HBHemant K. Bhargava

Hemant K. Bhargava

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Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Hemant K. Bhargava has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Fighting Fire with Fire: Infusing Artificial Intelligence into Peer Review to Sustain Quality Scholarship

    by Hemant K. Bhargava, Sarah H. Bana, Zhe Zhang, Laura Brandimarte, Vidyanand Choudhary, J. Frank Li, Pantelis Loupos, Daniel Zantedeschi

    Adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) by authors has accelerated production of academic articles and increased submission rates to journals, thereby straining review capacity and hurting journal outcome metrics, such as turnaround time and decision accuracy. Academic journals face an imperative to improve review quality and productivity by incorporating generative AI tools in the review workflow. As a concrete first step toward this idea, we outline a particular workflow that deploys large language models as a structured, trained, frontline reviewer. The workflow underlines that AI-produced evaluations must be transparent and contestable by authors. We emphasize the need for AI-infused peer review to be journal specific, designed for efficiency, accuracy, and accountability, within a human-in-the-loop oversight framework. We build a mathematical model of journal operations to compare outcomes under a status quo no-AI workflow and the proposed AI-infused workflow. The model captures how governed AI reconfigures human reviewer effort and illuminates conditions under which the AI-infused workflow can improve vital metrics, such as turnaround time and decision accuracy. Our essential point is that journals need to adopt a deliberate and institutionally governed approach for using AI in the review process. We recognize that identifying an “optimal” AI-infused peer review workflow or even definitively projecting the consequences of one will require substantial experimentation to calibrate and configure the workflow across multiple alternative designs. This discussion was accepted by Christoph Loch. Funding: D. Zantedeschi acknowledges support for this research from the Muma College of Business Dean’s Research Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2026.00184 .


  • Top Cited Papers

    The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets

    by Hemant Bhargava, Antoine Dubus, David Ronayne, Shiva Shekhar

    Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .


  • Open Access

    Exploring Generative AI’s Impact on Research: Perspectives from Senior Scholars in Management Information Systems

    by Hemant K. Bhargava, Susan Brown, Anindya Ghose, Alok Gupta, Dorothy Leidner, D. J. Wu

    This commentary reflects on insights from a panel discussion at the 2024 Annual MIS Academic Leadership Conference, where six senior MIS scholars discussed the impact of Generative AI on scholarly research and peer review. The discussion underscored the importance of responsible use, transparency, and ethical standards, as well as the irreplaceable role of human judgment in maintaining research integrity. This commentary explores the potential of Generative AI as a collaborative tool across various stages of the research lifecycle, highlighting the "human-in-the-loop" approach to harness AI's capabilities while preserving essential human insight. This commentary synthesizes the senior scholars’ perspectives on the responsible integration of Generative AI, emphasizing opportunities to enhance research efficiency and foster interdisciplinary collaboration, while advocating for policies that ensure AI supports—rather than substitutes—human intellectual contributions in academic research.


    • 28 February 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets

    by Hemant Bhargava, Antoine Dubus, Shiva Shekhar, David Ronayne

    Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.

  • Open Access

    How Should We Deal with Malicious Customers’ Threats in Online Review? Perspectives of Retailers, Customers, and Platforms

    by Hemant Bhargava, Junghee Lee, Xinxue Qu, Daewon Sun

    We show that existence of malicious customers will distort the retailer's overall rating and under certain conditions, complying to malicious customers' request can actually increase its profit. In addition, we examine the importance of information provided by the platform, including the actually product quality and customer preference. Counter-intuitively, we show that retailer may not always use the perfect information as compliance with malicious customers can obtain positive ratings from them. This work also generates important implications for both retailers and platforms when dealing with malicious reviews.

  • Fending Off Critics of Platform Power with Differential Revenue Sharing: Doing Well by Doing Good?

    by Hemant K. Bhargava, Kitty Wang, Xingyue (Luna) Zhang

    Many digital platforms have accrued enormous power and scale, leveraging cross-side network effects between the sides they connect (e.g., producers and consumers or creators and viewers). Platforms motivate a diverse spectrum of producers, large and small, to participate by sharing platform revenue with them, predominantly under a linear revenue-sharing scheme with the same commission rate regardless of producer power or size. Under pressure from society, lawsuits, and antitrust investigations, major platforms have announced revenue sharing designs that favor smaller businesses. We develop a model of platform economics and show that a small-business oriented (SBO) differential revenue sharing design can increase total welfare and outputs on the platform. Although smaller producers almost always benefit from the shift in revenue sharing design, spillover effects can also make large producers better off under some conditions. More interestingly, we show that platforms are the most likely winner under a differential revenue sharing scheme. Hence, an intervention that ostensibly offers concessions and generous treatment to producers might well be self-serving for platforms and good for the entire ecosystem. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: H. K. Bhargava’s work on platform ecosystems was supported by a research excellence gift from Google Apigee in 2018. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4545 .


  • Top Cited Papers

    The Creator Economy: Managing Ecosystem Supply, Revenue Sharing, and Platform Design

    by Hemant K. Bhargava

    Many digital platforms give users a bundle of goods sourced from numerous creators, generate revenue through consumption of these goods, and motivate creators by sharing of revenue. This paper studies the platform’s design choices and creators’ participation and supply decisions when users’ (viewers’) consumption of goods (content) is financed by third-party advertisers. The model specifies the platform’s scale: number of creators and content supplied and magnitudes of viewers, advertisers, and revenues. I examine how the distribution of creator capabilities affects market concentration among creators and how it can be influenced by platform design. Tools for ad management and analytics are more impactful when the platform has sufficient content and viewers but has low ad demand. Conversely, reducing viewers’ distaste for ads through better matching and timing—which can create win–win–win effects throughout the ecosystem—is important when the platform has strong demand from advertisers. Platform infrastructure improvements that motivate creators to supply more content (e.g., development toolkits) must be chosen carefully to avoid creating higher concentration among a few powerful creators. Investments in first-party content are most consequential when the platform scale is small and when it has greater urgency to attract more viewers. I show that revenue sharing is (only partly) a tug of war between the platform and creators because a moderate sharing formula strengthens the overall ecosystem and profits of all participants. However, revenue-sharing tensions indicate a need to extend the one-rate-for-all creators approach with richer revenue-sharing arrangements that can better accommodate heterogeneity among creators. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems.


  • Bundling for Flexibility and Variety: An Economic Model for Multiproducer Value Aggregation

    by Hemant K. Bhargava

    Many markets feature an economic structure in which value is cocreated by multiple producers and aggregated into a common bundle by a producer-consortium or independent firm. Examples include in-home video entertainment, technology goods and services, multisourced data platforms, and patent pools. This paper develops an economic model to study demand, production choices, revenue sharing, and relative market power in such markets. Producers in these markets are not rivalrous competitors in the usual zero-sum sense, because output of each casts an externality on production decisions of others and total market demand expands with total output, albeit with diminishing returns. This property allows multiple producers to flourish in equilibrium (versus just one with the most favorable technological or cost structure), and more so when the market expands less quickly with total output. Equilibrium production quantities of competitors are strategic complements, yet competition between producers does manifest itself, for example, if one acquires better production technology (i.e., makes value units at lower cost) then the equilibrium production levels of other producers are reduced. Insights are also derived for alternative market structures, for example, producers have more output and earn higher profit when organized into a distribution consortium (e.g., Hulu or consortia of zoos or museums) versus relying on a separate retailer. Mergers between producers have similar effect. The formulation enables us to rigorously answer economic questions ranging from pricing, revenue sharing, and production levels in a static setting, to market dynamics covering both the causes and effects of changes in industry structure. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.


  • The Business of Electric Vehicles: A Platform Perspective

    by Jonas Boehm, Hemant K. Bhargava, Geoffrey G. Parker

    Platform business tactics are highly visible and dominant in business today. Prominent firms in industries such as information services, retail, and travel, have embraced platform thinking. Still, many others are engaged in a platform game without realizing it, often to negative consequences. This monograph develops this theme with an illustrative focus on the battery electric vehicle segment of the automobile industry. It traces the development of the industry, identifies key decisions by various participants, and analyzes these decisions from a platform strategy lens. We emphasize that platform characteristics and network effects are at the core of the electric vehicle industry. A battery electric vehicle is not just a vehicle whose fuel happens to be supplied by the battery. Rather, the vehicle purchase decision is heavily influenced by the availability of a widespread supercharging network as a complementary good. Hence, it is vital for the vehicle maker to ensure that customers have access to both sides of the market—an exciting vehicle and robust supercharging network. An electric vehicle differs from gasoline-powered vehicles in this regard because the refueling network for gasoline vehicles is already robust, widespread, and interoperable across brands, thereby becoming inconsequential to customer adoption decision and firms’ strategy. For electric vehicles, the two-sided platform nature of the industry underlines the need for a well-coordinated strategy on both sides of the market. Our analysis reveals that industry participants (vehicle producers, providers of charging locations, government and policy makers)—with the notable exception of an industry newcomer, Tesla, which has astutely employed platform thinking in its core decisions—have executed a flawed strategy that fails to recognize and leverage the platform aspect of the industry.


  • On Optimal Auctions for Mixing Exclusive and Shared Matching in Platforms

    by Hemant K. Bhargava, Gergely Csapó, Rudolf Müller

    Platforms create value by matching participants on alternate sides of the marketplace. Although many platforms practice one-to-one matching (e.g., Uber), others can conduct and monetize one-to-many simultaneous matches (e.g., lead-marketing platforms). Both formats involve one dimension of private information, a participant’s valuation for exclusive or shared allocation, respectively. This paper studies the problem of designing an auction format for platforms that mix the modes rather than limit to one and, therefore, involve both dimensions of information. We focus on incentive-compatible auctions (i.e., where truthful bidding is optimal) because of ease of participation and implementation. We formulate the problem to find the revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible auction as a mathematical program. Although hard to solve, the mathematical program leads to heuristic auction designs that are simple to implement, provide good revenue, and have speedy performance, all critical in practice. It also enables creation of upper bounds on the (unknown) optimal auction revenue, which are useful benchmarks for our proposed auction designs. By demonstrating a tight gap for our proposed two-dimensional reserve-price-based mechanism, we prove that it has excellent revenue performance and places low information and computational burden on the platform and participants. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.