Praveen Kujal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Praveen Kujal has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Antonio Cabrales
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
2 shared publications - Irma Clots-Figueras
University of Kent
2 shared publications - Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
Department of Economics Lafayette College Easton Pennsylvania USA
2 shared publications - Andrej Angelovski
Middlesex University
1 shared publication Christos Mavridis
1 shared publication- Cintia Goddio
Economics Burrough of London, Hendon, London NW44BT, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Time Blocking, Goal Setting, and Work Performance
We experimentally examine how time blocking (dividing a fixed work period into shorter intervals) and non-binding goals influence worker performance. Measuring four outcomes, task performance, effort, accuracy, and mistake rate, we find that time blocking primarily operates through a speed accuracy trade off. While it substantially increases the number of tables attempted within a given period it simultaneously reduces accuracy, resulting in only a modest net gain in output. Goal setting, meanwhile, has no significant effect overall. The effects are heterogeneous and depend strongly on worker ability. For high-ability workers, goal setting significantly improves performance. Combining time blocking with goal setting yields the largest performance gains, indicating that the two techniques complement each other for this group. For low-ability workers, neither technique, individually or combined, produces significant improvements: although time blocking raises effort, the associated decline in accuracy offsets any potential benefit. Our findings highlight worker ability as a key moderator of non-monetary motivational interventions and caution against applying multiple techniques simultaneously without accounting for workforce heterogeneity.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTime Blocking, Goal Setting, and Work Performance
We experimentally examine how time blocking (dividing a fixed work period into shorter intervals) and non-binding goals influence worker performance. Measuring four outcomes, task performance, effort, accuracy, and mistake rate, we find that time blocking primarily operates through a speed accuracy trade off. While it substantially increases the number of tables attempted within a given period it simultaneously reduces accuracy, resulting in only a modest net gain in output. Goal setting, meanwhile, has no significant effect overall. The effects are heterogeneous and depend strongly on worker ability. For high-ability workers, goal setting significantly improves performance. Combining time blocking with goal setting yields the largest performance gains, indicating that the two techniques complement each other for this group. For low-ability workers, neither technique, individually or combined, produces significant improvements: although time blocking raises effort, the associated decline in accuracy offsets any potential benefit. Our findings highlight worker ability as a key moderator of non-monetary motivational interventions and caution against applying multiple techniques simultaneously without accounting for workforce heterogeneity.
- 15 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 109
Book review
- Open Access
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 112
Deciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 112
Open AccessDeciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries
- Open Access
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 216, 469-493
The effect of wage proposals on efficiency and income distribution
- 2 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 216, 469-493
Open AccessThe effect of wage proposals on efficiency and income distribution
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Institutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions.Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInstitutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions.Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Institutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInstitutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 63, 125-135
What is a fair wage? Reference points, entitlements and gift exchange
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 63, 125-135
What is a fair wage? Reference points, entitlements and gift exchange
- Open Access
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 11 (7) , e0158098
Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence
We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 11 (7) , e0158098
Open AccessMultiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence
We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings
Collusion is when firms coordinate on suppressing competition, and coordination typically requires that firms communicate in some manner. This study conducts ex
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings
Collusion is when firms coordinate on suppressing competition, and coordination typically requires that firms communicate in some manner. This study conducts ex