Rong Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rong Yang has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Baolei Qi
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, People’s Republic of China
2 shared publicationsAshok Robin
Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA
1 shared publication- Baolei Qi
Xi’an Jiaotong University
1 shared publication - Chan Li
University of Pittsburgh
1 shared publication Gaoliang Tian
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
1 shared publication- Gaoliang Tian
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 31 August 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 52 (1) , 38-66
The effect of enforcement action on audit fees and the audit reporting lag
We study the effect of audit market regulation on auditor contracting by examining a sample of enforcement actions on engagement auditors by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We conjecture that sanctions change auditor behaviour through increased effort and diligence. Specifically, we hypothesise that sanctioned auditors would (a) increase audit fees and (b) increase reporting lag. We find results consistent with these hypotheses. We also provide supporting evidence using a battery of output measures of audit quality including abnormal accruals (various kinds), modified audit opinion, F-score, and restatements. Thus, both input-based and output-based indicators show that sanctioned auditors improve audit quality. Additionally, in nuanced tests, we present evidence on other aspects of auditor behaviour: we find that audit firms combine sanctioned auditors with more seasoned co-partners and assign a lighter workload. By far, this is the most direct and compelling evidence that auditors respond to sanctions. Overall, sanctions appear to encourage sanctioned auditors as well as their firms to take a concerted and strategic approach to improve audit quality.
- 31 August 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 52 (1) , 38-66
The effect of enforcement action on audit fees and the audit reporting lag
We study the effect of audit market regulation on auditor contracting by examining a sample of enforcement actions on engagement auditors by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We conjecture that sanctions change auditor behaviour through increased effort and diligence. Specifically, we hypothesise that sanctioned auditors would (a) increase audit fees and (b) increase reporting lag. We find results consistent with these hypotheses. We also provide supporting evidence using a battery of output measures of audit quality including abnormal accruals (various kinds), modified audit opinion, F-score, and restatements. Thus, both input-based and output-based indicators show that sanctioned auditors improve audit quality. Additionally, in nuanced tests, we present evidence on other aspects of auditor behaviour: we find that audit firms combine sanctioned auditors with more seasoned co-partners and assign a lighter workload. By far, this is the most direct and compelling evidence that auditors respond to sanctions. Overall, sanctions appear to encourage sanctioned auditors as well as their firms to take a concerted and strategic approach to improve audit quality.
- 17 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 54 (3) , 981-1009
The SOX 404 control audit and the effectiveness of additional audit effort in lowering the risk of financial misstatements
- 17 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 54 (3) , 981-1009
The SOX 404 control audit and the effectiveness of additional audit effort in lowering the risk of financial misstatements
- 3 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 24 (3-4) , 440-463
Do social ties between individual auditors and client CEOs/CFOs matter to audit quality?
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether and how the social ties between individual auditors and client chief executive officers (CEOs)/chief financial officers (CFOs) affect audit quality using a large sample of publicly traded firms in China. We define social ties between individual auditors and client CEOs/CFOs as ‘working or educational alumni.’ We find that clients with social ties are significantly and positively associated with abnormal accruals and the presence of reporting small profits, and are more likely to receive clean audit opinions compared to clients without social ties. Moreover, we find that the working-tie effect on audit quality is stronger than the school-tie effect. Furthermore, we find that socially connected clients are more likely to downward restate their audited earnings in subsequent years. In addition, we find that the social-tie effect on audit quality can be mitigated by several personal characteristics of individual auditors, such as partner, female, accounting major, auditing experience, etc. Overall, our study sheds new light on the impact of social ties between individual auditors and client executives on audit quality.
- 3 November 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 24 (3-4) , 440-463
Do social ties between individual auditors and client CEOs/CFOs matter to audit quality?
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether and how the social ties between individual auditors and client chief executive officers (CEOs)/chief financial officers (CFOs) affect audit quality using a large sample of publicly traded firms in China. We define social ties between individual auditors and client CEOs/CFOs as ‘working or educational alumni.’ We find that clients with social ties are significantly and positively associated with abnormal accruals and the presence of reporting small profits, and are more likely to receive clean audit opinions compared to clients without social ties. Moreover, we find that the working-tie effect on audit quality is stronger than the school-tie effect. Furthermore, we find that socially connected clients are more likely to downward restate their audited earnings in subsequent years. In addition, we find that the social-tie effect on audit quality can be mitigated by several personal characteristics of individual auditors, such as partner, female, accounting major, auditing experience, etc. Overall, our study sheds new light on the impact of social ties between individual auditors and client executives on audit quality.
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China
- 8 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 42 (3) , 571-597
Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China