Maroš Servátka
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Maroš Servátka has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cary A. Deck
University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
2 shared publications - Daniel Woods
Department of Economics, Purdue University
2 shared publications - Radovan Vadovič
Centro de Investigación Económica, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Mexico City 10700, Mexico
2 shared publications - Steven Tucker
Department of Economics University of Waikato Hamilton New Zealand
2 shared publications - Andrej Angelovski
Middlesex University
1 shared publication Daniel Woods
Purdue University, Krannert School of Management
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 108, 103155
Intertemporal coordination in volunteer markets
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 108, 103155
Intertemporal coordination in volunteer markets
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 139, 15-25
Honesty in the city
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 139, 15-25
Honesty in the city
- Open Access
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 88 (4) , 1490-1516
Fairness concerns and job assignment to positions with different surplus
- 24 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 88 (4) , 1490-1516
Open AccessFairness concerns and job assignment to positions with different surplus
- 1 June 2020
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review: Insights
- Vol. 2 (2) , 225-236
Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?
The bubble-and-burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized by two alternative sets of clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction yields prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash-to-asset ratio.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review: Insights
- Vol. 2 (2) , 225-236
Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?
The bubble-and-burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized by two alternative sets of clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction yields prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash-to-asset ratio.
- 21 January 2020
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 86 (4) , 1510-1530
On the Importance of Context in Sequential Search
- 21 January 2020
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 86 (4) , 1510-1530
On the Importance of Context in Sequential Search
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 162, 49-65
Anchoring in project duration estimation
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 162, 49-65
Anchoring in project duration estimation
- Open Access
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (4) , 2163-2183
RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91, H41)
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (4) , 2163-2183
Open AccessRANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91, H41)
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (2) , 457-484
Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (2) , 457-484
Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation
- 30 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (2) , 506-529
Nice to you, nicer to me: Does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?
Reciprocity has been shown to be sensitive to perceived intentions, however, not much is known about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise nature of those intentions. For example, a person can strategically appear to be kind while being self-serving or can be selflessly (genuinely) kind. Do these two intentions elicit different reciprocal reactions? We propose a conjecture that self-serving but generous actions diminish the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless generous actions. We classify actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff, but by less than the giver’s maximum payoff, as being self-serving generous actions, while classifying actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff by more than the giver’s as selfless generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous actions are considered more generous than self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving generous actions will therefore result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this conjecture using two novel experimental designs. We find some evidence that subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, but no empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished reciprocal response.
- 30 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (2) , 506-529
Nice to you, nicer to me: Does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?
Reciprocity has been shown to be sensitive to perceived intentions, however, not much is known about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise nature of those intentions. For example, a person can strategically appear to be kind while being self-serving or can be selflessly (genuinely) kind. Do these two intentions elicit different reciprocal reactions? We propose a conjecture that self-serving but generous actions diminish the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless generous actions. We classify actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff, but by less than the giver’s maximum payoff, as being self-serving generous actions, while classifying actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff by more than the giver’s as selfless generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous actions are considered more generous than self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving generous actions will therefore result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this conjecture using two novel experimental designs. We find some evidence that subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, but no empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished reciprocal response.
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 106, 277-293
Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 106, 277-293
Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price