Yang Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yang Li has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kazuo Sakiyama
Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications
16 shared publications - Daiki Miyahara
The University of Electro-Communications
9 shared publications Kazuo Sakiyama
The University of Electro-Communications
6 shared publications- Yuko Hara-Azumi
Institute of Science Tokyo
6 shared publications - Haruka Hirata
The University of Electro-Communications
4 shared publications - Mingyu Yang
Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Masked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Open AccessMasked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- Open Access
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Advancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Open AccessAdvancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 290-304
Toward Cost-Effective Combined Countermeasures: Multiplicative Masked M&M
With the advancement of hardware security, combined attacks incorporating side-channel analysis (SCA) and fault analysis (FA) have driven the development of combined countermeasures. However, these countermeasures often incur significant overhead. In this paper, we propose a method to reduce the randomness requirement while maintaining security claims. We demonstrate the approach with Masks & Macs (M&M), a scheme that integrates Boolean masking and MAC tag redundancy to provide protection against SCA and differential fault analysis (DFA), addressing its substantial overhead, particularly the high randomness requirement. We introduce a novel multiplicative masking scheme to partially replace Boolean masked modules, achieving a reduction of over 50% in randomness requirement with a minor increase in FPGA resource overhead and latency. Through both theoretical and practical analyses, we prove that our approach maintains the same security claims against SCA, FA, and combined attacks as the original M&M-AES. Additionally, we discuss the feasibility of low-cost countermeasures against statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA). This work provides a new perspective on enhancing combined countermeasures by reducing system overhead.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 290-304
Open AccessToward Cost-Effective Combined Countermeasures: Multiplicative Masked M&M
With the advancement of hardware security, combined attacks incorporating side-channel analysis (SCA) and fault analysis (FA) have driven the development of combined countermeasures. However, these countermeasures often incur significant overhead. In this paper, we propose a method to reduce the randomness requirement while maintaining security claims. We demonstrate the approach with Masks & Macs (M&M), a scheme that integrates Boolean masking and MAC tag redundancy to provide protection against SCA and differential fault analysis (DFA), addressing its substantial overhead, particularly the high randomness requirement. We introduce a novel multiplicative masking scheme to partially replace Boolean masked modules, achieving a reduction of over 50% in randomness requirement with a minor increase in FPGA resource overhead and latency. Through both theoretical and practical analyses, we prove that our approach maintains the same security claims against SCA, FA, and combined attacks as the original M&M-AES. Additionally, we discuss the feasibility of low-cost countermeasures against statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA). This work provides a new perspective on enhancing combined countermeasures by reducing system overhead.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 889-891
Fault Sensitivity Analysis
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 152-166
Exploring Leakage Characteristics and Attacks Through Profiles of Screaming Channels
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 152-166
Exploring Leakage Characteristics and Attacks Through Profiles of Screaming Channels