Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
Authors:
- 8 August 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 72 (3) , 909-953
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71803004)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71973002)
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