Lise Vesterlund
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Lise Vesterlund has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gerhard Oskar Orosel
University of Vienna
2 shared publications - Marco Ottaviani
Bocconi University - Department of Economics
2 shared publications - Maria P. Recalde
Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia
2 shared publications - Subir Bose
Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, USA
2 shared publications - Alistair J. Wilson
Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
1 shared publication Ania Jaroszewicz
Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 455-475
Gender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Equalizing Outcomes
- 19 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 455-475
Gender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Equalizing Outcomes
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 March 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 107 (3) , 714-747
Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability
Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender segregation in labor markets. We examine the allocation of a task that everyone prefers be completed by someone else (writing a report, serving on a committee, etc.) and find evidence that women, more than men, volunteer, are asked to volunteer, and accept requests to volunteer for such tasks. Beliefs that women, more than men, say yes to tasks with low promotability appear as an important driver of these differences. If women hold tasks that are less promotable than those held by men, then women will progress more slowly in organizations. (JEL I23, J16, J44, J71, M12, M51)
- 1 March 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 107 (3) , 714-747
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessGender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability
Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender segregation in labor markets. We examine the allocation of a task that everyone prefers be completed by someone else (writing a report, serving on a committee, etc.) and find evidence that women, more than men, volunteer, are asked to volunteer, and accept requests to volunteer for such tasks. Beliefs that women, more than men, say yes to tasks with low promotability appear as an important driver of these differences. If women hold tasks that are less promotable than those held by men, then women will progress more slowly in organizations. (JEL I23, J16, J44, J71, M12, M51)
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-12
The slider task: an example of restricted inference on incentive effects
Real-effort experiments are frequently used when examining a response to incentives. For a real-effort task to be well suited for such an exercise its measurable output must be sufficiently elastic over the incentives considered. The popular slider task in Gill and Prowse (Am Econ Rev 102(1):469–503, 2012) has been characterized as satisfying this requirement, and the task is increasingly used to investigate the response to incentives. However, a between-subject examination of the slider task’s response to incentives has not been conducted. We provide such an examination with three different piece-rate incentives: half a cent, two cents, and eight cents per slider completed. We find only a small increase in performance: despite a 1500 % increase in the incentives, output only increases by 5 %. With such an inelastic response we caution that for typical experimental sample sizes and incentives the slider task is unlikely to demonstrate a meaningful and statistically significant performance response.
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 1-12
The slider task: an example of restricted inference on incentive effects
Real-effort experiments are frequently used when examining a response to incentives. For a real-effort task to be well suited for such an exercise its measurable output must be sufficiently elastic over the incentives considered. The popular slider task in Gill and Prowse (Am Econ Rev 102(1):469–503, 2012) has been characterized as satisfying this requirement, and the task is increasingly used to investigate the response to incentives. However, a between-subject examination of the slider task’s response to incentives has not been conducted. We provide such an examination with three different piece-rate incentives: half a cent, two cents, and eight cents per slider completed. We find only a small increase in performance: despite a 1500 % increase in the incentives, output only increases by 5 %. With such an inelastic response we caution that for typical experimental sample sizes and incentives the slider task is unlikely to demonstrate a meaningful and statistically significant performance response.
- 19 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 12 (4) , 709-735
The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving
Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether the success of this solicitation ordering in part can be attributed to the fact that it enables individuals to select organizations that have a high‐status donor base. Assuming that individuals prefer to associate with individuals of higher social ranking we use a simple linear model to show that both aggregate donations and earnings are larger when high‐status donors are solicited first. We investigate the predicted comparative statics using the experimental laboratory. Inducing a status differential we reverse the contribution ordering between participants of high and low status. Consistent with current fundraising practice, we find that low‐status followers are likely to mimic donations by high‐status leaders and this encourages high‐status leaders to give. Donations are therefore larger when individuals of high status give before rather than after those of low status.
- 19 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 12 (4) , 709-735
The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving
Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether the success of this solicitation ordering in part can be attributed to the fact that it enables individuals to select organizations that have a high‐status donor base. Assuming that individuals prefer to associate with individuals of higher social ranking we use a simple linear model to show that both aggregate donations and earnings are larger when high‐status donors are solicited first. We investigate the predicted comparative statics using the experimental laboratory. Inducing a status differential we reverse the contribution ordering between participants of high and low status. Consistent with current fundraising practice, we find that low‐status followers are likely to mimic donations by high‐status leaders and this encourages high‐status leaders to give. Donations are therefore larger when individuals of high status give before rather than after those of low status.
- Open Access
- 7 October 2008
- Published by MIT Press in Negotiation Journal
- Vol. 24 (4) , 447-463
Gender Differences in Competition
Negotiating in a highly competitive environment may prove particularly challenging for women. We describe three experimental studies that investigated and documented differences in the competitive behaviors of men and women. The first study examined gender differences in competitive performances. In a setting in which men and women performed at similar levels in single-sex competitions, men were found to outperform women in mixed-sex competitions. The second study focused on the decision of men and women to enter a competition. In a mixed-sex setting in which we found no gender differences in performance, many more men than women chose a compensation scheme in which they had to compete against others. Finally, we report the results of a recent study that examined an institutional intervention that may encourage more women to compete. Specifically, we found that a quota-like affirmative action environment in which women must be equally represented encourages many more women to compete. This response was greater than one would predict based solely on the increase in one's chances of winning and can be partially explained by the fact that the affirmative action competition was more gender specific.
- 7 October 2008
- Published by MIT Press in Negotiation Journal
- Vol. 24 (4) , 447-463
Open AccessGender Differences in Competition
Negotiating in a highly competitive environment may prove particularly challenging for women. We describe three experimental studies that investigated and documented differences in the competitive behaviors of men and women. The first study examined gender differences in competitive performances. In a setting in which men and women performed at similar levels in single-sex competitions, men were found to outperform women in mixed-sex competitions. The second study focused on the decision of men and women to enter a competition. In a mixed-sex setting in which we found no gender differences in performance, many more men than women chose a compensation scheme in which they had to compete against others. Finally, we report the results of a recent study that examined an institutional intervention that may encourage more women to compete. Specifically, we found that a quota-like affirmative action environment in which women must be equally represented encourages many more women to compete. This response was greater than one would predict based solely on the increase in one's chances of winning and can be partially explained by the fact that the affirmative action competition was more gender specific.
- 23 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-241
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
- 23 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 37 (2) , 203-241
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
- Open Access
- 11 January 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 33 (1) , 169-182
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- 11 January 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 33 (1) , 169-182
Open AccessLeading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (4) , 910-928
Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (4) , 910-928
Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding