GLGregory J. Love

Gregory J. Love

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Gregory J. Love has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Executive Approval in Extraordinary Times: Comparing across Crises

    by Timothy Hellwig, Ryan E. Carlin, Jonathan Hartlyn, Will Horne, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, Matthew M. Singer

    What drives popular support for political executives? Compared to normal times, we know little about how the public responds to executives in extraordinary circumstances, and we know even less about similarities and differences across crisis events. While a calculating public may sanction incumbents for adverse events, the unexpected nature of many crises has the potential to increase leaders’ approval ratings. Based on time series analyses of executive approval from 35 countries across 25 years and drawing on an original Crisis Events Dataset, we show that the strength of rallies corresponds to crises’ degree of plausible exogeneity and to whether their resolution requires concentrated action by the government. Crises in three domains – security, the environment, and public health – tend to produce rallies rather than reprimands, while economic shocks yield no direct effect on approval. Lastly, we find that institutional features are less important in predicting approval during crises than they are in normal times. By demonstrating crises’ potential to upend the mechanisms of political accountability, our findings lay a foundation for further inquiry into how political context matters for public opinion in extraordinary times.

  • Open Access

    Measuring affective polarization

    by Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love


  • Open Access

    LASSOing the Governor’s Mansion: A Machine-Learning Approach to Forecasting Gubernatorial Elections

    by Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer

    Despite governors’ crucial roles in shaping important policies, including abortion, education, and infrastructure, forecasters have paid little attention to gubernatorial elections. We posit that institutional idiosyncrasies and lack of public opinion data have exacerbated the classic problem facing all election forecasts: there are too many predictors and too few cases, leading to overfitting. To address these problems, we combine new governor and state-level presidential approval data with a machine-learning approach, LASSO, for variable selection. LASSO examines numerous variables but retains only those that substantively improve model performance. Results demonstrate the efficacy of gubernatorial and presidential approval ratings measured two quarters preelection in predicting both incumbent-party vote share and election winners in out-of-sample predictions. For 2022, our approach outperformed the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voting Index and compared well with 538’s Election Day prediction. For 2024, our LASSO-Popularity model predictions indicate that it will likely be a difficult year for Democrats in gubernatorial contests.


  • Open Access

    Executive Approval Dynamics in Presidential and Parliamentary Democratic Regimes

    by Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, Gregory J. Love, Jonathan Hartlyn, Ryan E. Carlin, Timothy Hellwig, Matthew M. Singer

    Does the type of democratic regime matter for public evaluations of leaders? We argue two characteristics intrinsic to presidential and parliamentary regimes lead to divergent patterns of executive approval. For presidents, direct elections foster more personal leader-voter linkages; for prime ministers, dependence on the legislature for survival contributes to more institutionalized party systems. These two mechanisms should generate higher approval at the outset of a term—larger honeymoons— for presidents than for prime ministers, but also more rapid decline. Analyses of data from 40 countries produce evidence consistent with these constitutionally-based distinctions. Yet we uncover important within-regime differences. Within presidential systems, approval patterns vary along with paths to power—first-election versus re-election, and elected versus unelected. Within parliamentarism, honeymoons are greater for prime ministers overseeing single-party majoritarian governments. Study findings advance long-standing debates about the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems—particularly the tradeoff between democratic responsiveness and stability.


  • Open Access

    When growth is not enough: inequality, economic gains, and executive approval

    by Ryan E. Carlin, Timothy Hellwig, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, Matthew M. Singer

    A robust economy is assumed to bolster leaders' standing. This ignores how benefits of growth are distributed. Extending the partisan models of economic voting, we theorize executives are more likely rewarded when gains from growth go to their constituents. Analyses of presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries support our pro-constituency model of accountability. When economic inequality is high, growth concentrates among the rich, and approval of right-of-center presidents is higher. Leftist presidents benefit from growth when gains are more equally distributed. Further analyses show growth and inequality inform perceptions of personal finances differently based on wealth, providing a micro-mechanism behind the aggregate findings. Study results imply that the economy is not purely a valence issue, but also a position issue.


  • Ethnicity or Policy? The Conditioning of Intergroup Trust in the Context of Ethnic Conflict

    by Ryan E. Carlin, Roberto González, Gregory J. Love, Daniel Andres Miranda, Patricio D. Navia

    How do stances on public policies aimed at ethnic conflict resolution affect intergroup trust? Building on theories of prosociality, social identity, and intergroup bias, we expect redistributive policy preferences meant to resolve ethnic conflict to replace ethnicity as the main barrier to intergroup trust because their zero‐sum nature raises intergroup threat. We test our expectations in Chile's ongoing indigenous/nonindigenous conflict using behavioral trust games embedded in an online nationally representative quota survey (n = 1105). Results align with our expectation. Namely, a lack of shared ethnic identity between nonindigenous Chileans and indigenous Mapuche does not lower intergroup trust. However, shared stances on a policy that would raise taxes to spur development in indigenous communities do increase intergroup trust discrimination. We probe the psychological mechanism—meaningful policy‐based group identities—by testing whether trustor indigenous identification and trustor political ideology moderate the effect of trustee policy stances on intergroup trust. Results are consistent with our assumption that shared policy stances can, indeed, form the basis of a meaningful social identity. Hence the very policies meant to end intergroup conflict could potentially perpetuate or redirect it to institutional channels of representation.


  • Open Access

    When Does the Public Get It Right? The Information Environment and the Accuracy of Economic Sentiment

    by Ryan E. Carlin, Timothy Hellwig, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, Matthew M. Singer

    Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.


  • Why the Rule of Law? Experimental Evidence from China

    by Jennifer R. Wilking, Gregory J. Love

    Similar to many developing countries, the government of China has publicly committed itself to the rule of law. As part of the campaign to strengthen the rule of law, the government, media and academics have employed multiple justifications for the value of rule of law, including instrumental justifications such as economic growth and corruption reduction, and intrinsic or normative justifications like increased fairness and neutrality of judicial decisions. While various justifications for the rule of law abound, we know exceedingly little about why the public might value the rule of law. To understand mass attitudes toward the rule of law, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment using a national urban sample of 2,100 Chinese residents. We find instrumental justifications, especially corruption reduction, to have the largest effects, though several intrinsic justifications are also significant. Additionally, intergroup analysis shows that income and experience with the courts condition the type of justification that is most likely to be employed.


  • Political Competition, Partisanship, and Interpersonal Trust Under Party Dominance: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa

    by Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, Daniel J. Young

    How does single-party dominance influence interpersonal trust? We draw on evidence from trust games played by more than 2,000 subjects in South Africa, where, since Apartheid, race-based social enmity has persisted under democratic competition characterized by single-party dominance. We find that partisan-based trust discrimination is most pronounced for those who identify with the main opposition party and is driven by strong distrust of rival partisans. These findings underscore how electoral competition, in general, shapes trust across party lines and suggests one-sided competition, in particular, has asymmetrical effects between parties in dominant party systems. Moreover, this study provides additional evidence regarding the relative weights of trustworthiness stereotypes tied to partisanship and race.