Nan Hu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Nan Hu has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Baolei Qi
School of Management , Xi’an Jiaotong University , Xi’an , Shaanxi , P.R. China
1 shared publication- Baolei Qi
Xi’an Jiaotong University
1 shared publication Gaoliang Tian
School of Management , Xi’an Jiaotong University , Xi’an , Shaanxi , P.R. China
1 shared publication- Gaoliang Tian
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
1 shared publication Lee Yao
The Butt College of Business, Loyola University , New Orleans , USA
1 shared publication- Ling Liu
College of Business, University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire, Eau Claire, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 20 (3) , 334-347
The impact of ineffective internal control on the value relevance of accounting information
This paper investigates the value relevance of accounting information in the presence of ineffective internal control (IIC). Based on Ohlson’s valuation model, this paper first documents that IIC can directly affect a firm’s market value after control cost of capital, corporate governance, and other, value-relevant variables. Second, this paper finds that the value relevance of earnings and book value in determining a firm’s market value are significantly reduced. Collectively, the results of this paper indicate that the effectiveness of internal controls can directly affect a firm’s market value and the value relevance of accounting information.
- 4 April 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 20 (3) , 334-347
The impact of ineffective internal control on the value relevance of accounting information
This paper investigates the value relevance of accounting information in the presence of ineffective internal control (IIC). Based on Ohlson’s valuation model, this paper first documents that IIC can directly affect a firm’s market value after control cost of capital, corporate governance, and other, value-relevant variables. Second, this paper finds that the value relevance of earnings and book value in determining a firm’s market value are significantly reduced. Collectively, the results of this paper indicate that the effectiveness of internal controls can directly affect a firm’s market value and the value relevance of accounting information.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.
- 24 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
- Vol. 23 (3) , 187-207
Can Government Policies Induce Earnings Management Behavior? ‐Evidence from Chinese Public Listed Firms
Earnings management behavior is a concern of standard setters, regulators, and investors. This study predicts that government policies can induce earnings management behavior. Based on a sample of 8,765 firm years ranging from 2002 to 2009, this study uses two methods to detect the effect of government policies on managers' earnings management behavior. One is the earnings distribution method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the other is the modified Jones model proposed by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We find that policies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can induce managers of listed firms to engage in earnings management to either avoid negative consequences (e.g., delisting) or to meet requirements (e.g., refinancing). So, although the purpose of government is to protect investors as well as to promote the healthy development of the securities market, its policies are a double‐edged sword: if there is no strict and effective control mechanism, government policies can harm investors and disturb the normal order of the securities market.