Alexandr Burilkov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexandr Burilkov has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guntram B. Wolff
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
2 shared publications - Javier Ospital1 shared publication
- Juan Mejino-López
Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and Bruegel
1 shared publication Julian Voje
1 shared publicationKatelyn Bushnell
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Germany)
1 shared publication- Oldrich Bures
Center for Security Studies, Metropolitan University Prague
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s strategic bet on US technology for air superiority is unravelling
Europe’s bet on the US defence industrial base for air defence is fast becoming a major strategic liability in the face of the Russian threat
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s strategic bet on US technology for air superiority is unravelling
Europe’s bet on the US defence industrial base for air defence is fast becoming a major strategic liability in the face of the Russian threat
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2663891
Fit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia
This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2663891
Top Cited PapersFit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia
This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
- 11 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 36-54
Russian maritime strategy since the Ukrainian crisis
Relations between the West and Russia have markedly deteriorated since 2014 as a result of the annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, Russian intervention in Syria, and perceived interference in electoral processes in the U.S. as well as a number of EU states. Despite near-constant decline in capabilities since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a significant naval power, second by tonnage after the U.S. and third in number of ships after the U.S. and China, though the Navy is geographically dispersed. 1 The Russian Navy has been involved in several high-profile actions since 2014. The resupply of Russian forces in the Syrian conflict has been the most prominent example of power projection, but Russian antagonism in the North Sea and the Baltic is particularly relevant for NATO’s European member states, especially the newer Eastern members. 2 The election of President Trump in 2016 has not particularly altered the Russian naval calculus, and even the first meeting between Trump and Putin, in July 2017 at the G20 in Hamburg, is unlikely to do so, despite discussion of cooperation on security issues such as cybersecurity. In practical terms, the Trump presidency has not substantively altered the course of U.S. foreign policy in the areas considered vital to Russia, such as the sanctions, the Ukrainian question, or American commitment to collective security in Europe through NATO. As the Russians are very unlikely to unilaterally commit to de-escalation, the course of Russian naval strategy will continue regardless of the transfer of power in Washington.
- 11 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 36-54
Russian maritime strategy since the Ukrainian crisis
Relations between the West and Russia have markedly deteriorated since 2014 as a result of the annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, Russian intervention in Syria, and perceived interference in electoral processes in the U.S. as well as a number of EU states. Despite near-constant decline in capabilities since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a significant naval power, second by tonnage after the U.S. and third in number of ships after the U.S. and China, though the Navy is geographically dispersed. 1 The Russian Navy has been involved in several high-profile actions since 2014. The resupply of Russian forces in the Syrian conflict has been the most prominent example of power projection, but Russian antagonism in the North Sea and the Baltic is particularly relevant for NATO’s European member states, especially the newer Eastern members. 2 The election of President Trump in 2016 has not particularly altered the Russian naval calculus, and even the first meeting between Trump and Putin, in July 2017 at the G20 in Hamburg, is unlikely to do so, despite discussion of cooperation on security issues such as cybersecurity. In practical terms, the Trump presidency has not substantively altered the course of U.S. foreign policy in the areas considered vital to Russia, such as the sanctions, the Ukrainian question, or American commitment to collective security in Europe through NATO. As the Russians are very unlikely to unilaterally commit to de-escalation, the course of Russian naval strategy will continue regardless of the transfer of power in Washington.
- Open Access
- 16 September 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 23 (3) , 654-680
Institutional pioneers in world politics: Regional institution building and the influence of the European Union
What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of ‘diffusion theory’ — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization’s structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union’s own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.
- 16 September 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 23 (3) , 654-680
Open AccessInstitutional pioneers in world politics: Regional institution building and the influence of the European Union
What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of ‘diffusion theory’ — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization’s structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union’s own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.
- 25 July 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quarterly
- Vol. 34 (6) , 1037-1053
Maritime Strategies of Rising Powers: developments in China and Russia
This paper seeks to uncover the drivers of maritime strategy formulation in Russia and China, two active players on the international stage that have often been identified as both rising and regional powers. The paper takes as its starting point the realist theory of state power and threat perception, which provide the means and motivation for states to accumulate material capabilities in an effort to safeguard their position in the international system. Given the increasing pressures of a changing security environment, China’s and Russia’s maritime strategies show a trend towards greater complexity and capability. The paper also addresses the impact of the revolution in military affairs ( rma ) and its subsequent manifestation as force transformation in Western states, especially the USA. Given that this new, qualitatively focused way of war has gained supremacy, at least where high-intensity inter-state war is concerned, the question remains of whether the Chinese and Russians will choose to emulate the leading powers in the system or, instead, will forge into the unknown and formulate an entirely different and innovative maritime strategy.
- 25 July 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quarterly
- Vol. 34 (6) , 1037-1053
Maritime Strategies of Rising Powers: developments in China and Russia
This paper seeks to uncover the drivers of maritime strategy formulation in Russia and China, two active players on the international stage that have often been identified as both rising and regional powers. The paper takes as its starting point the realist theory of state power and threat perception, which provide the means and motivation for states to accumulate material capabilities in an effort to safeguard their position in the international system. Given the increasing pressures of a changing security environment, China’s and Russia’s maritime strategies show a trend towards greater complexity and capability. The paper also addresses the impact of the revolution in military affairs ( rma ) and its subsequent manifestation as force transformation in Western states, especially the USA. Given that this new, qualitatively focused way of war has gained supremacy, at least where high-intensity inter-state war is concerned, the question remains of whether the Chinese and Russians will choose to emulate the leading powers in the system or, instead, will forge into the unknown and formulate an entirely different and innovative maritime strategy.
- 26 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-225
Russlands maritime Strategie im 21. Jahrhundert: Im Spannungsfeld zwischen neuen und klassischen Bedrohungswahrnehmungen
- 26 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-225
Russlands maritime Strategie im 21. Jahrhundert: Im Spannungsfeld zwischen neuen und klassischen Bedrohungswahrnehmungen