Nieves Gómez Aguilar

In today’s technological and digital society, education in digital competencies through which students can make critical and safe use of the Information Society Technologies for work, leisure, and communication, is essential. This paper presents a serious game based on interactive fiction for the self-assessment of digital competence according to the DigComp European model. In addition, it describes the evaluation of the perception of use of the serious game to assess the digital competence of secondary school students, in terms of user experience and usability, with the goal to obtain indications of the software quality of the developed digital tool from the point of view of teachers. The obtained results provide positive evidence of the effectiveness of the serious game as a tool for the assessment of students’ digital competence and the motivation of students towards the use of this kind of resource instead of traditional methods. In addition, the teachers’ perception of use of the game highlights the satisfaction and ease of use, as well as the attractiveness and fun that the game offers to the students.

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Information about the paper titled "INTERNAL EVALUATION OF ERASMUS+ PROJECTS: THE CASE OF ELSE PROJECT" at IATED Digital Library

ResumenLa dependencia económica del auditor respecto de su cliente es considerada una amenaza para su independencia. El comité de auditoría puede actuar como salvaguarda, sin embargo, es una medida creada por la empresa auditada y de ella depende que cuente con las características necesarias para ser eficaz. Este trabajo analiza si las empresas gradúan el nivel de independencia del comité de auditoría dependiendo del nivel de dependencia económica de su auditor. Aplicando la técnica de datos de panel a una muestra de empresas españolas cotizadas entre los años 1998 y 2005, los resultados confirman la existencia de una relación significativa entre el nivel de independencia del comité de auditoría y el nivel de dependencia económica del auditor, siendo las empresas con auditores menos dependientes las que forman comités más independientes. Estos resultados suponen una importante contribución a la literatura previa en tanto que aportan evidencia sobre la estrategia seguida por las empresas en el diseño conjunto de mecanismos de garantía de la calidad de la información financiera. Asimismo, se han obtenido teniendo en cuenta algunas de las limitaciones metodológicas que han sido señaladas como principales obstáculos en las investigaciones sobre gobierno corporativo, tales como la endogeneidad y la heterogeneidad inobservable.AbstractLiterature states that the auditor's economic bond on a client company could undermine auditor independence. One of the primary functions of an audit committee is to safeguard auditor independence. However, the audit committee is a mechanism within the governance structure of the client firm. Therefore, it depends on this firm that its audit committee possesses the characteristics necessary to be effective. This study analyses whether firms’ decision regarding the degree of independence of the audit committee is determined by the level of economic dependence of their auditors. By mean of a panel data analysis in a sample of Spanish companies between 1998 and 2005, results confirm the existence of a significant relation between the level of independence of the audit committee and the degree of economic dependence of the auditor. Moreover, firms with auditors less economically dependent are those which establish more independent audit committees. These results represent an important contribution to previous literature as provide evidence concerning the strategy followed by firms in the joint design of mechanisms which guarantee the quality of financial reporting system. In addition, they were obtained taking into consideration some of the methodological limitations that have been identified as major obstacles in research on corporate governance, such as endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity

SUMMARY: In this study, we document evidence on the impact of mandatory rotation of audit firms on auditor independence using Spanish archival data. Rotation of audit firms every nine years was mandatory in Spain from 1988–1995. Although the rule was never enforced, the Spanish context provides a unique setting to examine the effects that mandatory audit firm rotation has on auditor behavior. We examine audit reports for a sample of financially stressed companies from 1991–2000 to compare audit reporting behavior in a regime with rotation (mandatory rotation period: 1991–1994) and one without rotation (post-mandatory rotation period: 1995–2000). We test two competing hypotheses concerning the impact of mandatory rotation on the likelihood of auditors' issuing going-concern modified audit opinions. We find no evidence to suggest that a mandatory rotation requirement is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. Our results suggest that auditors' incentives to protect their reputation have a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, while auditors' incentives to retain existing clients did not impact on their decisions in both the mandatory rotation and post-mandatory rotation periods. Overall, our results provide empirical support for the arguments put forward by opponents of mandatory rotation.