MBMarc Bourreau

Marc Bourreau

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Marc Bourreau has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 28 July 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Horizontal Mergers and Incremental Innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on the incentives of merging …rms to invest in incremental innovation. We provide a decomposition of this impact that clari…es the various forces at work and the di¤erences between demand-enhancing and cost-reducing innovation. Moreover, we derive su¢ cient conditions for a merger to either reduce or raise the merging …rms'incentives to innovate, and show that the comparison of the price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio can help screen mergers. We also uncover a useful connection between the level of production synergies induced by a merger and its impact on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.