Richard Zach
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Richard Zach has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Matthias Baaz
TU Wien
6 shared publications - Erich H. Reck
University of California at Riverside
2 shared publications - Georg Moser
University of Innsbruck
2 shared publications - Georg Schiemer
University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
2 shared publications - Landon D. C. Elkind
Western Kentucky University
2 shared publications - Norbert Preining
Vienna University of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Hilbert's Program and Infinity
The primary aim of Hilbert's proof theory was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using finitary means only. Hilbert's strategy for doing this was to eliminate the infinite (in the form of unbounded quantifiers) from formalized proofs using the so-called epsilon substitution method. The result is a formal proof which does not mention or appeal to infinite objects or "concept-formations." However, as later developments showed, the consistency proof itself lets the infinite back into proof theory, through a back door, so to speak. The paper outlines the epsilon substitution method as an example of how proof-theoretic constructions "eliminate the infinite" from formal proofs, and how they aim to establish conservativity and consistency. The proof also requires an argument that this proof theoretic construction always works. This second argument, however, requires possibly infinitary reasoning at the meta-level, using induction on ordinal notations.
Open AccessHilbert's Program and Infinity
The primary aim of Hilbert's proof theory was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using finitary means only. Hilbert's strategy for doing this was to eliminate the infinite (in the form of unbounded quantifiers) from formalized proofs using the so-called epsilon substitution method. The result is a formal proof which does not mention or appeal to infinite objects or "concept-formations." However, as later developments showed, the consistency proof itself lets the infinite back into proof theory, through a back door, so to speak. The paper outlines the epsilon substitution method as an example of how proof-theoretic constructions "eliminate the infinite" from formal proofs, and how they aim to establish conservativity and consistency. The proof also requires an argument that this proof theoretic construction always works. This second argument, however, requires possibly infinitary reasoning at the meta-level, using induction on ordinal notations.
- Open Access
Some Unpublished Letters by Gödel and von Neumann in the Fraenkel Archive
Several letters by Kurt Gödel and Johann (János) von Neumann from the (so far uncatalogued) archive of Abraham (Adolf) Fraenkel at the National Library of Israel are published and discussed. These include two fragments by Gödel of special interest, since they concern the relationship between Gödel's incompleteness theorem and work by Herbrand, Presburger, and Zermelo, as well as a long letter from von Neumann from 1923 explaining his own approach to the axiomatization of set theory.
Open AccessSome Unpublished Letters by Gödel and von Neumann in the Fraenkel Archive
Several letters by Kurt Gödel and Johann (János) von Neumann from the (so far uncatalogued) archive of Abraham (Adolf) Fraenkel at the National Library of Israel are published and discussed. These include two fragments by Gödel of special interest, since they concern the relationship between Gödel's incompleteness theorem and work by Herbrand, Presburger, and Zermelo, as well as a long letter from von Neumann from 1923 explaining his own approach to the axiomatization of set theory.
- Open Access
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika/Nicolaus Copernicus University in Logic and Logical Philosophy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 161-179
An Epimorphism between Fine and Ferguson’s Matrices for Angell’s AC
Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC has been shown to be characterized by a 9-valued matrix NC by Ferguson, and by a 16-valued matrix by Fine. It is shown that the former is the image of a surjective homomorphism from the latter, i.e., an epimorphic image. Some candidate 7-valued matrices are ruled out as characteristic of AC. Whether matrices with fewer than 9 values exist remains an open question. The results were obtained with the help of the MUltlog system for investigating finite-valued logics; the results serve as an example of the usefulness of techniques from computational algebra in logic. A tableau proof system for NC is also provided. .
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika/Nicolaus Copernicus University in Logic and Logical Philosophy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 161-179
Open AccessAn Epimorphism between Fine and Ferguson’s Matrices for Angell’s AC
Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC has been shown to be characterized by a 9-valued matrix NC by Ferguson, and by a 16-valued matrix by Fine. It is shown that the former is the image of a surjective homomorphism from the latter, i.e., an epimorphic image. Some candidate 7-valued matrices are ruled out as characteristic of AC. Whether matrices with fewer than 9 values exist remains an open question. The results were obtained with the help of the MUltlog system for investigating finite-valued logics; the results serve as an example of the usefulness of techniques from computational algebra in logic. A tableau proof system for NC is also provided. .
- 2 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 51 (3) , 691
Corrections to: Natural Deduction for the Sheffer Stroke and Peirce’s Arrow (and any Other Truth-Functional Connective)
- 2 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 51 (3) , 691
Corrections to: Natural Deduction for the Sheffer Stroke and Peirce’s Arrow (and any Other Truth-Functional Connective)
- Open Access
- 10 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 87 (2) , 682-720
EPSILON THEOREMS IN INTERMEDIATE LOGICS
- 10 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 87 (2) , 682-720
Open AccessEPSILON THEOREMS IN INTERMEDIATE LOGICS
- Open Access
- 3 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 16 (3) , 862-899
THE GENEALOGY OF ‘’
The use of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for “or,”vel. We show that the origin of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and Russell’s pre-Principiawork in formal logic. Because ofPrincipia’s influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert’s adoption of $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ in hisGrundzüge der theoretischen Logikguaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed.- 3 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 16 (3) , 862-899
Open AccessTHE GENEALOGY OF ‘’
The use of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for “or,”vel. We show that the origin of the symbol $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and Russell’s pre-Principiawork in formal logic. Because ofPrincipia’s influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert’s adoption of $\mathbin {\boldsymbol {\vee }}$ in hisGrundzüge der theoretischen Logikguaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed. - Open Access
The Genealogy of '$\lor$'
The use of the symbol $\lor$ for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol $\lor$ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for "or", vel. We show that the origin of the symbol $\lor$ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and Russell's pre-Principia work in formal logic. Because of Principia's influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert's adoption of $\lor$ in his Grundz\"uge der theoretischen Logic guaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed.Open AccessThe Genealogy of '$\lor$'
The use of the symbol $\lor$ for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol $\lor$ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for "or", vel. We show that the origin of the symbol $\lor$ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and Russell's pre-Principia work in formal logic. Because of Principia's influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert's adoption of $\lor$ in his Grundz\"uge der theoretischen Logic guaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed. - Open Access
Epsilon Theorems in Intermediate Logics
Any intermediate propositional logic (i.e., a logic including intuitionistic logic and contained in classical logic) can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert's $\varepsilon$-calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon$-theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon$-calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon$-theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon$-calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon$- and $\tau$-formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon$- and $\tau$-terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate $\varepsilon\tau$-calculi. The "extended" first $\varepsilon$-theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued G\"odel-Dummett logic, fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued G\"odel logic. The second $\varepsilon$-theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order G\"odel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon$-theorem for infinite-valued G\"odel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic.
Open AccessEpsilon Theorems in Intermediate Logics
Any intermediate propositional logic (i.e., a logic including intuitionistic logic and contained in classical logic) can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert's $\varepsilon$-calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon$-theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon$-calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon$-theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon$-calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon$- and $\tau$-formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon$- and $\tau$-terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate $\varepsilon\tau$-calculi. The "extended" first $\varepsilon$-theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued G\"odel-Dummett logic, fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued G\"odel logic. The second $\varepsilon$-theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order G\"odel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon$-theorem for infinite-valued G\"odel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic.
- 17 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 202-268
The cut-elimination theorem
All the rules of the sequent calculus have the property that all the formulas that are present in the premises also occur in the conclusion. There is only one exception, the cut rule. In this chapter, it is shown using double induction that every theorem provable in Gentzen’s sequent calculi using the cut rule can also be proved without. One first proves that the mix rule is equivalent in proof-theoretic strength to the cut rule. Then one proves by induction on two complexity measures, the degree and the rank of a mix, that every application of mix can be eliminated. Several results follow from the cut-elimination theorem, including the so-called “mid-sequent” theorem and Herbrand’s theorem. In addition, one can prove the consistency of minimal, intuitionistic, and classical logic.
- 17 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 202-268
The cut-elimination theorem
All the rules of the sequent calculus have the property that all the formulas that are present in the premises also occur in the conclusion. There is only one exception, the cut rule. In this chapter, it is shown using double induction that every theorem provable in Gentzen’s sequent calculi using the cut rule can also be proved without. One first proves that the mix rule is equivalent in proof-theoretic strength to the cut rule. Then one proves by induction on two complexity measures, the degree and the rank of a mix, that every application of mix can be eliminated. Several results follow from the cut-elimination theorem, including the so-called “mid-sequent” theorem and Herbrand’s theorem. In addition, one can prove the consistency of minimal, intuitionistic, and classical logic.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 14 (4) , 910-929
CUT-FREE COMPLETENESS FOR MODULAR HYPERSEQUENT CALCULI FOR MODAL LOGICS K, T, AND D
We investigate a recent proposal for modal hypersequent calculi. The interpretation of relational hypersequents incorporates an accessibility relation along the hypersequent. These systems give the same interpretation of hypersequents as Lellman’s linear nested sequents, but were developed independently by Restall for S5 and extended to other normal modal logics by Parisi. The resulting systems obey Došen’s principle: the modal rules are the same across different modal logics. Different modal systems only differ in the presence or absence of external structural rules. With the exception of S5, the systems are modular in the sense that different structural rules capture different properties of the accessibility relation. We provide the first direct semantical cut-free completeness proofs for K, T, and D, and show how this method fails in the case of B and S4.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 14 (4) , 910-929
CUT-FREE COMPLETENESS FOR MODULAR HYPERSEQUENT CALCULI FOR MODAL LOGICS K, T, AND D
We investigate a recent proposal for modal hypersequent calculi. The interpretation of relational hypersequents incorporates an accessibility relation along the hypersequent. These systems give the same interpretation of hypersequents as Lellman’s linear nested sequents, but were developed independently by Restall for S5 and extended to other normal modal logics by Parisi. The resulting systems obey Došen’s principle: the modal rules are the same across different modal logics. Different modal systems only differ in the presence or absence of external structural rules. With the exception of S5, the systems are modular in the sense that different structural rules capture different properties of the accessibility relation. We provide the first direct semantical cut-free completeness proofs for K, T, and D, and show how this method fails in the case of B and S4.