Raphael Cohen-Almagor

This article examines how Kahanism transitioned from a banned racist and terrorist movement into a governing force, following the November 2022 Israeli elections. Tracing its trajectory from Meir Kahane, the father of the movement, to the appointment of Itamar Ben-Gvir as Minister of National Security, the study analyses how an extremist ideology achieved mainstream legitimacy and institutional power. Employing historical process tracing and ideological genealogy, the article identifies five mechanisms driving this normalisation: ideological adaptation, organisational continuity, recurring security crises, demographic anxieties, and elite legitimation through coalition politics. It demonstrates how Kahanist actors navigated political prohibition and leveraged democratic processes to reshape their public appeal. The article reveals the profound consequences of this institutionalisation for Israeli democracy, the rule of law and Arab–Jewish relations, offering broader insights into how proscribed extremist movements can exploit electoral politics to secure state authority.

Drawing on more than four decades of Arab–Israeli negotiations, as well as lessons from peace processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa, this article develops a practical framework for resolving protracted conflicts. It identifies five conditions that are essential for achieving lasting peace: recognition that a military solution is unattainable, careful strategic preparation, domestic political legitimacy, effective management of spoilers, and sustained third-party support. The article argues that, although the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has distinctive features, many of its core challenges, including power asymmetries, competing historical narratives, and difficulties in implementing agreements, are common to deeply divided societies. Across six sections, it examines previous negotiations, the contribution of civil society, and regional dynamics to propose an integrated and actionable approach to sustainable peacemaking.

This article suggests practical information on the requirements for successful negotiations. Building on extensive research in archives and more than 100 in-depth interviews with senior decision-makers and negotiators who were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the article outlines the basic qualities that negotiators, mediators, and facilitators should have and things they should do, and then the discussion focuses on what negotiators, mediators, and facilitators should not do. The arguments are supported by examples from previous peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. These experiences shed important light on past events and they offer yardsticks for future negotiations. Thus, this is a practical essay that can be useful for future negotiations.

This article suggests practical information on the requirements for successful negotiations. Building on extensive research in archives and more than 100 in‐depth interviews with senior decision‐makers and negotiators who were involved in the Arab‐Israeli conflict, the article outlines the basic qualities that negotiators, mediators, and facilitators should have and things they should do , and then the discussion focuses on what negotiators, mediators, and facilitators should not do. The arguments are supported by examples from previous peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. These experiences shed important light on past events and they offer yardsticks for future negotiations. Thus, this is a practical essay that can be useful for future negotiations.

This book analyses more than three decades of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), from the inception of the Oslo process in 1993 to the present. It does not attempt to provide an exhaustive historical record of every negotiation. Instead, it seeks to explain why the peace process has failed so repeatedly and what can be done differently. The study pays particular attention to the roles of third-party mediators, the conditions for successful negotiations, and the lessons learned from critical junctures such as Oslo, Camp David, and the Abbas–Olmert talks. This research project, in the fields of diplomacy, IR, peace and conflict resolution, aims to: (1) develop a comprehensive theoretical framework of conflict resolution; (2) apply it for a detailed analysis of peace mediation, facilitation and negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from the start of the Oslo process in 1993 until today; (3) provide original insights to explain the main peace junctions between the two parties; (4) outline the keys to successful negotiations, mediation and facilitation, so that, in the event that an opportunity for peace presents itself, the opportunity will not be missed; and (5) map possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The project explains the keys to future successful negotiations.

This article explains the events that brought about the meaningful negotiations between President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert. Despite Olmert’s good intentions and clear willingness to make peace by agreeing to unprecedented concessions, Olmert failed to convince Abbas to sign an agreement. The article opens by explaining the research methodology and the theoretical framework. It then explains the Annapolis conference and process including the three tiers of negotiations installed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. While Olmert presented the best peace offer to date that any Israeli prime minister was willing to sign, it remained short of the Palestinian demands. A host of reasons led to yet another failure to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are analyzed: the negotiations’ structure, internal rivalries in Israel and the Palestinians, the continuation of the settlement project, Olmert’s decision to embark on two wars, Olmert’s illegitimate leadership due to his implication in corruption affairs, and Palestinian lack of trust in the Israeli government to deliver a long-lasting peace. The article concludes with a detailed assessment of the negotiation dynamics, aiming to distill key lessons that may inform future efforts should Israeli and Palestinian leaders re-enter serious peace talks.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a protracted, multidimensional struggle shaped by migration, violence, displacement, and deep religious and national divisions. It extends beyond a territorial dispute, rooted in competing historical narratives, security concerns, and ideological commitments. Both peoples maintain legitimate claims to a small, symbolically charged land, while stark asymmetry—between Israel as a sovereign state and Palestine as a non-sovereign entity—further complicates resolution. Internal fractures within both societies and the geographic separation of the West Bank and Gaza intensify instability. This article proposes a phased framework for conflict transformation. First, Gaza must be reconstructed through coordinated international and regional efforts. Second, Israel and the Palestinian Authority should renew civilian and economic cooperation. Third, militant groups must be marginalized and disarmed under strict conditions. Fourth, democratic processes should privilege peace-oriented actors. Finally, a two-state solution, potentially evolving into a Jordanian–Palestinian confederation, remains essential for sustainable peace.

This paper explores the limits of state intervention in regulating cultural practices that harm women and girls. Accentuating gender equality, the paper focuses on gender discrimination, denial of meaningful education, and forced or arranged marriages. Such practices-exemplified by child marriage and educational deprivation-constitute serious violations of basic human rights as articulated in the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and subsequent conventions protecting women and children. Through an examination of discriminatory Pueblo tribal norms and the U.S. Supreme Court case Santa Clara v. Martinez, as well as the forced marriage patterns among Jewish-Yemenite immigrants to Israel in the 1950s, the paper assesses when a liberal state is justified in overriding cultural autonomy. Drawing on Rawls's conception of justice, it argues that cultural practices that undermine women's equal dignity and opportunities cannot be shielded by claims of cultural or religious protection and warrant state action to safeguard vulnerable individuals.