JMJuan Mejino-López

Juan Mejino-López

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Juan Mejino-López has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Europe’s dependence on US foreign military sales: evidence for policy makers from a new database

    by Juan Mejino-López, Guntram B. Wolff

    1Europe faces a deteriorating threat scenario with an aggressive and increasingly assertive Russia at a moment of a significant disruption in the transatlantic relationship. The state of transatlan...

  • Pivot to Asia, Europe or the Homeland? 18 Years of US Foreign Military Sales

    by Juan Mejino‐López, Javier Ospital, Guntram B. Wolff

    Subsequent US administrations have shifted the focus of US foreign policy over the last decades. A pivot to Asia characterised President Obama's administrations while President Biden focused on Europe. President Trump's second administration emphasises homeland security and the Western hemisphere. Meanwhile, the Middle East continues to be an important focus of US foreign policy. But do these ‘pivots’ result in different weapon export patterns, one of the key resources of US foreign policy? The US defence industrial base produces the most advanced weapons in the world and they are in high demand thanks to their effectiveness. In this paper, we analyse all US foreign military sales notifications since 2008 based on a novel database. Our descriptive evidence does not show a ‘pivot to Asia’ during the Obama presidency while exports to Europe have increased substantially during the Biden presidency and Russia's war against Ukraine. The first Trump administration shows no clear shift towards Asia nor towards the homeland but in the second administration, first evidence suggests that FMS are declining while the US military is substantially increasing its demand from the US defence industrial base—consistent with a shift to the homeland. Three policy implications emerge. First, while strategies set the tone, the United States has historically reacted to actual needs as they emerge, a factor that US defence companies need to consider. Second, from the perspective of recipient countries of weapon sales, US ‘pivots’ need to be taken with a grain of salt. Finally, military planners, especially in Europe, need to prepare for less dependence on the US military industrial base given the general uncertainty and the much more forceful shift in US policy during the current administration compared to previous ‘pivots’.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Fit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia

    by Alexandr Burilkov, Katelyn Bushnell, Juan Mejino-López, Thomas Morgan, Guntram Wolff

    This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.


  • Who controls the defence industry?

    by Marco Becht, Juan Mejino-López, Guntram B. Wolff

    Defence markets exhibit extreme asset specificity and bilateral monopoly. Transaction-cost economics predicts state ownership or control in such circumstances. This paper examines what governments actually do. Ownership alone does not determine control. A state with zero equity can have influence through governance provisions and legal tools. Using large language model extraction from annual reports, we compile a dataset on corporate governance and state control for the largest 112 defence companies by revenue in 24 countries. We construct a novel state influence index aggregating voting power, voting enhancements, board appointment and veto rights. State ownership is bimodal: full state ownership at one end, no state ownership at the other. Formal control varies independently. China and Russia combine full ownership with full control. The United States has no ownership and little formal control, relying instead on security agreements, revenue dependence and personnel interchange. The rest of the distribution is dispersed. Some countries combine minority equity with legal devices that amplify formal control well beyond ownership stakes. Others rely on regulatory mechanisms with little or no formal governance authority. In several cases, states have delegated control to domestic families operating under implicit state leverage. Corporate governance mechanisms matter most when defence entities operate beyond the home state’s jurisdiction, where regulatory authority alone does not reach. A complementary State Restraint Index shows that European companies with high state influence also score highly on voluntary self-limitation, consistent with credible commitment to attract private capital. Cross-border cooperation is producing new governance architectures that partition operations across national subsidiaries to reconcile economies of scale with sovereign control. The observed patterns are consistent with basic predictions of transaction cost economics and property rights theory: higher asset specificity and bilateral dependence are associated with stronger state control, though the institutional form varies with legal tradition and political economy.

  • Open Access

    The state of financial knowledge in the European Union: a new survey

    by Maria Demertzis, Juan Mejino-López, Luca Léry Moffat

    For the very first time, in the Spring of 2023, the European Commission (EC) carried out a survey across all member states to assess their level of financial literacy. This survey complements other national surveys and fills an important gap because it provides a consistent metric that allows comparisons among the European Union (EU) countries. The motivation behind the EC’s survey stems from the need to advance the state of financial literacy to safeguard financial stability and promote important projects, such as the creation of a Capital Markets Union. In this paper, we analyze these new data and confirm findings in the literature about the importance of being financially knowledgeable to achieve good financial outcomes. Unfortunately, the survey also confirms that barely one in two individuals, on average in the EU, is financially literate.


  • Open Access

    Abatement and transaction costs of water reallocation

    by C. Dionisio Pérez-Blanco, Adam Loch, Juan Mejino-López, Laura Gil-García, David Adamson, Pablo Saiz-Santiago, José Antonio Ortega