Deciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries
Authors:
- Andrej AngelovskiAAAndrej Angelovski
- Praveen KujalPKPraveen Kujal
- Christos MavridisCMChristos Mavridis
Open Access
- 8 June 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 112
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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