Collecting and Selling Consumer Information:Selling Mechanisms Matter
Authors:
- David BounieDBDavid Bounie
- Antoine DubusADAntoine Dubus
- Patrick WaelbroeckPWPatrick Waelbroeck
- Alessandro BonattiABAlessandro Bonatti
- Andreea Cosnita-LanglaisACAndreea Cosnita-Langlais
- Axel GautierAGAxel Gautier
- Vic- Tor GinsburghVGVic- Tor Ginsburgh
- Shin DohSDShin Doh
- Brad JeonBJBrad Jeon
- Patrick LarsenPLPatrick Larsen
- Flavio LegrosFLFlavio Legros
- Wilfried PinoWPWilfried Pino
Preprint
- 4 November 2022
- preprint
- Published by HAL
Abstract
We study the strategies of a data intermediary collecting and selling information to competing firms under different selling mechanisms. We characterize the amount of data collected and sold as well as the price of information with posted prices, sequential bargaining, first-price and second-price auctions. We generalize pair-wise comparisons to establish the economic properties of classes of mechanisms.Keywords
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