Erich H. Reck
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Erich H. Reck has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Georg Schiemer
University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
4 shared publications - Richard Zach
Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
2 shared publications - Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1 shared publication Eric Dane Walker
University of California at Riverside
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 247-252
Carnaps Beiträge zur mathematischen Grundlagendebatte
Zusammenfassung: Neben der Wissenschaftstheorie, Sprachphilosophie, Logik und philosophischen Methodik war Carnap seit Beginn seiner Karriere auch an den Grundlagen der Mathematik interessiert. Ausserdem hatte er direkte Kontakte zu Frege, Russell, und Hilbert, später auch zu Gödel, Fraenkel, Tarski, usw. Was seine eigene Position betrifft, wird Carnap meist als Logizist klassifiziert, auch von ihm selbst. Er vertrag aber einen unorthodoxen Logizismus, der zunehmend pragmatische und pluralistische Züge annahm, und den Gödel später als ‚linguistischen Konvertionalismus‘ bezeichnete. In diesem Kapitel wird die Entwicklung dieser Position in vier Schritten beschrieben.
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 247-252
Open AccessCarnaps Beiträge zur mathematischen Grundlagendebatte
Zusammenfassung: Neben der Wissenschaftstheorie, Sprachphilosophie, Logik und philosophischen Methodik war Carnap seit Beginn seiner Karriere auch an den Grundlagen der Mathematik interessiert. Ausserdem hatte er direkte Kontakte zu Frege, Russell, und Hilbert, später auch zu Gödel, Fraenkel, Tarski, usw. Was seine eigene Position betrifft, wird Carnap meist als Logizist klassifiziert, auch von ihm selbst. Er vertrag aber einen unorthodoxen Logizismus, der zunehmend pragmatische und pluralistische Züge annahm, und den Gödel später als ‚linguistischen Konvertionalismus‘ bezeichnete. In diesem Kapitel wird die Entwicklung dieser Position in vier Schritten beschrieben.
- Open Access
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 45 (4) , 389-393
Editorial Introduction
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 45 (4) , 389-393
Open AccessEditorial Introduction
- Open Access
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 45 (4) , 476-497
Frege’s Begriffsschrift: On the Visual Basis of Logical Articulation and Understanding
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 45 (4) , 476-497
Open AccessFrege’s Begriffsschrift: On the Visual Basis of Logical Articulation and Understanding
- 14 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 194 (1) , 33-65
Carnap’s early metatheory: scope and limits
- 14 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 194 (1) , 33-65
Carnap’s early metatheory: scope and limits
- Open Access
Carnap's Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits
In his Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (1928) and Abriss der Logistik (1929), Rudolf Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap's attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to be. By providing such a reassessment, the paper contributes to a reevaluation of Carnap's contributions to the development of modern logic.
Open AccessCarnap's Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits
In his Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (1928) and Abriss der Logistik (1929), Rudolf Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap's attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to be. By providing such a reassessment, the paper contributes to a reevaluation of Carnap's contributions to the development of modern logic.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 10 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 194 (1) , 195-215
Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization
- 10 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 194 (1) , 195-215
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCarnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (4) , 433-472
Logic in the 1930s: type theory and model theory
In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (4) , 433-472
Logic in the 1930s: type theory and model theory
In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.
- 5 September 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (4) , 433-472
Logic in the 1930s: Type Theory and Model Theory
In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.
- 5 September 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (4) , 433-472
Logic in the 1930s: Type Theory and Model Theory
In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.
- 5 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 34 (3) , 242-265
Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism
This paper has a two-fold objective: to provide a balanced, multi-faceted account of the origins of logicism; to rehabilitate Richard Dedekind as a main logicist. Logicism should be seen as more deeply rooted in the development of modern mathematics than typically assumed, and this becomes evident by reconsidering Dedekind's writings in relation to Frege's. Especially in its Dedekindian and Fregean versions, logicism constitutes the culmination of the rise of ‘pure mathematics’ in the nineteenth century; and this rise brought with it an inter-weaving of methodological and epistemological considerations. The latter aspect illustrates how philosophical concerns can grow out of mathematical practice, as opposed to being imposed on it from outside. It also sheds new light on the legacy and the lasting significance of logicism today.
- 5 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in History and Philosophy of Logic
- Vol. 34 (3) , 242-265
Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism
This paper has a two-fold objective: to provide a balanced, multi-faceted account of the origins of logicism; to rehabilitate Richard Dedekind as a main logicist. Logicism should be seen as more deeply rooted in the development of modern mathematics than typically assumed, and this becomes evident by reconsidering Dedekind's writings in relation to Frege's. Especially in its Dedekindian and Fregean versions, logicism constitutes the culmination of the rise of ‘pure mathematics’ in the nineteenth century; and this rise brought with it an inter-weaving of methodological and epistemological considerations. The latter aspect illustrates how philosophical concerns can grow out of mathematical practice, as opposed to being imposed on it from outside. It also sheds new light on the legacy and the lasting significance of logicism today.