Matthew Amengual
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Matthew Amengual has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Greg Distelhorst
Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources and the Rotman School of Management University of Toronto Toronto Ontario Canada
2 shared publications - Tim Bartley
Georgetown University
2 shared publications - Akshay Mangla
Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 shared publication - Alessandro Guasti
ESADE Business School Ramon Llull University Barcelona Spain
1 shared publication Alex Rustler
1 shared publication- Alexander Rustler
Said Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Industrial Relations
- Vol. 64 (4) , 739-753
What Jobs Do Workers Want? Worker Preferences in Global Value Chains
What do workers in global value chains (GVCs) consider a good job? Research on work in GVCs largely studies compliance with standards set from the top‐down rather than worker preferences. Understanding worker preferences is crucial because workers are the intended beneficiaries of governance institutions; policies better aligned to their preferences could enjoy greater legitimacy and effectiveness. To explore what GVC workers want, we embedded an experiment in an original survey of 2500 workers in 50 formal Moroccan apparel factories integrated into GVCs. These workers highly valued jobs with characteristics that reduced their exposure to physical risks and provided job stability. They also had strong preferences for jobs with supervisors that treated workers respectfully. By contrast, worker preferences for wage increases available in the Moroccan context were weak, especially when compared with non‐wage features. Our results suggests that when wages are compressed and extended working hours is the main way to increase earnings, preferences for non‐wage attributes may dominate. We also find more similarities than differences between men and women workers; although women place greater value on respectful supervision, safety and childcare benefits, their overall preferences closely track those of men. These findings provide novel evidence to inform efforts to improve jobs in GVCs.
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Industrial Relations
- Vol. 64 (4) , 739-753
Open AccessWhat Jobs Do Workers Want? Worker Preferences in Global Value Chains
What do workers in global value chains (GVCs) consider a good job? Research on work in GVCs largely studies compliance with standards set from the top‐down rather than worker preferences. Understanding worker preferences is crucial because workers are the intended beneficiaries of governance institutions; policies better aligned to their preferences could enjoy greater legitimacy and effectiveness. To explore what GVC workers want, we embedded an experiment in an original survey of 2500 workers in 50 formal Moroccan apparel factories integrated into GVCs. These workers highly valued jobs with characteristics that reduced their exposure to physical risks and provided job stability. They also had strong preferences for jobs with supervisors that treated workers respectfully. By contrast, worker preferences for wage increases available in the Moroccan context were weak, especially when compared with non‐wage features. Our results suggests that when wages are compressed and extended working hours is the main way to increase earnings, preferences for non‐wage attributes may dominate. We also find more similarities than differences between men and women workers; although women place greater value on respectful supervision, safety and childcare benefits, their overall preferences closely track those of men. These findings provide novel evidence to inform efforts to improve jobs in GVCs.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 253-280
Moralized global markets and contested fields: perceptions of supply chain controversies in Germany
How do people judge the moral boundaries of markets? While scholars have mostly addressed this question in local/national contexts, we ask about perceptions of environmental, labor, and human rights abuses in global supply chains. Extending theories of moralized markets as contested fields, we develop a framework centered on competing claims of corporations and NGOs. Using a conjoint survey experiment in Germany, we examine the conditions under which individuals want to ban products because of exploitation or environmental degradation in the production process. Consistent with a contested fields approach, strategic claims of both corporations and NGOs influence judgments about bans—in opposite directions—and anti-corporate critiques counteract the effects of corporate promises to some degree. Socio-political attitudes structure judgments about bans, though many corporate and advocacy messages resonate similarly across political divides. Open-ended responses further reveal the collective imagination of problems, products, and claims that animate this kind of moralized market.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 253-280
Open AccessMoralized global markets and contested fields: perceptions of supply chain controversies in Germany
How do people judge the moral boundaries of markets? While scholars have mostly addressed this question in local/national contexts, we ask about perceptions of environmental, labor, and human rights abuses in global supply chains. Extending theories of moralized markets as contested fields, we develop a framework centered on competing claims of corporations and NGOs. Using a conjoint survey experiment in Germany, we examine the conditions under which individuals want to ban products because of exploitation or environmental degradation in the production process. Consistent with a contested fields approach, strategic claims of both corporations and NGOs influence judgments about bans—in opposite directions—and anti-corporate critiques counteract the effects of corporate promises to some degree. Socio-political attitudes structure judgments about bans, though many corporate and advocacy messages resonate similarly across political divides. Open-ended responses further reveal the collective imagination of problems, products, and claims that animate this kind of moralized market.
- Open Access
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 46 (11) , 2663-2689
Cooperation and punishment in managing social performance: Labor standards in the Gap Inc. supply chain
Research Summary: Corporate social performance depends not only on a firm's behavior but also on the behavior of its suppliers. What management strategies improve the social performance of suppliers? Scholarship on inter‐firm relations and regulatory governance debates the efficacy of threatening to penalize suppliers, compared with more cooperative approaches. This study uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effects of typical actions to manage supplier social performance, both with and without threatened penalties. Suppliers improved social performance—increasing their probability of passing labor audits by 22 percentage points—only when regulatory actions included a threatened penalty: to discontinue business. Suppliers improved most in response to threatened penalties when they faced higher levels of supply chain competition or were engaged in longer‐term commercial relationships with the buyer.Managerial Summary: How can multinationals improve labor standards in their suppliers around the world? We compared two approaches at the clothing retailer Gap Inc. When Gap did not threaten to discontinue business with low‐performing suppliers, we found no improvement in labor compliance when Gap issued failing compliance grades. However, once Gap began threatening to discontinue business with its lowest‐compliance suppliers, failing suppliers showed marked improvement in labor compliance. Failing suppliers improved most when (a) they faced high competition within their product category, and (b) when they were in longer‐term commercial relationships with the buyer. Our findings suggest buyers should use a combination of both threats and cooperation with suppliers to improve labor standards in global supply chains.
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 46 (11) , 2663-2689
Open AccessCooperation and punishment in managing social performance: Labor standards in the Gap Inc. supply chain
Research Summary: Corporate social performance depends not only on a firm's behavior but also on the behavior of its suppliers. What management strategies improve the social performance of suppliers? Scholarship on inter‐firm relations and regulatory governance debates the efficacy of threatening to penalize suppliers, compared with more cooperative approaches. This study uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effects of typical actions to manage supplier social performance, both with and without threatened penalties. Suppliers improved social performance—increasing their probability of passing labor audits by 22 percentage points—only when regulatory actions included a threatened penalty: to discontinue business. Suppliers improved most in response to threatened penalties when they faced higher levels of supply chain competition or were engaged in longer‐term commercial relationships with the buyer.Managerial Summary: How can multinationals improve labor standards in their suppliers around the world? We compared two approaches at the clothing retailer Gap Inc. When Gap did not threaten to discontinue business with low‐performing suppliers, we found no improvement in labor compliance when Gap issued failing compliance grades. However, once Gap began threatening to discontinue business with its lowest‐compliance suppliers, failing suppliers showed marked improvement in labor compliance. Failing suppliers improved most when (a) they faced high competition within their product category, and (b) when they were in longer‐term commercial relationships with the buyer. Our findings suggest buyers should use a combination of both threats and cooperation with suppliers to improve labor standards in global supply chains.
- Open Access
- 4 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 185 (1) , 49-74
The ‘Court of Public Opinion:’ Public Perceptions of Business Involvement in Human Rights Violations
Public pressure is essential for providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with motivation to follow the standards of human rights conduct set in soft-law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. But how does the public judge MNE involvement in human rights violations? We empirically answer this question drawing on an original survey of American adults. We asked respondents to judge over 12,000 randomly generated scenarios in which MNEs may be considered to have been involved in human rights violations. Our findings reveal substantial gaps between public judgments and the standards set in soft law and the normative literature. We identify the attributes of episodes of human rights violations involving MNEs that influence public judgments, including the relationship between the MNE and the perpetrator, the practice of due diligence, and the type of abuse. These results provide insights as to when we might expect public pressure to drive MNE compliance with soft-law instruments, and they direct attention to specific standards that will likely require stronger, ‘hard’ law approaches or broader efforts to shift the public’s view.
- 4 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 185 (1) , 49-74
Open AccessThe ‘Court of Public Opinion:’ Public Perceptions of Business Involvement in Human Rights Violations
Public pressure is essential for providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with motivation to follow the standards of human rights conduct set in soft-law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. But how does the public judge MNE involvement in human rights violations? We empirically answer this question drawing on an original survey of American adults. We asked respondents to judge over 12,000 randomly generated scenarios in which MNEs may be considered to have been involved in human rights violations. Our findings reveal substantial gaps between public judgments and the standards set in soft law and the normative literature. We identify the attributes of episodes of human rights violations involving MNEs that influence public judgments, including the relationship between the MNE and the perpetrator, the practice of due diligence, and the type of abuse. These results provide insights as to when we might expect public pressure to drive MNE compliance with soft-law instruments, and they direct attention to specific standards that will likely require stronger, ‘hard’ law approaches or broader efforts to shift the public’s view.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Sociological Review
- Vol. 87 (3) , 383-414
Global Markets, Corporate Assurances, and the Legitimacy of State Intervention: Perceptions of Distant Labor and Environmental Problems
Collective perceptions of harm and impropriety channel the evolution of capitalism, as shown by research on the moral boundaries of markets. But how are boundaries perceived when harms are distant and observers face competing claims from advocacy organizations and corporations? These conditions are particularly salient in global supply chains, where private voluntary initiatives have been formed to address labor exploitation and environmental degradation. We argue that state intervention is now on the rise and that popular judgments about state intervention carry new insights for the sociology of markets, morality, policy, and globalization. Analyzing data from a conjoint survey experiment, we find that distant labor and environmental problems (e.g., forced labor, natural resource depletion) provoke varied levels of interest in state intervention as well as different justifications for state intervention. We also find an asymmetry of influence by strategic actors: transnational advocacy frames shape judgments to some degree, but they fall flat or backfire among conservatives. Corporate promises of reform reduce the perceived importance of state intervention—across political-ideological divides and regardless of credibility. Moving beyond stylized pro-/anti-trade attitudes, these findings reveal implicit logics of a contested moral field and the legitimacy of state intervention at a formative moment.
- 29 April 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Sociological Review
- Vol. 87 (3) , 383-414
Open AccessGlobal Markets, Corporate Assurances, and the Legitimacy of State Intervention: Perceptions of Distant Labor and Environmental Problems
Collective perceptions of harm and impropriety channel the evolution of capitalism, as shown by research on the moral boundaries of markets. But how are boundaries perceived when harms are distant and observers face competing claims from advocacy organizations and corporations? These conditions are particularly salient in global supply chains, where private voluntary initiatives have been formed to address labor exploitation and environmental degradation. We argue that state intervention is now on the rise and that popular judgments about state intervention carry new insights for the sociology of markets, morality, policy, and globalization. Analyzing data from a conjoint survey experiment, we find that distant labor and environmental problems (e.g., forced labor, natural resource depletion) provoke varied levels of interest in state intervention as well as different justifications for state intervention. We also find an asymmetry of influence by strategic actors: transnational advocacy frames shape judgments to some degree, but they fall flat or backfire among conservatives. Corporate promises of reform reduce the perceived importance of state intervention—across political-ideological divides and regardless of credibility. Moving beyond stylized pro-/anti-trade attitudes, these findings reveal implicit logics of a contested moral field and the legitimacy of state intervention at a formative moment.
- Open Access
- 6 November 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The ‘Court of Public Opinion:’ Public Perceptions of Business Involvement in Human Rights Violations
Public pressure is essential for providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with motivation to follow the standards of human rights conduct set in soft law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. But how does the public judge MNE involvement in human rights violations? We empirically answer this question drawing on an original survey of American adults. We asked respondents to judge over 12,000 randomly generated scenarios in which MNEs may be considered to have been involved in human rights violations. Our findings reveal substantial gaps between public judgments and the standards set in soft law and the normative literature. We identify the attributes of episodes of human rights violations involving MNEs that influence public judgments, including the relationship between the MNE and the perpetrator, the practice of due diligence, and the type of abuse. These results provide insights as to when we might expect public pressure to drive MNE compliance with soft law instruments, and they direct attention to specific standards that will likely require stronger, ‘hard’ law approaches or broader efforts to shift the public’s view
- 6 November 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe ‘Court of Public Opinion:’ Public Perceptions of Business Involvement in Human Rights Violations
Public pressure is essential for providing multinational enterprises (MNEs) with motivation to follow the standards of human rights conduct set in soft law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. But how does the public judge MNE involvement in human rights violations? We empirically answer this question drawing on an original survey of American adults. We asked respondents to judge over 12,000 randomly generated scenarios in which MNEs may be considered to have been involved in human rights violations. Our findings reveal substantial gaps between public judgments and the standards set in soft law and the normative literature. We identify the attributes of episodes of human rights violations involving MNEs that influence public judgments, including the relationship between the MNE and the perpetrator, the practice of due diligence, and the type of abuse. These results provide insights as to when we might expect public pressure to drive MNE compliance with soft law instruments, and they direct attention to specific standards that will likely require stronger, ‘hard’ law approaches or broader efforts to shift the public’s view
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (8) , 5032-5051
True Motives: Prosocial and Instrumental Justifications for Behavioral Change in Organizations
When organizations want their employees to adopt behaviors that advance prosocial and instrumental aims, which motive should they express? A groundswell of recent work suggests that highlighting prosocial actions inspires and motivates employees. Building on this work, we embed a field experiment in the context of an organizational change initiative (Study 1). A large university sought to change the behavior of administrative employees who purchase office supplies, encouraging them to place orders of at least $50, referred to as “bundling.” We exploit the fact that the organization could justify the same behavior in contrasting ways. We randomly assign employees to view either a prosocial (“limiting pollution”), instrumental (“limiting costs”), or mixed motive (“limiting pollution and limiting costs”) for caring about bundling each time they access the organization’s procurement system. We then evaluate changes in employees’ behavior by comparing a six-month baseline to a six-month experimental period, covering 10,169 purchases in 556 offices. Contrary to expectations from related research, the instrumental motive was most effective for changing behavior, leading to significantly more bundling than the prosocial motive. Two follow-up vignette experiments probe theoretical mechanisms. They indicate that an instrumental motive seems more genuine (i.e., reflecting the organization’s true motive) than a prosocial motive (Study 2) and that seeming genuine increases individuals’ intention to bundle (Study 3). This research reveals that prosocial justifications can be less effective than instrumental ones and suggests that perceptions of genuineness may shape the effectiveness of behavioral change efforts in organizations. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (8) , 5032-5051
True Motives: Prosocial and Instrumental Justifications for Behavioral Change in Organizations
When organizations want their employees to adopt behaviors that advance prosocial and instrumental aims, which motive should they express? A groundswell of recent work suggests that highlighting prosocial actions inspires and motivates employees. Building on this work, we embed a field experiment in the context of an organizational change initiative (Study 1). A large university sought to change the behavior of administrative employees who purchase office supplies, encouraging them to place orders of at least $50, referred to as “bundling.” We exploit the fact that the organization could justify the same behavior in contrasting ways. We randomly assign employees to view either a prosocial (“limiting pollution”), instrumental (“limiting costs”), or mixed motive (“limiting pollution and limiting costs”) for caring about bundling each time they access the organization’s procurement system. We then evaluate changes in employees’ behavior by comparing a six-month baseline to a six-month experimental period, covering 10,169 purchases in 556 offices. Contrary to expectations from related research, the instrumental motive was most effective for changing behavior, leading to significantly more bundling than the prosocial motive. Two follow-up vignette experiments probe theoretical mechanisms. They indicate that an instrumental motive seems more genuine (i.e., reflecting the organization’s true motive) than a prosocial motive (Study 2) and that seeming genuine increases individuals’ intention to bundle (Study 3). This research reveals that prosocial justifications can be less effective than instrumental ones and suggests that perceptions of genuineness may shape the effectiveness of behavioral change efforts in organizations. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis.
- 26 December 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 73 (4) , 817-840
Global Purchasing as Labor Regulation: The Missing Middle
Do purchasing practices support or undermine the regulation of labor standards in global supply chains? This study offers the first analysis of the full range of supply chain regulatory efforts, integrating records of factory labor audits with purchase order microdata. Studying an apparel and equipment retailer with a strong reputation for addressing labor conditions in its suppliers, the authors show that the retailer persuaded factories to improve and terminated factories with poor labor compliance. However, the authors also find that purchase orders did not increase when labor standards improved. If anything, factories whose standards worsened tended to see their orders increase. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this “missing middle” in incentives for compliance appears unrelated to any cost advantage of noncompliant factories. Instead, lack of flexibility in supplier relationships created obstacles to reallocating orders in response to compliance findings.
- 26 December 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 73 (4) , 817-840
Global Purchasing as Labor Regulation: The Missing Middle
Do purchasing practices support or undermine the regulation of labor standards in global supply chains? This study offers the first analysis of the full range of supply chain regulatory efforts, integrating records of factory labor audits with purchase order microdata. Studying an apparel and equipment retailer with a strong reputation for addressing labor conditions in its suppliers, the authors show that the retailer persuaded factories to improve and terminated factories with poor labor compliance. However, the authors also find that purchase orders did not increase when labor standards improved. If anything, factories whose standards worsened tended to see their orders increase. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this “missing middle” in incentives for compliance appears unrelated to any cost advantage of noncompliant factories. Instead, lack of flexibility in supplier relationships created obstacles to reallocating orders in response to compliance findings.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 11 (4) , 404-421
Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions
Competing accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics agree that firms influence regulations, but make contrasting predictions for which firms are most likely to oppose regulations. Using survey data from employers in 19,000 manufacturing firms in 82 developing countries, we examine the determinants of employers’ opinions toward labor regulation. In contrast to the predictions of optimistic theories of globalization, we find that (i) firms that export are more likely to have negative opinions toward labor regulation than those that sell domestically, and (ii) firms that receive foreign direct investment have similar views as firms that rely only on domestic capital. Further, we show that systematic differences in employers’ opinions depend on the intensity of the competitive pressures they face and their use of skilled workers. In doing so, we provide an empirically grounded account of the heterogeneous opinions of key actors in economic policymaking in developing countries.
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 11 (4) , 404-421
Open AccessWho opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions
Competing accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics agree that firms influence regulations, but make contrasting predictions for which firms are most likely to oppose regulations. Using survey data from employers in 19,000 manufacturing firms in 82 developing countries, we examine the determinants of employers’ opinions toward labor regulation. In contrast to the predictions of optimistic theories of globalization, we find that (i) firms that export are more likely to have negative opinions toward labor regulation than those that sell domestically, and (ii) firms that receive foreign direct investment have similar views as firms that rely only on domestic capital. Further, we show that systematic differences in employers’ opinions depend on the intensity of the competitive pressures they face and their use of skilled workers. In doing so, we provide an empirically grounded account of the heterogeneous opinions of key actors in economic policymaking in developing countries.
- 11 July 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 69 (5) , 1056-1080
Reinforcing the State
Research on global programs to regulate labor standards has emphasized interactions between transnational and state regulatory institutions. If transnational initiatives can make state institutions more relevant, they have the potential to reinforce, rather than displace, state labor regulation. Through a study of the Indonesia-based program of a leading initiative to improve working conditions in the garment industry, Better Work, this article identifies the conditions under which transnational regulations reinforce domestic ones. Drawing on two case studies comparing regulations governing fixed-term contracts and minimum wage renegotiations in four Indonesian districts, the authors find that reinforcement is likely when two conditions jointly occur: unions mobilize to activate state institutions, and transnational regulators have support to resolve ambiguities in formal rules in ways that require firms to engage with constraining institutions. The authors further test the findings through a quantitative analysis of factory participation in state-supervised wage renegotiations. The findings reveal opportunities and constraints to designing global programs that can both improve factory-level standards and support the functioning of state labor market institutions.
- 11 July 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 69 (5) , 1056-1080
Reinforcing the State
Research on global programs to regulate labor standards has emphasized interactions between transnational and state regulatory institutions. If transnational initiatives can make state institutions more relevant, they have the potential to reinforce, rather than displace, state labor regulation. Through a study of the Indonesia-based program of a leading initiative to improve working conditions in the garment industry, Better Work, this article identifies the conditions under which transnational regulations reinforce domestic ones. Drawing on two case studies comparing regulations governing fixed-term contracts and minimum wage renegotiations in four Indonesian districts, the authors find that reinforcement is likely when two conditions jointly occur: unions mobilize to activate state institutions, and transnational regulators have support to resolve ambiguities in formal rules in ways that require firms to engage with constraining institutions. The authors further test the findings through a quantitative analysis of factory participation in state-supervised wage renegotiations. The findings reveal opportunities and constraints to designing global programs that can both improve factory-level standards and support the functioning of state labor market institutions.