Victoria Charlton
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Victoria Charlton has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael J. DiStefano
Skaggs School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus , Aurora, CO 80045
2 shared publications Albert Weale
University College London
1 shared publication- Albert Weale
University College London
1 shared publication Annette Rid
Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK
1 shared publication- Annette Rid
National Institutes of Health
1 shared publication - Anthony J. Culyer
University of York
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 405 (10472) , 3-5
What price is society willing to pay for new drugs?
- 12 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 405 (10472) , 3-5
What price is society willing to pay for new drugs?
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 67-89
Innovation, values and NICE's changing societal role
This chapter draws on insights from empirical bioethics to explore how NICE’s normative approach has evolved over time and the implications for NICE’s societal role. It considers the values underpinning NICE’s priority-setting decisions, now and previously, and gives particular attention to the Institute’s relationship with innovation: a value that has come to occupy an increasingly central position in NICE policy and practice. Having found the ethical rationale for specifically valuing innovation unpersuasive, the chapter considers some of the potential political and sociological drivers for this emerging concern. It concludes that, however NICE’s approach has changed, in failing to properly acknowledge and justify how and why it has done so, NICE makes itself vulnerable to claims that it is not being open about the reasons for its decisions. It is hoped that, on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, NICE will reflect on and rearticulate its goals and values and thereby renew its moral mandate to set healthcare priorities on society’s behalf.
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 67-89
Innovation, values and NICE's changing societal role
This chapter draws on insights from empirical bioethics to explore how NICE’s normative approach has evolved over time and the implications for NICE’s societal role. It considers the values underpinning NICE’s priority-setting decisions, now and previously, and gives particular attention to the Institute’s relationship with innovation: a value that has come to occupy an increasingly central position in NICE policy and practice. Having found the ethical rationale for specifically valuing innovation unpersuasive, the chapter considers some of the potential political and sociological drivers for this emerging concern. It concludes that, however NICE’s approach has changed, in failing to properly acknowledge and justify how and why it has done so, NICE makes itself vulnerable to claims that it is not being open about the reasons for its decisions. It is hoped that, on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, NICE will reflect on and rearticulate its goals and values and thereby renew its moral mandate to set healthcare priorities on society’s behalf.
- Open Access
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Medical Ethics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-22
An empirical ethics study of the coherence of NICE technology appraisal policy and its implications for moral justification
Background: As the UK’s main healthcare priority-setter, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has good reason to want to demonstrate that its decisions are morally justified. In doing so, it has tended to rely on the moral plausibility of its principle of cost-effectiveness and the assertion that it has adopted a fair procedure. But neither approach provides wholly satisfactory grounds for morally defending NICE’s decisions. In this study we adopt a complementary approach, based on the proposition that a priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the coherence of its approach and that the reliability of any such claim is undermined by the presence of dissonance within its moral system. This study is the first to empirically assess the coherence of NICE’s formal approach and in doing so to generate evidence-based conclusions about the extent to which this approach is morally justified. Methods: The study is grounded in the theory, methods and standards of empirical bioethics. Twenty NICE policy documents were coded to identify and classify the normative commitments contained within NICE technology appraisal policy as of 31 December 2021. Coherence was systematically assessed by attempting to bring these commitments into narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) and by identifying sources of dissonance. Findings: Much of NICE policy rests on coherent values that provide a strong foundation for morally justified decision-making. However, NICE’s formal approach also contains several instances of dissonance which undermine coherence and prevent NRE from being fully established. Dissonance arises primarily from four sources: i) NICE’s specification of the principle of cost-effectiveness; ii) its approach to prioritising the needs of particular groups; iii) its conception of reasonableness in the context of uncertainty, and iv) its concern for innovation as an independent value. Conclusion: At the time of analysis, the level of coherence across NICE policy provides reason to question the extent to which its formal approach to technology appraisal is morally justified. Some thoughts are offered on why, given these findings, NICE has been able to maintain its legitimacy as a healthcare priority-setter and on what could be done to enhance coherence.
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Medical Ethics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 1-22
Open AccessAn empirical ethics study of the coherence of NICE technology appraisal policy and its implications for moral justification
Background: As the UK’s main healthcare priority-setter, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has good reason to want to demonstrate that its decisions are morally justified. In doing so, it has tended to rely on the moral plausibility of its principle of cost-effectiveness and the assertion that it has adopted a fair procedure. But neither approach provides wholly satisfactory grounds for morally defending NICE’s decisions. In this study we adopt a complementary approach, based on the proposition that a priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the coherence of its approach and that the reliability of any such claim is undermined by the presence of dissonance within its moral system. This study is the first to empirically assess the coherence of NICE’s formal approach and in doing so to generate evidence-based conclusions about the extent to which this approach is morally justified. Methods: The study is grounded in the theory, methods and standards of empirical bioethics. Twenty NICE policy documents were coded to identify and classify the normative commitments contained within NICE technology appraisal policy as of 31 December 2021. Coherence was systematically assessed by attempting to bring these commitments into narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) and by identifying sources of dissonance. Findings: Much of NICE policy rests on coherent values that provide a strong foundation for morally justified decision-making. However, NICE’s formal approach also contains several instances of dissonance which undermine coherence and prevent NRE from being fully established. Dissonance arises primarily from four sources: i) NICE’s specification of the principle of cost-effectiveness; ii) its approach to prioritising the needs of particular groups; iii) its conception of reasonableness in the context of uncertainty, and iv) its concern for innovation as an independent value. Conclusion: At the time of analysis, the level of coherence across NICE policy provides reason to question the extent to which its formal approach to technology appraisal is morally justified. Some thoughts are offered on why, given these findings, NICE has been able to maintain its legitimacy as a healthcare priority-setter and on what could be done to enhance coherence.
- Open Access
- 19 February 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 50 (12) , 835-840
The ethical canary: narrow reflective equilibrium as a source of moral justification in healthcare priority-setting
Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice.
- 19 February 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 50 (12) , 835-840
Open AccessThe ethical canary: narrow reflective equilibrium as a source of moral justification in healthcare priority-setting
Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice.
- Open Access
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
We need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 19 (2) , 153-173
Open AccessWe need to talk about values: a proposed framework for the articulation of normative reasoning in health technology assessment
It is acknowledged that health technology assessment (HTA) is an inherently value-based activity that makes use of normative reasoning alongside empirical evidence. But the language used to conceptualise and articulate HTA's normative aspects is demonstrably unnuanced, imprecise, and inconsistently employed, undermining transparency and preventing proper scrutiny of the rationales on which decisions are based. This paper – developed through a cross-disciplinary collaboration of 24 researchers with expertise in healthcare priority-setting – seeks to address this problem by offering a clear definition of key terms and distinguishing between the types of normative commitment invoked during HTA, thus providing a novel conceptual framework for the articulation of reasoning. Through application to a hypothetical case, it is illustrated how this framework can operate as a practical tool through which HTA practitioners and policymakers can enhance the transparency and coherence of their decision-making, while enabling others to hold them more easily to account. The framework is offered as a starting point for further discussion amongst those with a desire to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of HTA by facilitating practical public reasoning, in which decisions are made on behalf of the public, in public view, through a chain of reasoning that withstands ethical scrutiny.
- 27 January 2023
- Published by BMJ in BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine
- Vol. 28 (4) , 247-250
All health is not equal: the use of modifiers in NICE technology appraisal
Nineteen years on, NICE has maintained its reputation as an innovator, and its methods have evolved considerably.2 3 One change concerns its adoption of numerical ‘modifiers’ to adjust how the health needs of different groups are prioritised in evaluating new technologies. This article describes NICE’s current modifiers and briefly considers the implications of their use.
- 27 January 2023
- Published by BMJ in BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine
- Vol. 28 (4) , 247-250
All health is not equal: the use of modifiers in NICE technology appraisal
Nineteen years on, NICE has maintained its reputation as an innovator, and its methods have evolved considerably.2 3 One change concerns its adoption of numerical ‘modifiers’ to adjust how the health needs of different groups are prioritised in evaluating new technologies. This article describes NICE’s current modifiers and briefly considers the implications of their use.
NICE’s new methods: putting innovation first, but at what cost?
Traditionally the gatekeeper to the NHS, NICE has increasingly reoriented its role towards facilitating access to innovative technologies. This change has clear benefits for some patients, but the costs shouldered by others risk going unacknowledged, say Victoria Charlton and colleagues
NICE’s new methods: putting innovation first, but at what cost?
Traditionally the gatekeeper to the NHS, NICE has increasingly reoriented its role towards facilitating access to innovative technologies. This change has clear benefits for some patients, but the costs shouldered by others risk going unacknowledged, say Victoria Charlton and colleagues
- Open Access
- 13 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Health Services
- Vol. 2, 889423
The ethics of aggregation in cost-effectiveness analysis or, “on books, bookshelves, and budget impact”
In deciding how to allocate resources, healthcare priority-setters are increasingly paying attention to an intervention's budget impact alongside its cost-effectiveness. Some argue that approaches that use budget impact as a substantive consideration unfairly disadvantage individuals who belong to large patient groups. Others reject such claims of “numerical discrimination” on the grounds that consideration of the full budget impact of an intervention's adoption is necessary to properly estimate opportunity cost. This paper summarizes this debate and advances a new argument against modifying the cost-effectiveness threshold used for decision-making based on a technology's anticipated budget impact. In making this argument, the paper sets out how the apparent link between budget impact and opportunity cost is largely broken if the effects of a technology's adoption are disaggregated, while highlighting that the theoretical aggregation of effects during cost-effectiveness analysis likely only poorly reflects the operation of the health system in practice. As such, it identifies a need for healthcare priority-setters to be cognizant of the ethical implications associated with aggregating the effects of a technology's adoption for the purpose of decision-making. Throughout the paper, these arguments are illustrated with reference to a “bookshelf” analogy borrowed from previous work.
- 13 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Health Services
- Vol. 2, 889423
Open AccessThe ethics of aggregation in cost-effectiveness analysis or, “on books, bookshelves, and budget impact”
In deciding how to allocate resources, healthcare priority-setters are increasingly paying attention to an intervention's budget impact alongside its cost-effectiveness. Some argue that approaches that use budget impact as a substantive consideration unfairly disadvantage individuals who belong to large patient groups. Others reject such claims of “numerical discrimination” on the grounds that consideration of the full budget impact of an intervention's adoption is necessary to properly estimate opportunity cost. This paper summarizes this debate and advances a new argument against modifying the cost-effectiveness threshold used for decision-making based on a technology's anticipated budget impact. In making this argument, the paper sets out how the apparent link between budget impact and opportunity cost is largely broken if the effects of a technology's adoption are disaggregated, while highlighting that the theoretical aggregation of effects during cost-effectiveness analysis likely only poorly reflects the operation of the health system in practice. As such, it identifies a need for healthcare priority-setters to be cognizant of the ethical implications associated with aggregating the effects of a technology's adoption for the purpose of decision-making. Throughout the paper, these arguments are illustrated with reference to a “bookshelf” analogy borrowed from previous work.
- Open Access
- 16 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1-27
The normative grounds for NICE decision-making: a narrative cross-disciplinary review of empirical studies
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK's primary health care priority-setter, responsible for advising the National Health Service on its adoption of health technologies. The normative basis for NICE's advice has long been the subject of public and academic interest, but the existing literature does not include any comprehensive summary of the factors observed to have substantively shaped NICE's recommendations. The current review addresses this gap by bringing together 29 studies that have explored NICE decision-making from different disciplinary perspectives, using a range of quantitative and qualitative methods. It finds that although cost-effectiveness has historically played a central role in NICE decision-making, 10 other factors (uncertainty, budget impact, clinical need, innovation, rarity, age, cause of disease, wider societal impacts, stakeholder influence and process factors) are also demonstrably influential and interact with one another in ways that are not well understood. The review also highlights an over-representation in the literature of appraisals conducted prior to 2009, according to methods that have since been superseded. It suggests that this may present a misleading view of the importance of allocative efficiency to NICE's current approach and illustrates the need for further up-to-date research into the normative grounds for NICE's decisions.
- 16 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Health Economics, Policy and Law
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1-27
Open AccessThe normative grounds for NICE decision-making: a narrative cross-disciplinary review of empirical studies
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK's primary health care priority-setter, responsible for advising the National Health Service on its adoption of health technologies. The normative basis for NICE's advice has long been the subject of public and academic interest, but the existing literature does not include any comprehensive summary of the factors observed to have substantively shaped NICE's recommendations. The current review addresses this gap by bringing together 29 studies that have explored NICE decision-making from different disciplinary perspectives, using a range of quantitative and qualitative methods. It finds that although cost-effectiveness has historically played a central role in NICE decision-making, 10 other factors (uncertainty, budget impact, clinical need, innovation, rarity, age, cause of disease, wider societal impacts, stakeholder influence and process factors) are also demonstrably influential and interact with one another in ways that are not well understood. The review also highlights an over-representation in the literature of appraisals conducted prior to 2009, according to methods that have since been superseded. It suggests that this may present a misleading view of the importance of allocative efficiency to NICE's current approach and illustrates the need for further up-to-date research into the normative grounds for NICE's decisions.
- Open Access
- 8 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 30 (2) , 115-145
Justice, Transparency and the Guiding Principles of the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK’s primary healthcare priority-setting body, responsible for advising the National Health Service in England on which technologies to fund and which to reject. Until recently, the normative approach underlying this advice was described in a 2008 document entitled ‘Social value judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance’ (SVJ). In January 2020, however, NICE replaced SVJ with a new articulation of its guiding principles. Given the significant evolution of NICE’s methods between 2008 and 2020, this study examines whether this new document (‘Principles’) offers a transparent account of NICE’s current normative approach. It finds that it does not, deriving much of its content directly from SVJ and failing to fully acknowledge or explain how and why NICE’s approach has since changed. In particular, Principles is found to offer a largely procedural account of NICE decision-making, despite evidence of the increasing reliance of NICE’s methods on substantive decision-rules and ‘modifiers’ that cannot be justified in purely procedural terms. Thus, while Principles tells NICE’s stakeholders much about how the organisation goes about the process of decision-making, it tells them little about the substantive grounds on which its decisions are now based. It is therefore argued that Principles does not offer a transparent account of NICE’s normative approach (either alone, or alongside other documents) and that, given NICE’s reliance on transparency as a requirement of procedural justice, NICE does not in this respect satisfy its own specification of a just decision-maker.
- 8 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 30 (2) , 115-145
Open AccessJustice, Transparency and the Guiding Principles of the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK’s primary healthcare priority-setting body, responsible for advising the National Health Service in England on which technologies to fund and which to reject. Until recently, the normative approach underlying this advice was described in a 2008 document entitled ‘Social value judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance’ (SVJ). In January 2020, however, NICE replaced SVJ with a new articulation of its guiding principles. Given the significant evolution of NICE’s methods between 2008 and 2020, this study examines whether this new document (‘Principles’) offers a transparent account of NICE’s current normative approach. It finds that it does not, deriving much of its content directly from SVJ and failing to fully acknowledge or explain how and why NICE’s approach has since changed. In particular, Principles is found to offer a largely procedural account of NICE decision-making, despite evidence of the increasing reliance of NICE’s methods on substantive decision-rules and ‘modifiers’ that cannot be justified in purely procedural terms. Thus, while Principles tells NICE’s stakeholders much about how the organisation goes about the process of decision-making, it tells them little about the substantive grounds on which its decisions are now based. It is therefore argued that Principles does not offer a transparent account of NICE’s normative approach (either alone, or alongside other documents) and that, given NICE’s reliance on transparency as a requirement of procedural justice, NICE does not in this respect satisfy its own specification of a just decision-maker.