Jeffrey Ziegler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Jeffrey Ziegler has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Ryan Miller
American University
2 shared publications - Sivaram Cheruvu
Michigan State University
2 shared publications - Andrew R. Stone
University of Mississippi
1 shared publication David Carlson
1 shared publication- David Carlson
YouGov, Inc
1 shared publication - James L. Gibson
Department of Political Science, Florida State University , 531 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Law and Courts
- Vol. 14 (2) , 585-602
How Much Influence Do Opinion-Writers Have on Per Curiam Courts? Uncovering Author Drift in Written Decisions at the European Court of Justice
Research that assesses individual judges’ ability to shape decisions typically focuses on courts that publish separate votes and opinions. Yet, many courts issue per curiam judgments that do not permit public dissent. To overcome this limitation, we use a convolutional neural network (CNN) to model the variation in judges’ expressed preferences from language in aggregated judgments. Specifically, we construct a CNN to analyze the written judgments of judge-rapporteurs and opinions of advocates-general from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Along a pro-/anti-EU dimension, we estimate how judgments differ within (1) each case relative to the advocate-general’s opinion, and (2) each judge-rapporteur, which captures how judges alter their writing across cases. Our results provide novel empirical support for theoretical models of European judicial decision-making: more pro-EU opinions driven by the Court, not the advocate-general or the judge-rapporteur, are associated with larger chambers and stronger external signals of compliance.
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Law and Courts
- Vol. 14 (2) , 585-602
Open AccessHow Much Influence Do Opinion-Writers Have on Per Curiam Courts? Uncovering Author Drift in Written Decisions at the European Court of Justice
Research that assesses individual judges’ ability to shape decisions typically focuses on courts that publish separate votes and opinions. Yet, many courts issue per curiam judgments that do not permit public dissent. To overcome this limitation, we use a convolutional neural network (CNN) to model the variation in judges’ expressed preferences from language in aggregated judgments. Specifically, we construct a CNN to analyze the written judgments of judge-rapporteurs and opinions of advocates-general from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Along a pro-/anti-EU dimension, we estimate how judgments differ within (1) each case relative to the advocate-general’s opinion, and (2) each judge-rapporteur, which captures how judges alter their writing across cases. Our results provide novel empirical support for theoretical models of European judicial decision-making: more pro-EU opinions driven by the Court, not the advocate-general or the judge-rapporteur, are associated with larger chambers and stronger external signals of compliance.
- Open Access
- 24 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- p. 1-14
Do the Audio and Video from Public Hearings Impact High Court Legitimacy?
Judges may express underlying political preferences when speaking that can only be captured with audio and not text. Yet, it is unclear if audio or video recordings of judicial proceedings shape high courts’ legitimacy differently than written transcripts. We address this question with two survey experiments using short, real-world case excerpts from the US and UK. In sum, we do not find evidence that the method of delivery is associated with evaluations of court legitimacy as predicted by past studies. These null results persist when we account for the emotions that judges convey, perceived political inclinations of judges, and participants’ political preferences. Our findings offer novel insight into the relationship between high court attitudes and the medium through which judicial decisions are communicated.
- 24 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- p. 1-14
Open AccessDo the Audio and Video from Public Hearings Impact High Court Legitimacy?
Judges may express underlying political preferences when speaking that can only be captured with audio and not text. Yet, it is unclear if audio or video recordings of judicial proceedings shape high courts’ legitimacy differently than written transcripts. We address this question with two survey experiments using short, real-world case excerpts from the US and UK. In sum, we do not find evidence that the method of delivery is associated with evaluations of court legitimacy as predicted by past studies. These null results persist when we account for the emotions that judges convey, perceived political inclinations of judges, and participants’ political preferences. Our findings offer novel insight into the relationship between high court attitudes and the medium through which judicial decisions are communicated.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 11 (4)
Preferential abstention in conjoint experiments
Conjoint experiments are often used to mimic political choices that people face, such as voting for public officials or selecting news stories. Conjoint designs, however, do not always mirror the real-world decision-making contexts that individuals engage in because respondents are typically forced to select one of the available options. Theoretically, we illustrate how offering respondents an abstention option can produce average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of differing signs and magnitudes relative to a forced-choice outcome. This difference depends on (1) the proportion of respondents who would rather abstain than select profiles lacking their preferred attribute-levels and (2) those respondents’ preference orderings. Empirically, we replicate two conjoint experiments and demonstrate how omitting a realistic abstention option could lead to different AMCE estimates.
- 1 October 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 11 (4)
Open AccessPreferential abstention in conjoint experiments
Conjoint experiments are often used to mimic political choices that people face, such as voting for public officials or selecting news stories. Conjoint designs, however, do not always mirror the real-world decision-making contexts that individuals engage in because respondents are typically forced to select one of the available options. Theoretically, we illustrate how offering respondents an abstention option can produce average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of differing signs and magnitudes relative to a forced-choice outcome. This difference depends on (1) the proportion of respondents who would rather abstain than select profiles lacking their preferred attribute-levels and (2) those respondents’ preference orderings. Empirically, we replicate two conjoint experiments and demonstrate how omitting a realistic abstention option could lead to different AMCE estimates.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and Religion
- Vol. 17 (2) , 1-26
Political responsiveness and centralized religious leaders: lessons from the Catholic Church
Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers' political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics' overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members' political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and Religion
- Vol. 17 (2) , 1-26
Open AccessPolitical responsiveness and centralized religious leaders: lessons from the Catholic Church
Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers' political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics' overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members' political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.
- Open Access
- 10 August 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Preferential Abstention in Conjoint Experiments
Conjoint experiments are used to mimic political choices that people face, such as voting for public officials or selecting news stories. Conjoint designs, however, do not always mirror the real-world decision-making contexts that individuals engage in because respondents are typically forced to select one of the available options. Theoretically, we illustrate how offering respondents an abstention option can produce average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of differing signs and magnitudes relative to a forced-choice outcome. This difference depends on 1) the proportion of respondents who would rather abstain than select profiles lacking their preferred attribute-levels, and 2) those respondents’ preference orderings. Empirically, we replicate two conjoint experiments and demonstrate how omitting a realistic abstention option can lead to different AMCE estimates.
- 10 August 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessPreferential Abstention in Conjoint Experiments
Conjoint experiments are used to mimic political choices that people face, such as voting for public officials or selecting news stories. Conjoint designs, however, do not always mirror the real-world decision-making contexts that individuals engage in because respondents are typically forced to select one of the available options. Theoretically, we illustrate how offering respondents an abstention option can produce average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of differing signs and magnitudes relative to a forced-choice outcome. This difference depends on 1) the proportion of respondents who would rather abstain than select profiles lacking their preferred attribute-levels, and 2) those respondents’ preference orderings. Empirically, we replicate two conjoint experiments and demonstrate how omitting a realistic abstention option can lead to different AMCE estimates.
- Open Access
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
How Much Influence Do Opinion-Writers Have on Per Curiam Courts? Uncovering Author Drift in Written Decisions
Research assessing judges’ political preferences typically focuses on courts that publish individual votes and opinions, yet many courts issue per curiam judgments that do not permit public dissent. To overcome this limitation, we use convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to model the variation in judges’ expressed preferences from language in aggregated judgments. Specifically, we apply CNNs to analyze the written judgments of judges-rapporteur and opinions of advocates-general from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Along a pro/anti-EU dimension, we estimate how judgments differ within (1) each case to the advocate-general’s opinion, providing a baseline for the case’s legal merits, and (2) each judge-rapporteur, which measures how judges alter their writing across cases. Our results provide novel empirical support for theoretic models of European judicial decision-making: more pro- EU opinions driven by the Court, not the advocates-general or judge-rapporteur, are associated with larger chambers and stronger external signals of compliance.
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessHow Much Influence Do Opinion-Writers Have on Per Curiam Courts? Uncovering Author Drift in Written Decisions
Research assessing judges’ political preferences typically focuses on courts that publish individual votes and opinions, yet many courts issue per curiam judgments that do not permit public dissent. To overcome this limitation, we use convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to model the variation in judges’ expressed preferences from language in aggregated judgments. Specifically, we apply CNNs to analyze the written judgments of judges-rapporteur and opinions of advocates-general from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Along a pro/anti-EU dimension, we estimate how judgments differ within (1) each case to the advocate-general’s opinion, providing a baseline for the case’s legal merits, and (2) each judge-rapporteur, which measures how judges alter their writing across cases. Our results provide novel empirical support for theoretic models of European judicial decision-making: more pro- EU opinions driven by the Court, not the advocates-general or judge-rapporteur, are associated with larger chambers and stronger external signals of compliance.
- 20 December 2021
- Published by Uluslararasi Iliskiler Dergisi
- Vol. 18 (72) , 37-49
Uluslararası Yatırım Antlaşmalarının İhlalinde Demokratik Yönetişim ve Dolaylı Kamulaştırmanın Rolü
Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation. Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları, yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin, hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor.
- 20 December 2021
- Published by Uluslararasi Iliskiler Dergisi
- Vol. 18 (72) , 37-49
Uluslararası Yatırım Antlaşmalarının İhlalinde Demokratik Yönetişim ve Dolaylı Kamulaştırmanın Rolü
Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation. Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları, yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin, hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor.
- Open Access
- 23 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 30 (2) , 289-297
A Text-As-Data Approach for Using Open-Ended Responses as Manipulation Checks
Participants that complete online surveys and experiments may be inattentive, which can hinder researchers’ abilityto draw substantive or causal inferences. As such, many practitioners include multiple factualor instructional closed-ended manipulation checks to identify low-attention respondents. However, closed-ended manipulation checks are either correct or incorrect, which allows participants to more easily guess and it reduces the potential variation in attention between respondents. In response to these shortcomings, I develop an automatic and standardized methodology to measure attention that relies on the text that respondents provide in an open-ended manipulation check. There are multiple benefits to this approach. First, it provides a continuous measure of attention, which allows for greater variation between respondents. Second, it reduces the reliance on subjective, paid humans to analyze open-ended responses. Last, I outline how to diagnose the impact of inattentive workers on the overall results, including how to assess the average treatment effect of those respondents that likely received the treatment. I provide easy-to-use software in R to implement these suggestions for open-ended manipulation checks.
- 23 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 30 (2) , 289-297
Open AccessA Text-As-Data Approach for Using Open-Ended Responses as Manipulation Checks
Participants that complete online surveys and experiments may be inattentive, which can hinder researchers’ abilityto draw substantive or causal inferences. As such, many practitioners include multiple factualor instructional closed-ended manipulation checks to identify low-attention respondents. However, closed-ended manipulation checks are either correct or incorrect, which allows participants to more easily guess and it reduces the potential variation in attention between respondents. In response to these shortcomings, I develop an automatic and standardized methodology to measure attention that relies on the text that respondents provide in an open-ended manipulation check. There are multiple benefits to this approach. First, it provides a continuous measure of attention, which allows for greater variation between respondents. Second, it reduces the reliance on subjective, paid humans to analyze open-ended responses. Last, I outline how to diagnose the impact of inattentive workers on the overall results, including how to assess the average treatment effect of those respondents that likely received the treatment. I provide easy-to-use software in R to implement these suggestions for open-ended manipulation checks.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Political Responsiveness and Centralized Religious Leaders: Lessons from the Catholic Church
Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers’ political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics’ overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members’ political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.
- 14 May 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessPolitical Responsiveness and Centralized Religious Leaders: Lessons from the Catholic Church
Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers’ political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics’ overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members’ political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Role of Democratic Governance and Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Treaty Violations
Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters over foreign business interests, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. We use a data set of BIT violation complaints that better captures potential indirect expropriation to confirm prior findings that show a difference in violations by regime type. Since policies are not passed immediately and companies do not file arbitration complaints instantly when a potential violation occurs, democratic governments are only more likely to be sued as their time in office increases. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation.
- 9 May 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Role of Democratic Governance and Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Treaty Violations
Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters over foreign business interests, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. We use a data set of BIT violation complaints that better captures potential indirect expropriation to confirm prior findings that show a difference in violations by regime type. Since policies are not passed immediately and companies do not file arbitration complaints instantly when a potential violation occurs, democratic governments are only more likely to be sued as their time in office increases. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation.