Francois Brochet
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Francois Brochet has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fabrizio Ferri
Miami Herbert Business School, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida 33146
3 shared publications - Chengzhu Sun
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2 shared publications - Roman Chychyla
University of Miami
2 shared publications - Thomas Bourveau
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1HP, United Kingdom
2 shared publications - Alexandre Garel
Finance Department, Audencia Business School, 44300 Nantes, France
1 shared publication - André Betzer
Bergische Universität Wuppertal
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
When Quarterly Reporting Becomes Optional: The Role of Prior Disclosure Practices
We examine how investors' reactions to proposed flexibility in mandatory reporting frequency vary with firms' pre-existing voluntary disclosure practices. Using three U.S. policy events during 2025-2026, we compare firms with established quarterly management guidance practices with firms that provide guidance only at an annual horizon. Annual-only guiders experience announcement returns approximately 100 basis points lower than quarterly guiders. The difference is negative around each event, persists across alternative definitions and measurement windows for quarterly guidance, and is unusually large relative to return differentials observed on placebo dates. Because the proposed regime has not yet been implemented, these reactions reflect investors' expectations about firms' reporting choices and their consequences. Overall, our findings suggest that investors' assessments of reporting-frequency flexibility depend on firms' established voluntary disclosure practices.
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhen Quarterly Reporting Becomes Optional: The Role of Prior Disclosure Practices
We examine how investors' reactions to proposed flexibility in mandatory reporting frequency vary with firms' pre-existing voluntary disclosure practices. Using three U.S. policy events during 2025-2026, we compare firms with established quarterly management guidance practices with firms that provide guidance only at an annual horizon. Annual-only guiders experience announcement returns approximately 100 basis points lower than quarterly guiders. The difference is negative around each event, persists across alternative definitions and measurement windows for quarterly guidance, and is unusually large relative to return differentials observed on placebo dates. Because the proposed regime has not yet been implemented, these reactions reflect investors' expectations about firms' reporting choices and their consequences. Overall, our findings suggest that investors' assessments of reporting-frequency flexibility depend on firms' established voluntary disclosure practices.
- Open Access
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 83-110
Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; J33; K22; M12; M16.
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 83-110
Open AccessSay on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000–2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness. Data Availability: All data used in the paper are available from cited public sources. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; J33; K22; M12; M16.
- 19 October 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (9) , 5896-5930
Virtual Shareholder Meetings
We examine determinants and consequences of virtual shareholder meetings (VSMs) using a sample of voluntary (precoronavirus disease 2019) and forced (i.e., because of coronavirus disease 2019) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders’ scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSMs, business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter, and more generic but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm’s choice rather than are a by-product of the virtual format per se. VSMs are more likely to exhibit no questions during the question and answer period, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions; such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSMs, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSMs exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics’ concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor does it appear to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4946 .
- 19 October 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (9) , 5896-5930
Virtual Shareholder Meetings
We examine determinants and consequences of virtual shareholder meetings (VSMs) using a sample of voluntary (precoronavirus disease 2019) and forced (i.e., because of coronavirus disease 2019) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders’ scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSMs, business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter, and more generic but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm’s choice rather than are a by-product of the virtual format per se. VSMs are more likely to exhibit no questions during the question and answer period, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions; such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSMs, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSMs exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics’ concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor does it appear to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4946 .
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (1) , 660-683
The Supply and Effectiveness of Investor Relations in Insider- vs. Outsider-Oriented Markets
Using annual survey-based investor relations (IR) data for a panel of European companies, we document that the supply and effectiveness of IR varies with country- and firm-level demand. Relative to their industry peers, firms from insider-oriented countries have larger IR staff, which predicts better IR rankings. Better IR is associated with greater visibility, information assimilation, and valuation, with visibility and assimilation being significantly greater for firms from insider-oriented countries. Within such countries, firms with greater outsider orientation have higher capital market benefits. Furthermore, using Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II as a shock to analyst coverage, we find an incrementally larger association between IR and visibility in insider-oriented countries after 2017. Overall, the evidence suggests that the supply of IR in insider-oriented markets has reached a high level, acting as a viable mechanism to improve firms’ information environment. However, within those countries, IR demand still varies significantly, with outsider-oriented firms showing greater IR effectiveness. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4368 .
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (1) , 660-683
The Supply and Effectiveness of Investor Relations in Insider- vs. Outsider-Oriented Markets
Using annual survey-based investor relations (IR) data for a panel of European companies, we document that the supply and effectiveness of IR varies with country- and firm-level demand. Relative to their industry peers, firms from insider-oriented countries have larger IR staff, which predicts better IR rankings. Better IR is associated with greater visibility, information assimilation, and valuation, with visibility and assimilation being significantly greater for firms from insider-oriented countries. Within such countries, firms with greater outsider orientation have higher capital market benefits. Furthermore, using Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II as a shock to analyst coverage, we find an incrementally larger association between IR and visibility in insider-oriented countries after 2017. Overall, the evidence suggests that the supply of IR in insider-oriented markets has reached a high level, acting as a viable mechanism to improve firms’ information environment. However, within those countries, IR demand still varies significantly, with outsider-oriented firms showing greater IR effectiveness. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4368 .
- 1 December 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (12) , 9107-9128
The Capital Market Consequences of Tenure-Based Voting Rights: Evidence from the Florange Act
We examine the consequences of a regulatory intervention aimed at generalizing tenure voting in French public companies. The 2014 Florange Act departs from the ‘one share one vote’ principle by automatically granting double-voting rights (DVR) to shares held for at least two years. However, firms can opt out through an annual meeting vote. We document three main findings. First, firms that adopt DVR by default experience a decrease in long-term foreign institutional ownership offset by an increase in insider/family ownership. Second, those firms significantly underperform in terms of stock returns after Florange relative to those that reject DVR. Third, their environmental and social performance deteriorates. Collectively, our evidence casts doubt on the merit of regulation-induced tenure voting as a desirable corporate governance mechanism. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [16513216]. We also acknowledge the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [Project No. 16505017] for financial support. Supplemental Material: The e-companion and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4320 .
- 1 December 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (12) , 9107-9128
The Capital Market Consequences of Tenure-Based Voting Rights: Evidence from the Florange Act
We examine the consequences of a regulatory intervention aimed at generalizing tenure voting in French public companies. The 2014 Florange Act departs from the ‘one share one vote’ principle by automatically granting double-voting rights (DVR) to shares held for at least two years. However, firms can opt out through an annual meeting vote. We document three main findings. First, firms that adopt DVR by default experience a decrease in long-term foreign institutional ownership offset by an increase in insider/family ownership. Second, those firms significantly underperform in terms of stock returns after Florange relative to those that reject DVR. Third, their environmental and social performance deteriorates. Collectively, our evidence casts doubt on the merit of regulation-induced tenure voting as a desirable corporate governance mechanism. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [16513216]. We also acknowledge the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [Project No. 16505017] for financial support. Supplemental Material: The e-companion and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4320 .
- Open Access
- 11 October 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000-2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption of say on pay is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected by say on pay. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessSay on Pay Laws and Insider Trading
We examine whether mandatory adoption of say on pay increases executives’ incentives to engage in insider trading to compensate for the negative impact of say on pay on the value of their explicit compensation packages. Our empirical design exploits the staggered adoption of say on pay laws across 14 countries over the 2000-2015 period. We find that mandatory adoption of say on pay is associated with a material increase in insider trading profits, especially in firms where executive pay is most affected by say on pay. The increase in insider trading profits is driven mostly by more frequent and larger profitable insider sales, consistent with executives’ desire to reduce their greater exposure to firm-specific risk while increasing their trading profits. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering potential effects on insider trading incentives when designing compensation reforms and when assessing their effectiveness.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Virtual Shareholder Meetings
We examine determinants and consequences of ‘virtual’ shareholder meetings (VSM), using a sample of voluntary (pre-Covid) and forced (i.e. due to Covid) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms, and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders’ scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSM business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter and more generic, but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm’s choice rather than a byproduct of the virtual format per se. VSM are more likely to exhibit no questions during the Q&A, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions, and such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers’ using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSM, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSM exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics’ concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny.
- 11 August 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessVirtual Shareholder Meetings
We examine determinants and consequences of ‘virtual’ shareholder meetings (VSM), using a sample of voluntary (pre-Covid) and forced (i.e. due to Covid) VSM adopters. Voluntary adopters are tech firms, and firms traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder participation. In contrast, we do not find that firms choose the virtual format to avoid shareholders’ scrutiny. Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that in VSM business presentations by management are less frequent, shorter and more generic, but only among voluntary adopters, suggesting that these properties reflect a firm’s choice rather than a byproduct of the virtual format per se. VSM are more likely to exhibit no questions during the Q&A, but conditioned upon having one question, they exhibit the same number of questions, and such questions are more negative in tone, inconsistent with managers’ using the virtual format to filter out hostile questions. Finally, there is some evidence of greater abnormal absolute returns around VSM, supporting the notion that greater attendance translates into greater information content. Overall, VSM exhibit less activity on average, consistent with critics’ concerns, but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in information content nor to reflect an attempt to avoid scrutiny.
- 10 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 2758-2794
Investors' Perceptions of Activism via Voting: Evidence from Contentious Shareholder Meetings*
Motivated by the increasing influence of shareholder votes on corporate policies, we examine investors' perceptions of activism via voting. To identify instances of activism via voting, we focus on annual meetings with at least one ballot item where a substantial fraction of shareholders is expected to vote against management's voting recommendation, indicating an increase in their monitoring activity. We define such meetings as “contentious.” Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we examine stock returns over the period between the proxy filing and the annual meeting. This period captures when investors learn about the contentious nature of the upcoming meeting and form expectations about its likely impact on firms' policies. We find that abnormal stock returns prior to contentious meetings are significantly positive and higher than those prior to noncontentious meetings. These higher abnormal returns increase with the contentiousness of the meeting; are more pronounced in firms with poor past performance, which are more likely to respond to shareholder pressure; and persist after controlling for firm‐specific news and proxies for risk factors. Our results are consistent with investors' expecting activism via voting to have a positive impact on firm value, on average, and cast doubts on regulatory attempts to restrict the use of shareholder votes.
- 10 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 2758-2794
Investors' Perceptions of Activism via Voting: Evidence from Contentious Shareholder Meetings*
Motivated by the increasing influence of shareholder votes on corporate policies, we examine investors' perceptions of activism via voting. To identify instances of activism via voting, we focus on annual meetings with at least one ballot item where a substantial fraction of shareholders is expected to vote against management's voting recommendation, indicating an increase in their monitoring activity. We define such meetings as “contentious.” Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we examine stock returns over the period between the proxy filing and the annual meeting. This period captures when investors learn about the contentious nature of the upcoming meeting and form expectations about its likely impact on firms' policies. We find that abnormal stock returns prior to contentious meetings are significantly positive and higher than those prior to noncontentious meetings. These higher abnormal returns increase with the contentiousness of the meeting; are more pronounced in firms with poor past performance, which are more likely to respond to shareholder pressure; and persist after controlling for firm‐specific news and proxies for risk factors. Our results are consistent with investors' expecting activism via voting to have a positive impact on firm value, on average, and cast doubts on regulatory attempts to restrict the use of shareholder votes.
- 24 March 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (6) , 47-71
CEO Tenure and Firm Value
Our study is the first to provide systematic evidence of a hump-shaped CEO tenure-firm value relation. Cross-sectionally, firm value starts to decline after fewer years of CEO tenure in more dynamic industries, if CEOs are less adaptable to changes, and in the presence of greater labor market frictions. Overall, the dynamics of CEO-firm match quality appear to be a first-order driver of the CEO tenure-firm value association, as explained by CEO characteristics (adaptability), firm/industry characteristics (dynamism), and labor market characteristics that facilitate optimal matching between firms and CEOs. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; J24.
- 24 March 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (6) , 47-71
CEO Tenure and Firm Value
Our study is the first to provide systematic evidence of a hump-shaped CEO tenure-firm value relation. Cross-sectionally, firm value starts to decline after fewer years of CEO tenure in more dynamic industries, if CEOs are less adaptable to changes, and in the presence of greater labor market frictions. Overall, the dynamics of CEO-firm match quality appear to be a first-order driver of the CEO tenure-firm value association, as explained by CEO characteristics (adaptability), firm/industry characteristics (dynamism), and labor market characteristics that facilitate optimal matching between firms and CEOs. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; J24.
- 6 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 46 (3-4) , 336-369
Aggregate insider trading and market returns: The role of transparency
Using a sample of countries that require timely disclosures of insider trades, I investigate the effect of country‐level institutions that promote transparency on the extent to which aggregate insider trades predict market returns. I find that financial information transparency mitigates the predictive content of aggregate insider trades when markets are more likely to deviate from fundamentals (i.e., during market fads), and when there is greater co‐movement in stock prices. In contrast, there is some evidence that governance and investor protection mitigate the association between aggregate insider trades and future earnings surprises. Hence, holding constant the timely disclosures of insider trades, other capital market institutions play complementary roles in mitigating the informational frictions that give rise to the predictive content of aggregate insider trades.
- 6 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 46 (3-4) , 336-369
Aggregate insider trading and market returns: The role of transparency
Using a sample of countries that require timely disclosures of insider trades, I investigate the effect of country‐level institutions that promote transparency on the extent to which aggregate insider trades predict market returns. I find that financial information transparency mitigates the predictive content of aggregate insider trades when markets are more likely to deviate from fundamentals (i.e., during market fads), and when there is greater co‐movement in stock prices. In contrast, there is some evidence that governance and investor protection mitigate the association between aggregate insider trades and future earnings surprises. Hence, holding constant the timely disclosures of insider trades, other capital market institutions play complementary roles in mitigating the informational frictions that give rise to the predictive content of aggregate insider trades.