Shantaram P. Hegde
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Shantaram P. Hegde has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amedeo De Cesari
The Accounting and Finance Group, Alliance Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, Manchester M15 6PB, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Hugh M. J. Colaco
Aston Business School
2 shared publications - Asli Ascioglu
Department of Finance, Bryant University, Smithfield, USA
1 shared publication - Gopal V. Krishnan
Bentley University
1 shared publication - Hieu V. Phan
University of Massachusetts Lowell
1 shared publication - John A. Vernon
Department of Health Policy and Management , University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , 1101-c McGavaran-Greenberg, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-7411, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 23 (4) , 691-727
Retail Investor Attention and IPO Valuation
Given restrictions placed on communication with prospective investors, retail investor attention can help firms/underwriters with the task of initially valuing an IPO. Using Google search volume to proxy for retail investor attention, we find that the presence of and an increase in retail attention following initial filing but prior to initial pricing are positively related to initial valuations. Our results are robust to alternative matching methods to identify our matched sample of non‐IPO firms and to including several controls for institutional demand. We conclude that retail investor attention plays a critical role in the early stages of IPO valuation.
- 25 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 23 (4) , 691-727
Retail Investor Attention and IPO Valuation
Given restrictions placed on communication with prospective investors, retail investor attention can help firms/underwriters with the task of initially valuing an IPO. Using Google search volume to proxy for retail investor attention, we find that the presence of and an increase in retail attention following initial filing but prior to initial pricing are positively related to initial valuations. Our results are robust to alternative matching methods to identify our matched sample of non‐IPO firms and to including several controls for institutional demand. We conclude that retail investor attention plays a critical role in the early stages of IPO valuation.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Waiting Period of Initial Public Offerings
The length of time it takes an IPO firm to go public (called “waiting period”) reflects multiple layers of scrutiny from underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists, institutional investors, and regulators. Accordingly, we show that the waiting period is a good barometer of ex ante uncertainty about future cash flows and that it has predictive power after the firm goes public. We find that firms marked by short waiting periods experience lower underpricing and less uncertainty and superior stock/operating performance in the aftermarket. We also report that smaller firms are taking longer to go public after Sarbanes-Oxley, thus providing justification for the 2012 JOBS Act.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Waiting Period of Initial Public Offerings
The length of time it takes an IPO firm to go public (called “waiting period”) reflects multiple layers of scrutiny from underwriters, auditors, venture capitalists, institutional investors, and regulators. Accordingly, we show that the waiting period is a good barometer of ex ante uncertainty about future cash flows and that it has predictive power after the firm goes public. We find that firms marked by short waiting periods experience lower underpricing and less uncertainty and superior stock/operating performance in the aftermarket. We also report that smaller firms are taking longer to go public after Sarbanes-Oxley, thus providing justification for the 2012 JOBS Act.
- 3 May 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 48 (3) , 919-946
Corporate Governance and Risk Taking in Pension Plans: Evidence from Defined Benefit Asset Allocations
Based on theoretical advice and empirical evidence suggesting that risk taking in asset allocation enhances pension returns, we evaluate empirically whether good corporate governance leads to a larger allocation of pension assets to risky securities as compared to safe investments. Our findings suggest that firms with good external and internal corporate governance take more risk by investing heavily in equities and allocating a smaller share of the plan assets to cash, government debt, and insurance company accounts. The main underlying mechanisms appear to be higher investment returns and better pension funding status associated with higher equity and lower safe asset allocations.
- 3 May 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 48 (3) , 919-946
Corporate Governance and Risk Taking in Pension Plans: Evidence from Defined Benefit Asset Allocations
Based on theoretical advice and empirical evidence suggesting that risk taking in asset allocation enhances pension returns, we evaluate empirically whether good corporate governance leads to a larger allocation of pension assets to risky securities as compared to safe investments. Our findings suggest that firms with good external and internal corporate governance take more risk by investing heavily in equities and allocating a smaller share of the plan assets to cash, government debt, and insurance company accounts. The main underlying mechanisms appear to be higher investment returns and better pension funding status associated with higher equity and lower safe asset allocations.
- 14 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 38 (2) , 257-274
Earnings management and market liquidity
- 14 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 38 (2) , 257-274
Earnings management and market liquidity
- 26 November 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 45 (1) , 239-264
Pharmaceutical R&D Spending and Threats of Price Regulation
Do threats of pharmaceutical price regulation affect subsequent research and development (R&D) spending? This study uses the Clinton administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to study this issue. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between firms’ stock price changes and their subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on stock prices and firm-level R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by about $1 billion even though it never became law.
- 26 November 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 45 (1) , 239-264
Pharmaceutical R&D Spending and Threats of Price Regulation
Do threats of pharmaceutical price regulation affect subsequent research and development (R&D) spending? This study uses the Clinton administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to study this issue. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between firms’ stock price changes and their subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on stock prices and firm-level R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by about $1 billion even though it never became law.