Robert Barnard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robert Barnard has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joseph Ulatowski
University of Waikato
5 shared publications - Cailin O'Connor
University of California Irvine
1 shared publication - Chase Wrenn
The University of Alabama
1 shared publication - Jonathan M. Weinberg
University of Arizona
1 shared publication - Maria Baghramian
University College Dublin
1 shared publication - Michael Patrick Lynch
University of Connecticut
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 187-210
Truth and Polarization
- Open Access
- 3 December 2021
- Published by University of Warsaw in Filozofia Nauki
- Vol. 29 (2) , 77-113
The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work
The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.
- 3 December 2021
- Published by University of Warsaw in Filozofia Nauki
- Vol. 29 (2) , 77-113
Open AccessThe Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work
The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.
- 8 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S2) , 717-733
The objectivity of truth, a core truism?
- 8 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S2) , 717-733
The objectivity of truth, a core truism?
- 20 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 81 (3) , 457-477
Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”
- 20 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 81 (3) , 457-477
Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”
- 27 June 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (4) , 621-638
Truth, Correspondence, and Gender
- 27 June 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (4) , 621-638
Truth, Correspondence, and Gender
- 15 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 23 (1) , 153-156
Philosophy as continuous with social science?
- 15 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 23 (1) , 153-156
Philosophy as continuous with social science?
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Southwest Philosophy Review
- Vol. 29 (1) , 49-59
A Theory of Logical Normativity
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Southwest Philosophy Review
- Vol. 29 (1) , 49-59
A Theory of Logical Normativity
- 24 August 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 69 (4) , 781-783
Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy * By HEATHER DYKE
Dyke's titular fallacy is no simple logical error. Instead, we commit the representational fallacy when we reason metaphysically from the supposition that a descriptive sentence is true to the consequence that reality must be as the description claims; the fallacy results from embracing a mistaken assumption about the relationship between language and reality: the Strong Linguistic Thesis (SLT). SLT holds that there is ‘a privileged true description of reality, the sentences of which (a) stand in a one-to-one correspondence with facts in the world, and (b) are structurally isomorphic to the facts with which they correspond’ (7). The book has two complementary aims: (i) to demonstrate that there is broad commitment to SLT, and (ii) to show that we would be better off metaphysically rejecting SLT.
- 24 August 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 69 (4) , 781-783
Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy * By HEATHER DYKE
Dyke's titular fallacy is no simple logical error. Instead, we commit the representational fallacy when we reason metaphysically from the supposition that a descriptive sentence is true to the consequence that reality must be as the description claims; the fallacy results from embracing a mistaken assumption about the relationship between language and reality: the Strong Linguistic Thesis (SLT). SLT holds that there is ‘a privileged true description of reality, the sentences of which (a) stand in a one-to-one correspondence with facts in the world, and (b) are structurally isomorphic to the facts with which they correspond’ (7). The book has two complementary aims: (i) to demonstrate that there is broad commitment to SLT, and (ii) to show that we would be better off metaphysically rejecting SLT.