Mark Povich
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Mark Povich has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carl F. Craver
Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, USA
3 shared publications - Stuart Glennan
Butler University, Indianapolis, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (6)
Neo-conventionalism and the imaginative origin of haecceitistic intuitions
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (6)
Neo-conventionalism and the imaginative origin of haecceitistic intuitions
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (2) , 416-425
(A little) quantified modal logic for normativists
Burgess (‘Quinus ab omni nævo vindicatus’), building on Quine (‘Reference and modality’), convincingly argued that claims in quantified modal logic cannot be understood as synonymous with or logically equivalent to claims about the analyticity of certain sentences. According to modal normativism, metaphysically necessary claims instead express or convey our actual semantic rules. In this paper, I show how the normativist can use Sidelle’s neglected work on rigidity to account for two important phenomena in quantified modal logic: the necessity of identity and the substitutivity of identicals into modal contexts.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (2) , 416-425
(A little) quantified modal logic for normativists
Burgess (‘Quinus ab omni nævo vindicatus’), building on Quine (‘Reference and modality’), convincingly argued that claims in quantified modal logic cannot be understood as synonymous with or logically equivalent to claims about the analyticity of certain sentences. According to modal normativism, metaphysically necessary claims instead express or convey our actual semantic rules. In this paper, I show how the normativist can use Sidelle’s neglected work on rigidity to account for two important phenomena in quantified modal logic: the necessity of identity and the substitutivity of identicals into modal contexts.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Philosophia Mathematica
- Vol. 32 (3) , 332-357
Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence
In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual-rule account of thin existence.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Philosophia Mathematica
- Vol. 32 (3) , 332-357
Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence
In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual-rule account of thin existence.
- Open Access
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Copernicus Center Foundation in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
- No. 74,p. 171-223
A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Copernicus Center Foundation in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
- No. 74,p. 171-223
Open AccessA conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (3) , 1-4
Review of Stavros Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos’s Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? - Stavros Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos , Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2022), 250 pp. $99.99 (hardback)
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (3) , 1-4
Review of Stavros Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos’s Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? - Stavros Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos , Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2022), 250 pp. $99.99 (hardback)
- 12 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 132 (526) , 479-492
A Scheme Foiled: A Critique of Baron’s Account of Extra-mathematical Explanation
Extra-mathematical explanations explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. Philosophers disagree about whether there are extra-mathematical explanations, the correct account of them if they exist, and their implications (for example, for the philosophy of scientific explanation and for the metaphysics of mathematics) (Baker 2005, 2009; Bangu 2008; Colyvan 1998; Craver and Povich 2017; Lange 2013, 2016, 2018; Mancosu 2008; Povich 2019, 2020; Steiner 1978). In this discussion, I present three desiderata for any account of extra-mathematical explanation and argue that Baron’s (2020) U-Counterfactual theory fails to meet each of them. I conclude with some reasons for pessimism that a successful account will be forthcoming.
- 12 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 132 (526) , 479-492
A Scheme Foiled: A Critique of Baron’s Account of Extra-mathematical Explanation
Extra-mathematical explanations explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. Philosophers disagree about whether there are extra-mathematical explanations, the correct account of them if they exist, and their implications (for example, for the philosophy of scientific explanation and for the metaphysics of mathematics) (Baker 2005, 2009; Bangu 2008; Colyvan 1998; Craver and Povich 2017; Lange 2013, 2016, 2018; Mancosu 2008; Povich 2019, 2020; Steiner 1978). In this discussion, I present three desiderata for any account of extra-mathematical explanation and argue that Baron’s (2020) U-Counterfactual theory fails to meet each of them. I conclude with some reasons for pessimism that a successful account will be forthcoming.
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Top Cited PapersConstitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 28 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 11 (2) , 1-17
Information and explanation: an inconsistent triad and solution
- 28 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 11 (2) , 1-17
Information and explanation: an inconsistent triad and solution
- 27 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 10 (3) , 1-10
Modality and constitution in distinctively mathematical explanations
- 27 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 10 (3) , 1-10
Modality and constitution in distinctively mathematical explanations