DBDavid Bounie

David Bounie

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


David Bounie has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 29 April 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Competition and the Two Margins of Privacy

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck

    This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.

    • 2 May 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Competition and the Two Margins of Privacy

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck

    This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data -- the extensive margin of privacy -- as well as the precision of information -- the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policymakers can efficiently protect both margins of privacy and consumer surplus by safeguarding the intensive margin. Indeed, when both strategic variables are strategic complements, restricting the amount of information that firms have on each consumer (the intensive margin) also induces firms to collect data on fewer consumers, thereby protecting the extensive margin of privacy. This softens the intensity of competition but also reduces rent extraction by firms, and total consumer surplus increases. When both variables are strategic substitutes, protecting the intensive margin harms privacy at the extensive margin, but still increases consumer surplus.

    • 28 April 2023
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Competition Between Strategic Data Intermediaries with Implications for Merger Policy

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck

    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of consumers. Information allows firms to distinguish different segments of the consumer demand, and an equilibrium has the following properties. (i.) The largest intermediary collects the highest number of segments and sells information in the competitive market. (ii.) The incentives of the largest intermediary to collect data increase with the competitive pressure exerted by smaller intermediaries through an escape-competition effect. (iii.) Intermediaries sell information on a larger group of consumers in the competitive market than in the monopoly markets, increasing the intensity of competition among firms. (iv.) Competition reduces the incentives of intermediaries to collect data, thus increasing consumer surplus. These results have important implications for merger policy. Indeed, mergers increase the amount of data collected by intermediaries, which reduces consumer surplus due to enhanced price discrimination. This effect takes place in the market where the merging intermediaries operate, and also in other related markets through a ripple effect.

    • 28 April 2023
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Competition Between Strategic Data Intermediaries with Implications for Merger Policy

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck

    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of consumers. Information allows firms to distinguish different segments of the consumer demand, and an equilibrium has the following properties. (i.) The largest intermediary collects the highest number of segments and sells information in the competitive market. (ii.) The incentives of the largest intermediary to collect data increase with the competitive pressure exerted by smaller intermediaries through an escape-competition effect. (iii.) Intermediaries sell information on a larger group of consumers in the competitive market than in the monopoly markets, increasing the intensity of competition among firms. (iv.) Competition reduces the incentives of intermediaries to collect data, thus increasing consumer surplus. These results have important implications for merger policy. Indeed, mergers increase the amount of data collected by intermediaries, which reduces consumer surplus due to enhanced price discrimination. This effect takes place in the market where the merging intermediaries operate, and also in other related markets through a ripple effect.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.

    • 4 November 2022
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter

    by David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Axel Gautier, Vic- Tor Ginsburgh, Shin Doh, Brad Jeon, Patrick Larsen, et al.

    We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.