Kazuo Sakiyama
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kazuo Sakiyama has a total of 91 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yang Li
The University of Electro-Communications
16 shared publications - Daiki Miyahara
The University of Electro-Communications
13 shared publications - Takeshi Sugawara
The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
7 shared publications - Yuko Hara-Azumi
Institute of Science Tokyo
7 shared publications - Kazuo Ohta
Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
6 shared publications Yang Li
Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Masked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Open AccessMasked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- Open Access
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Advancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Open AccessAdvancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 889-891
Fault Sensitivity Analysis
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- Open Access
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E108.A (3) , 193-206
Practical Randomness Effects on Physical Security in Second-Order Threshold Implementation of AES
Physical attacks against cryptographic hardware have become a major threat. For example, side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit information leakage from power consumption and electromagnetic radiation during encryption to recover secret keys. We recognize them as a powerful threat because the attackers can conduct them using relatively inexpensive equipment. Thus, embedded systems based on cryptographic hardware need to be secure against SCAs. Threshold Implementation (TI) is widely studied as an effective countermeasure against SCAs. Each sensitive intermediate value is divided into multiple values called shares using random bits, and each share is performed to realize the cryptographic algorithm securely. TI requires three important properties for secure computation: correctness, non-completeness, and uniformity. Note that non-linear operation, e.g., AES S-box, cannot preserve perfect uniformity. Compensating for the lack of uniformity, the intermediate values must be re-masked using a large amount of fresh random numbers, called refreshing. Therefore, it is necessary to use random numbers in random number generators (RNGs) to implement TI, but the security requirements for randomness in such RNGs are not yet well-discussed. In this paper, we investigate the impact of practical randomness on security against SCAs. More specifically, we implement AES hardware protected by second-order TI on an FPGA to evaluate the security in cases where the random number used for dividing the secret value into shares is fixed or random. Furthermore, we also explore information leakage in the case where randomized or fixed seed values are sent to the RNG used in refreshing or where the frequency of random number updates is reduced. Based on these results, we discuss practical randomness suitable for TI-based hardware countermeasures.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E108.A (3) , 193-206
Open AccessPractical Randomness Effects on Physical Security in Second-Order Threshold Implementation of AES
Physical attacks against cryptographic hardware have become a major threat. For example, side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit information leakage from power consumption and electromagnetic radiation during encryption to recover secret keys. We recognize them as a powerful threat because the attackers can conduct them using relatively inexpensive equipment. Thus, embedded systems based on cryptographic hardware need to be secure against SCAs. Threshold Implementation (TI) is widely studied as an effective countermeasure against SCAs. Each sensitive intermediate value is divided into multiple values called shares using random bits, and each share is performed to realize the cryptographic algorithm securely. TI requires three important properties for secure computation: correctness, non-completeness, and uniformity. Note that non-linear operation, e.g., AES S-box, cannot preserve perfect uniformity. Compensating for the lack of uniformity, the intermediate values must be re-masked using a large amount of fresh random numbers, called refreshing. Therefore, it is necessary to use random numbers in random number generators (RNGs) to implement TI, but the security requirements for randomness in such RNGs are not yet well-discussed. In this paper, we investigate the impact of practical randomness on security against SCAs. More specifically, we implement AES hardware protected by second-order TI on an FPGA to evaluate the security in cases where the random number used for dividing the secret value into shares is fixed or random. Furthermore, we also explore information leakage in the case where randomized or fixed seed values are sent to the RNG used in refreshing or where the frequency of random number updates is reduced. Based on these results, we discuss practical randomness suitable for TI-based hardware countermeasures.