Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jan Baedke
Ruhr University Bochum
10 shared publications - Guido Ignacio Prieto
Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
5 shared publications - Abigail Nieves Delgado
Utrecht University
3 shared publications - Francisco Vergara-Silva
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad de México, México
3 shared publications - Gregory Radick
Gregory Radick, School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
2 shared publications - Francesco Catania
Institute for Evolution and Biodiversity, University of Münster, Hüfferstraße 1, 48149 Münster, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 48 (1) , 12
Modeling versatility as the hallmark of model organisms
In recent years, discussions on the epistemology of model organism-based research have emerged in the philosophy of science. A key topic of discussion is how the epistemic insights gained from model organisms differ from those gained through other experimental organisms used in laboratory and field research. Here, we argue that model organisms are epistemically special due to their nature as ontogenetically changeable, standardized, and evolved material model carriers . These characteristics afford six important kinds of modeling versatility that biologists marshal in their investigations: (i) synchronic target versatility; (ii) synchronic scope versatility; (iii) diachronic target versatility; (iv) diachronic scope versatility; (v) manipulation versatility; and (vi) discovery versatility. In presenting these dimensions of modeling versatility, we also clarify key notions such as ‘representational target,’ ‘representational scope,’ and ‘representational power’ as these apply to modeling practices that involve model organisms.
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 48 (1) , 12
Open AccessModeling versatility as the hallmark of model organisms
In recent years, discussions on the epistemology of model organism-based research have emerged in the philosophy of science. A key topic of discussion is how the epistemic insights gained from model organisms differ from those gained through other experimental organisms used in laboratory and field research. Here, we argue that model organisms are epistemically special due to their nature as ontogenetically changeable, standardized, and evolved material model carriers . These characteristics afford six important kinds of modeling versatility that biologists marshal in their investigations: (i) synchronic target versatility; (ii) synchronic scope versatility; (iii) diachronic target versatility; (iv) diachronic scope versatility; (v) manipulation versatility; and (vi) discovery versatility. In presenting these dimensions of modeling versatility, we also clarify key notions such as ‘representational target,’ ‘representational scope,’ and ‘representational power’ as these apply to modeling practices that involve model organisms.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-2
Correction: Two ontogenetic challenges to trait individuation
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-2
Correction: Two ontogenetic challenges to trait individuation
- Open Access
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-28
Representing with model organisms: a refined DEKI account
In this article, we mobilize and refine the DEKI account of scientific representation to contend that model organisms are not models tout court but model ‘carriers,’ only abstracted and selected ‘parts’ of which are included in biological models. These parts correspond to phenomena of interest that are interpreted as mechanisms or other kinds of causal processes within certain theoretical domains. The models can then be used to represent similar target phenomena in other organisms. Our proposal paves the way to reconcile opposing positions apropos the representational status of model organisms and build a more robust epistemology of model organism-based research.
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-28
Open AccessRepresenting with model organisms: a refined DEKI account
In this article, we mobilize and refine the DEKI account of scientific representation to contend that model organisms are not models tout court but model ‘carriers,’ only abstracted and selected ‘parts’ of which are included in biological models. These parts correspond to phenomena of interest that are interpreted as mechanisms or other kinds of causal processes within certain theoretical domains. The models can then be used to represent similar target phenomena in other organisms. Our proposal paves the way to reconcile opposing positions apropos the representational status of model organisms and build a more robust epistemology of model organism-based research.
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (6) , 1-27
Two ontogenetic challenges to trait individuation
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (6) , 1-27
Two ontogenetic challenges to trait individuation
- Open Access
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 47 (1) , 1-31
On the prospects of basal cognition research becoming fully evolutionary: promising avenues and cautionary notes
The research programme ‘basal cognition’ adopts an evolutionary perspective for studying biological cognition. This entails investigating possible cognitive processes in ‘simple’–often non-neuronal–organisms as a means to discover conserved mechanisms and adaptive capacities underwriting cognition in more complex (neuronal) organisms. However, by pulling in the opposite direction of a tradition that views cognition as something that is unique to neuronal organisms, basal cognition has been met with a fair amount of scepticism by philosophers and scientists. The very idea of approaching cognition by way of investigating the behaviour and underlying mechanisms in, say, bacteria, has been seen as preposterous and harmful to both cognitive science and biology. This paper aims to temper such scepticism to a certain degree by drawing parallels with how the evolution of ‘development,’ another loaded concept that refers to a not-so-easily definable, contested bundle of phenomena, has been fruitfully approached in Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo-Devo). Through this comparison, we identify four promising features of the basal cognition approach. These features suggest that sweeping scepticism may be unwarranted. However, each of them comes with important epistemic cautionary notes that should not be disregarded. By presenting these twofold considerations as potential ways to integrate a fully evolutionary perspective into basal cognition, this paper seeks to provide clarity and direction for the advancement of this research programme.
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 47 (1) , 1-31
Open AccessOn the prospects of basal cognition research becoming fully evolutionary: promising avenues and cautionary notes
The research programme ‘basal cognition’ adopts an evolutionary perspective for studying biological cognition. This entails investigating possible cognitive processes in ‘simple’–often non-neuronal–organisms as a means to discover conserved mechanisms and adaptive capacities underwriting cognition in more complex (neuronal) organisms. However, by pulling in the opposite direction of a tradition that views cognition as something that is unique to neuronal organisms, basal cognition has been met with a fair amount of scepticism by philosophers and scientists. The very idea of approaching cognition by way of investigating the behaviour and underlying mechanisms in, say, bacteria, has been seen as preposterous and harmful to both cognitive science and biology. This paper aims to temper such scepticism to a certain degree by drawing parallels with how the evolution of ‘development,’ another loaded concept that refers to a not-so-easily definable, contested bundle of phenomena, has been fruitfully approached in Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo-Devo). Through this comparison, we identify four promising features of the basal cognition approach. These features suggest that sweeping scepticism may be unwarranted. However, each of them comes with important epistemic cautionary notes that should not be disregarded. By presenting these twofold considerations as potential ways to integrate a fully evolutionary perspective into basal cognition, this paper seeks to provide clarity and direction for the advancement of this research programme.
- Open Access
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (6) , 1-22
Driftability and niche construction
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (6) , 1-22
Open AccessDriftability and niche construction
- Open Access
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1-23
Research environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization
In a recent development of what may be called biological philosophy of science, scholars have proposed that aligning notions of research environments with biological concepts of environment holds great promise for understanding the socio-material contexts in and through which science happens. Here, I explore the prospects and potential shortcomings of building sound research environment concepts by contrasting them with biological environment concepts. In doing so, I emphasize the importance of adhering to two central desiderata: the need to clarify what is being environed (i.e., what the counter relatum of an environment is) and what is doing the environing (i.e., what type of environmental partition is instantiated). Subsequently, I juxtapose two biological construals of environment—organismal environments and population environments—with possible articulations of what ‘research environments’ might stand for, and I maintain that each presents distinct epistemic upshots and limitations. More generally, I argue that there are two broad relations that could exist between biological and research environments: ontological parallels and ontic discordance. Finally, employing the visual metaphor of epistemic parallax, I conclude by conveying some lessons and cautionary notes arising from these comparisons and the importation of biological environment concepts into philosophy of science. While environment concepts may come with epistemic purchase, we should be careful when ontologizing them.
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1-23
Open AccessResearch environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization
In a recent development of what may be called biological philosophy of science, scholars have proposed that aligning notions of research environments with biological concepts of environment holds great promise for understanding the socio-material contexts in and through which science happens. Here, I explore the prospects and potential shortcomings of building sound research environment concepts by contrasting them with biological environment concepts. In doing so, I emphasize the importance of adhering to two central desiderata: the need to clarify what is being environed (i.e., what the counter relatum of an environment is) and what is doing the environing (i.e., what type of environmental partition is instantiated). Subsequently, I juxtapose two biological construals of environment—organismal environments and population environments—with possible articulations of what ‘research environments’ might stand for, and I maintain that each presents distinct epistemic upshots and limitations. More generally, I argue that there are two broad relations that could exist between biological and research environments: ontological parallels and ontic discordance. Finally, employing the visual metaphor of epistemic parallax, I conclude by conveying some lessons and cautionary notes arising from these comparisons and the importation of biological environment concepts into philosophy of science. While environment concepts may come with epistemic purchase, we should be careful when ontologizing them.
- Top Cited Papers
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
The Riddle of Organismal Agency
The Riddle of Organismal Agency brings together historians, philosophers, and scientists for an interdisciplinary re-assessment of one of the long-standing problems in the scientific understanding of life. Marshalling insights from diverse sciences including physiology, comparative psychology, developmental biology, and evolutionary biology, the book provides an up-to-date survey of approaches to non-human organisms as agents, capable of performing activities serving their own goals such as surviving or reproducing, and whose doings in the world are thus to be explained teleologically. From an Integrated History and Philosophy of Science perspective, the book contributes to a better conceptual and theoretical understanding of organismal agency, advancing some suggestions on how to study it empirically and how to frame it in relation to wider scientific and philosophical traditions. It also provides new historical entry points for examining the deployment, trajectories, and challenges of agential views of organisms in the history of biology and philosophy. This book will be of interest to philosophers of biology; historians of science; biologists interested in analysing the active roles of organisms in development, ecological interactions, and evolution; philosophers and practitioners of the cognitive sciences; and philosophers and historians of philosophy working on purposiveness and teleology.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Top Cited PapersThe Riddle of Organismal Agency
The Riddle of Organismal Agency brings together historians, philosophers, and scientists for an interdisciplinary re-assessment of one of the long-standing problems in the scientific understanding of life. Marshalling insights from diverse sciences including physiology, comparative psychology, developmental biology, and evolutionary biology, the book provides an up-to-date survey of approaches to non-human organisms as agents, capable of performing activities serving their own goals such as surviving or reproducing, and whose doings in the world are thus to be explained teleologically. From an Integrated History and Philosophy of Science perspective, the book contributes to a better conceptual and theoretical understanding of organismal agency, advancing some suggestions on how to study it empirically and how to frame it in relation to wider scientific and philosophical traditions. It also provides new historical entry points for examining the deployment, trajectories, and challenges of agential views of organisms in the history of biology and philosophy. This book will be of interest to philosophers of biology; historians of science; biologists interested in analysing the active roles of organisms in development, ecological interactions, and evolution; philosophers and practitioners of the cognitive sciences; and philosophers and historians of philosophy working on purposiveness and teleology.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-20
Organismal Agency
Organismal agency, together with cognate notions such as goal-directedness, purposiveness, and teleology, has undergone a revival in recent decades and is one of the most intensively debated topics in contemporary philosophy of the life and cognitive sciences. This chapter argues that it constitutes an enormously difficult riddle in biological and philosophical theorisation that shows a curious profile, at once encapsulating central biological phenomena and resisting conceptual clarification and theoretical articulation, whilst displaying a nomadic character, extending across manifold disciplines. A long-standing issue, the problem of organismal agency re-emerges in every generation of biologists and philosophers, taking different forms and being tackled from several standpoints. These peculiar features make organismal agency a challenging subject that demands a better conceptual and theoretical understanding, necessitating an interdisciplinary and Integrated History and Philosophy of Science approach. This orientation can help to clarify the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of this notion, historically contextualise it, explore the continuities and discontinuities of diverse perspectives that have construed it in dissimilar ways, and investigate the consequences of embracing it for the study of development, behaviour, and evolution. This chapter ends by introducing the guiding axes behind the edited collection and outlining the contributions from historians, philosophers, and scientists.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-20
Organismal Agency
Organismal agency, together with cognate notions such as goal-directedness, purposiveness, and teleology, has undergone a revival in recent decades and is one of the most intensively debated topics in contemporary philosophy of the life and cognitive sciences. This chapter argues that it constitutes an enormously difficult riddle in biological and philosophical theorisation that shows a curious profile, at once encapsulating central biological phenomena and resisting conceptual clarification and theoretical articulation, whilst displaying a nomadic character, extending across manifold disciplines. A long-standing issue, the problem of organismal agency re-emerges in every generation of biologists and philosophers, taking different forms and being tackled from several standpoints. These peculiar features make organismal agency a challenging subject that demands a better conceptual and theoretical understanding, necessitating an interdisciplinary and Integrated History and Philosophy of Science approach. This orientation can help to clarify the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of this notion, historically contextualise it, explore the continuities and discontinuities of diverse perspectives that have construed it in dissimilar ways, and investigate the consequences of embracing it for the study of development, behaviour, and evolution. This chapter ends by introducing the guiding axes behind the edited collection and outlining the contributions from historians, philosophers, and scientists.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 41-60
Charting Contrasting Stances on Organismal Purposiveness and Agency in Early Twentieth-Century Biology
This chapter charts how organismal purposiveness and agency were discussed and framed by experimental and theoretical biologists during the first decades of the twentieth century. It offers a systematic reconstruction of seven contrasting positions in diverse disciplines with respect to the riddle of organismal purposiveness and agency: (i) the neo-Aristotelian position; (ii) the Drieschian answer; (iii) the heuristic approach; (iv) the holistic alternative to purposiveness; (v) purposiveness eliminativism; (vi) organismal purposiveness and agency as explananda for equilibria-related research; and (vii) organismal agency as noetic principle. Some views solely focused on ontological dimensions, underlining or disallowing organismal purposiveness; others prioritized integrating teleological concepts into the epistemology of biological science; and a subset navigated both ontological and epistemic domains. This taxonomy reveals that the conventional tripartite historiographic classification of mechanism, organicism, and vitalism does not adequately encompass the breadth of viewpoints that practicing scientists had on organismal purposiveness and agency in the early twentieth century.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 41-60
Charting Contrasting Stances on Organismal Purposiveness and Agency in Early Twentieth-Century Biology
This chapter charts how organismal purposiveness and agency were discussed and framed by experimental and theoretical biologists during the first decades of the twentieth century. It offers a systematic reconstruction of seven contrasting positions in diverse disciplines with respect to the riddle of organismal purposiveness and agency: (i) the neo-Aristotelian position; (ii) the Drieschian answer; (iii) the heuristic approach; (iv) the holistic alternative to purposiveness; (v) purposiveness eliminativism; (vi) organismal purposiveness and agency as explananda for equilibria-related research; and (vii) organismal agency as noetic principle. Some views solely focused on ontological dimensions, underlining or disallowing organismal purposiveness; others prioritized integrating teleological concepts into the epistemology of biological science; and a subset navigated both ontological and epistemic domains. This taxonomy reveals that the conventional tripartite historiographic classification of mechanism, organicism, and vitalism does not adequately encompass the breadth of viewpoints that practicing scientists had on organismal purposiveness and agency in the early twentieth century.