on some of Ross’s insights.
- Open Access
- 13 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-234
The Mechanisms of Emergence
Emergentism is often imagined to be opposed to mechanism. If some phenomenon admits of mechanistic explanation, it is thought to be ipso facto not emergent. In this paper I argue to the contrary that emergence requires mechanism. Whenever some emergent phenomenon occurs, there is a mechanism responsible for its emergence. To make this case I show how mechanisms can explain four commonly held characteristics of emergent phenomena – dependence, autonomy, novelty and holism. By looking at the various kinds of emergence-generating mechanisms, it will be possible to classify different kinds of emergent phenomena by the particular features of the mechanisms that generate them, and so to bring some order to diversity of phenomena that we call emergent.
- 13 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-234
Open AccessThe Mechanisms of Emergence
Emergentism is often imagined to be opposed to mechanism. If some phenomenon admits of mechanistic explanation, it is thought to be ipso facto not emergent. In this paper I argue to the contrary that emergence requires mechanism. Whenever some emergent phenomenon occurs, there is a mechanism responsible for its emergence. To make this case I show how mechanisms can explain four commonly held characteristics of emergent phenomena – dependence, autonomy, novelty and holism. By looking at the various kinds of emergence-generating mechanisms, it will be possible to classify different kinds of emergent phenomena by the particular features of the mechanisms that generate them, and so to bring some order to diversity of phenomena that we call emergent.
- 20 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (2) , 503-519
The Object-Activity Theory of Events
- 20 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (2) , 503-519
The Object-Activity Theory of Events
- Open Access
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (2) , 143-161
Six Theses on Mechanisms and Mechanistic Science
In this paper we identify six theses that constitute core results of philosophical investigation into the nature of mechanisms, and of the role that the search for and identification of mechanisms play in the sciences. These theses represent the fruits of the body of research that is now often called New Mechanism. We concisely present the main arguments for these theses. In the literature, these arguments are scattered and often implicit. Our analysis can guide future research in many ways: it provides critics of New Mechanism with clear targets, it can reduce misunderstandings, it can clarify differences of opinion among New Mechanists and it helps to define a research agenda for New Mechanists.
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (2) , 143-161
Open AccessSix Theses on Mechanisms and Mechanistic Science
In this paper we identify six theses that constitute core results of philosophical investigation into the nature of mechanisms, and of the role that the search for and identification of mechanisms play in the sciences. These theses represent the fruits of the body of research that is now often called New Mechanism. We concisely present the main arguments for these theses. In the literature, these arguments are scattered and often implicit. Our analysis can guide future research in many ways: it provides critics of New Mechanism with clear targets, it can reduce misunderstandings, it can clarify differences of opinion among New Mechanists and it helps to define a research agenda for New Mechanists.
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Top Cited PapersConstitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 3 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (12) , 11439-11462
Corporeal composition
- 3 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (12) , 11439-11462
Corporeal composition
- 21 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Production and Relevance
This chapter offers an account of mechanistic production, which is contrasted with Salmon and Dowe’s theory of physical production. It provides a new analysis of the nature of events, and an account of how those events can form productive causal chains. This account identifies three distinct kinds of production: constitutive, precipitating, and chained. The chapter shows how the New Mechanist account addresses a number of standard problems for theories of causation, and for mechanistic theories in particular. These include how mechanistic production could be grounded in fundamental physics, how productive theories can explain causation by omission, prevention, and disconnection, how to explain causal relevance without appeal to counterfactuals, and how to understand the relation between production and constitution in inter-level causal claims. The chapter concludes by discussing how the New Mechanist approach to causation and constitution leads to a sensible account of the nature and limits of reduction and emergence.
- 21 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Production and Relevance
This chapter offers an account of mechanistic production, which is contrasted with Salmon and Dowe’s theory of physical production. It provides a new analysis of the nature of events, and an account of how those events can form productive causal chains. This account identifies three distinct kinds of production: constitutive, precipitating, and chained. The chapter shows how the New Mechanist account addresses a number of standard problems for theories of causation, and for mechanistic theories in particular. These include how mechanistic production could be grounded in fundamental physics, how productive theories can explain causation by omission, prevention, and disconnection, how to explain causal relevance without appeal to counterfactuals, and how to understand the relation between production and constitution in inter-level causal claims. The chapter concludes by discussing how the New Mechanist approach to causation and constitution leads to a sensible account of the nature and limits of reduction and emergence.