Lara Buchak
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lara Buchak has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jeffrey Sanford Russell
University of Southern California
1 shared publication - John Hawthorne
University of Oxford
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 174 (9) , 2363-2368
Precis of Risk and Rationality
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 174 (9) , 2363-2368
Precis of Risk and Rationality
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 174 (9) , 2397-2414
Replies to Commentators
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 174 (9) , 2397-2414
Replies to Commentators
- 9 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 113-133
Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence
- 9 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 113-133
Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 45 (5-6) , 841-862
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs
I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility (REU) maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility (EU) theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my original claims still stand. However, their arguments do highlight some costs of REU theory.
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 45 (5-6) , 841-862
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs
I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility (REU) maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility (EU) theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my original claims still stand. However, their arguments do highlight some costs of REU theory.
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 31 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 79 (S6) , 1091-1117
Risk and Tradeoffs
- 31 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 79 (S6) , 1091-1117
Risk and Tradeoffs
- Top Cited Papers
- 11 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 169 (2) , 285-311
Belief, credence, and norms
- 11 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 169 (2) , 285-311
Top Cited PapersBelief, credence, and norms
- 22 July 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 72 (2) , 139-144
Robert Audi: Rationality and religious commitment
- 22 July 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 72 (2) , 139-144
Robert Audi: Rationality and religious commitment