Daniel Schwarcz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Daniel Schwarcz has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jonathan H. Choi
University of Minnesota Law School
3 shared publicationsAllan Erbsen
1 shared publicationAmy Monahan
University of Minnesota Law School
1 shared publicationBeverly Rich
University of Southern California Gould School of Law, CA, USA
1 shared publicationBrett H. McDonnell
University of Minnesota Law School
1 shared publication- Dane Thorley
School of Law, Brigham Young University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Parametric Insurance Without Windfalls
Over the past few decades, parametric insurance has emerged as a promising tool for closing climate-related protection gaps. By delivering rapid, low-friction payments based on objective triggers rather than individualized loss adjustment, parametric insurance can get funds to those affected precisely when they are most needed. Yet its growth has been constrained by a persistent legal problem: because parametric contracts can pay out more than an insured's actual losses, they sit uneasily within the indemnity and insurable-interest principles that separate insurance from derivatives. Classified as derivatives, these products become largely inaccessible to municipalities, small businesses, and nonprofits, while firms seeking to sell them face increased costs and regulatory uncertainties. This Article identifies two ways to redesign parametric coverage so that it can be sold as insurance while advancing climate adaptation and resilience. The first, forecast-based parametric insurance, ties payouts to credible predictions of extreme weather events. The second, restricted-use parametric insurance, permits triggered payments only to offset actual financial losses or to fund mitigation measures that reduce future exposure to similar risks. Both designs, the Article argues, can be reconciled with insurance law's indemnity framework while preserving the speed, transparency, and administrative simplicity that make parametric coverage valuable. The Article further proposes legal mechanisms for implementing forecast-based and restricted use parametric structures, including requiring ex ante good-faith estimates of expected losses and limited tax-based reporting. Finally, it addresses the distinct problem of parametric shortfalls, explaining why undercompensation does not threaten insurance classification but does warrant targeted policyholder protections.
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessParametric Insurance Without Windfalls
Over the past few decades, parametric insurance has emerged as a promising tool for closing climate-related protection gaps. By delivering rapid, low-friction payments based on objective triggers rather than individualized loss adjustment, parametric insurance can get funds to those affected precisely when they are most needed. Yet its growth has been constrained by a persistent legal problem: because parametric contracts can pay out more than an insured's actual losses, they sit uneasily within the indemnity and insurable-interest principles that separate insurance from derivatives. Classified as derivatives, these products become largely inaccessible to municipalities, small businesses, and nonprofits, while firms seeking to sell them face increased costs and regulatory uncertainties. This Article identifies two ways to redesign parametric coverage so that it can be sold as insurance while advancing climate adaptation and resilience. The first, forecast-based parametric insurance, ties payouts to credible predictions of extreme weather events. The second, restricted-use parametric insurance, permits triggered payments only to offset actual financial losses or to fund mitigation measures that reduce future exposure to similar risks. Both designs, the Article argues, can be reconciled with insurance law's indemnity framework while preserving the speed, transparency, and administrative simplicity that make parametric coverage valuable. The Article further proposes legal mechanisms for implementing forecast-based and restricted use parametric structures, including requiring ex ante good-faith estimates of expected losses and limited tax-based reporting. Finally, it addresses the distinct problem of parametric shortfalls, explaining why undercompensation does not threaten insurance classification but does warrant targeted policyholder protections.
- Open Access
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Distributing Risk in an Age of AI: Procedural Bad Faith and AI Claims Handling
Written in honor of Kenneth Abraham and his foundational contributions to insurance law, this Essay argues that the rise of AI-driven insurance claims handling exposes a significant gap in first-party bad faith law. Traditional bad faith doctrine has focused primarily on outcomes, asking whether an insurer wrongfully denied or delayed payment of benefits owed under the policy. But increasingly automated claims processes create a distinct procedural injury when insurers deny, reduce, or delay claims without meaningful human review, adequate explanation, or a genuine opportunity for the insured to be heard. Drawing on procedural justice theory, the Essay shows that such practices can undermine voice, dignity, neutrality, and trustworthiness in a relationship defined by vulnerability and dependence. It therefore argues that courts should give procedural fairness substantially greater weight within the bad faith inquiry and should treat heavily automated claims denials without meaningful human oversight as powerful evidence of procedural bad faith. Doing so would adapt bad faith law to the distinctive risks posed by AI while preserving insurance’s core promise of fair, respectful, and accountable claims resolution.
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDistributing Risk in an Age of AI: Procedural Bad Faith and AI Claims Handling
Written in honor of Kenneth Abraham and his foundational contributions to insurance law, this Essay argues that the rise of AI-driven insurance claims handling exposes a significant gap in first-party bad faith law. Traditional bad faith doctrine has focused primarily on outcomes, asking whether an insurer wrongfully denied or delayed payment of benefits owed under the policy. But increasingly automated claims processes create a distinct procedural injury when insurers deny, reduce, or delay claims without meaningful human review, adequate explanation, or a genuine opportunity for the insured to be heard. Drawing on procedural justice theory, the Essay shows that such practices can undermine voice, dignity, neutrality, and trustworthiness in a relationship defined by vulnerability and dependence. It therefore argues that courts should give procedural fairness substantially greater weight within the bad faith inquiry and should treat heavily automated claims denials without meaningful human oversight as powerful evidence of procedural bad faith. Doing so would adapt bad faith law to the distinctive risks posed by AI while preserving insurance’s core promise of fair, respectful, and accountable claims resolution.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 9 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 220-250
AI-Powered Lawyering: AI Reasoning Models, Retrieval Augmented Generation, and the Future of Legal Practice
Generative AI is set to transform the legal profession, though its most promising uses and ultimate effects are still unclear. While AI models like GPT-4 improve efficiency, they can also “hallucinate” and may undermine legal judgment, particularly in complex tasks typically handled by skilled lawyers. This article examines two emerging AI innovations that may mitigate these concerns: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), which grounds AI-powered analysis in legal sources, and AI reasoning models, which structure complex reasoning before generating output. We conduct the first randomized controlled trial assessing these technologies, assigning upper-level law students to complete legal tasks using a RAG-powered legal AI tool (Vincent AI, 2024), an AI reasoning model (OpenAI’s o1-preview), or no AI. We find that both AI tools significantly enhance legal work quality, a marked contrast with previous research examining older large language models like GPT-4. Moreover, these newer models appear to maintain the efficiency benefits associated with older AI technologies. Our findings also show that these AI tools significantly boost productivity in five out of six tested legal tasks, with statistically significant gains of anywhere from 50% to 130%. They perform exceptionally well in complex tasks like drafting persuasive letters and analyzing complaints. Notably, o1-preview improves the analytical depth of work product and Vincent AI avoids introducing more hallucinations, suggesting that integrating domain-specific RAG capabilities with reasoning models could yield even larger improvements.
- 9 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 220-250
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAI-Powered Lawyering: AI Reasoning Models, Retrieval Augmented Generation, and the Future of Legal Practice
Generative AI is set to transform the legal profession, though its most promising uses and ultimate effects are still unclear. While AI models like GPT-4 improve efficiency, they can also “hallucinate” and may undermine legal judgment, particularly in complex tasks typically handled by skilled lawyers. This article examines two emerging AI innovations that may mitigate these concerns: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), which grounds AI-powered analysis in legal sources, and AI reasoning models, which structure complex reasoning before generating output. We conduct the first randomized controlled trial assessing these technologies, assigning upper-level law students to complete legal tasks using a RAG-powered legal AI tool (Vincent AI, 2024), an AI reasoning model (OpenAI’s o1-preview), or no AI. We find that both AI tools significantly enhance legal work quality, a marked contrast with previous research examining older large language models like GPT-4. Moreover, these newer models appear to maintain the efficiency benefits associated with older AI technologies. Our findings also show that these AI tools significantly boost productivity in five out of six tested legal tasks, with statistically significant gains of anywhere from 50% to 130%. They perform exceptionally well in complex tasks like drafting persuasive letters and analyzing complaints. Notably, o1-preview improves the analytical depth of work product and Vincent AI avoids introducing more hallucinations, suggesting that integrating domain-specific RAG capabilities with reasoning models could yield even larger improvements.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Artificial Intelligence and Human Legal Reasoning
Empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that generative artificial intelligence has the capacity to improve the speed and quality of legal work, yet many lawyers, judges, and clients are reluctant to fully embrace AI. One important reason for hesitation is the concern that AI may undermine the human reasoning and judgment on which competent legal practice depends. This Article provides the first empirical evidence evaluating that concern by testing whether upper level law students who rely on AI at an early stage of a project experience reduced comprehension and impaired legal reasoning on later stages when AI is not an available option.To evaluate the possibility that AI degrades comprehension and reasoning, we conducted a randomized controlled trial involving approximately one hundred second and third year law students at the University of Minnesota Law School. Participants completed four sequential lawyering tasks: writing a memo synthesizing the law based on a packet of legal materials, answering closed-book multiple choice questions that tested their comprehension of the materials, writing a memo applying the materials to a fact pattern, and revising their second memo. Participants were randomly assigned either to a control group, which could not use AI until the final revision task, or to an AI-exposed group, which used AI during both the initial synthesis task and the final revision task, but not during the intervening comprehension and application tasks.The results provide a more complex picture of AI’s effects on legal reasoning than critics or enthusiasts often assume. As expected, participants who used AI to help craft synthesis memos produced substantially stronger work and completed that task more quickly. But contrary to our preregistered hypothesis, AI exposure at this initial stage did not diminish downstream comprehension of the underlying legal principles. To the contrary, participants who used AI on the synthesis task outperformed the control group on the later application task even when neither group had access to AI. Yet when all participants used AI to revise their reasoning memos, participants who started with weaker memos improved while participants who started with stronger memos regressed. These findings suggest that AI does not inevitably erode or promote independent legal reasoning, but that its effects depend on when and how law students and junior lawyers use AI. The Article builds on this insight by suggesting best practices for AI use and avenues for further empirical research.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessArtificial Intelligence and Human Legal Reasoning
Empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that generative artificial intelligence has the capacity to improve the speed and quality of legal work, yet many lawyers, judges, and clients are reluctant to fully embrace AI. One important reason for hesitation is the concern that AI may undermine the human reasoning and judgment on which competent legal practice depends. This Article provides the first empirical evidence evaluating that concern by testing whether upper level law students who rely on AI at an early stage of a project experience reduced comprehension and impaired legal reasoning on later stages when AI is not an available option.To evaluate the possibility that AI degrades comprehension and reasoning, we conducted a randomized controlled trial involving approximately one hundred second and third year law students at the University of Minnesota Law School. Participants completed four sequential lawyering tasks: writing a memo synthesizing the law based on a packet of legal materials, answering closed-book multiple choice questions that tested their comprehension of the materials, writing a memo applying the materials to a fact pattern, and revising their second memo. Participants were randomly assigned either to a control group, which could not use AI until the final revision task, or to an AI-exposed group, which used AI during both the initial synthesis task and the final revision task, but not during the intervening comprehension and application tasks.The results provide a more complex picture of AI’s effects on legal reasoning than critics or enthusiasts often assume. As expected, participants who used AI to help craft synthesis memos produced substantially stronger work and completed that task more quickly. But contrary to our preregistered hypothesis, AI exposure at this initial stage did not diminish downstream comprehension of the underlying legal principles. To the contrary, participants who used AI on the synthesis task outperformed the control group on the later application task even when neither group had access to AI. Yet when all participants used AI to revise their reasoning memos, participants who started with weaker memos improved while participants who started with stronger memos regressed. These findings suggest that AI does not inevitably erode or promote independent legal reasoning, but that its effects depend on when and how law students and junior lawyers use AI. The Article builds on this insight by suggesting best practices for AI use and avenues for further empirical research.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 2-22
Grading Machines: Can AI Exam-Grading Replace Law Professors?
In the past few years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant technical advances, enabling legal-advocacy organizations to adopt them as complements to—or substitutes for—lawyers and other human experts. The role of LLMs in legal education, however, is underexplored. While several studies have examined LLMs’ performance in taking law school exams, finding mixed results, there have been no published studies systematically analyzing LLMs’ competence at one of law professors’ chief responsibilities: grading law school exams. This paper presents results of an analysis of how LLMs perform in evaluating student responses to legal analysis questions of the kind typically contained in law school exams. The data come from exams in four subjects administered at top-30 U.S. law schools. Unlike some projects in computer or data science, our goal is not to design a new LLM that minimizes error or that maximizes agreement with human graders. Rather, we seek to determine whether existing models—which can be straightforwardly applied by most professors and students—are already suitable for law exam evaluation. We find that, when provided with a detailed rubric, the LLM grades correlate with the human grader at Pearson correlation coefficients of up to 0.93. Our findings suggest that, even if they do not fully replace humans in the near future, LLMs could soon be put to valuable tasks by law school professors, such as reviewing and validating professor grading, providing substantive feedback on ungraded midterms, and providing students feedback on self-administered practice exams.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Law & Empirical Analysis
- Vol. 3 (1) , 2-22
Open AccessGrading Machines: Can AI Exam-Grading Replace Law Professors?
In the past few years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant technical advances, enabling legal-advocacy organizations to adopt them as complements to—or substitutes for—lawyers and other human experts. The role of LLMs in legal education, however, is underexplored. While several studies have examined LLMs’ performance in taking law school exams, finding mixed results, there have been no published studies systematically analyzing LLMs’ competence at one of law professors’ chief responsibilities: grading law school exams. This paper presents results of an analysis of how LLMs perform in evaluating student responses to legal analysis questions of the kind typically contained in law school exams. The data come from exams in four subjects administered at top-30 U.S. law schools. Unlike some projects in computer or data science, our goal is not to design a new LLM that minimizes error or that maximizes agreement with human graders. Rather, we seek to determine whether existing models—which can be straightforwardly applied by most professors and students—are already suitable for law exam evaluation. We find that, when provided with a detailed rubric, the LLM grades correlate with the human grader at Pearson correlation coefficients of up to 0.93. Our findings suggest that, even if they do not fully replace humans in the near future, LLMs could soon be put to valuable tasks by law school professors, such as reviewing and validating professor grading, providing substantive feedback on ungraded midterms, and providing students feedback on self-administered practice exams.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Collective Coverage: How Group Homeowners Insurance Could Promote Climate Adaptation and Resilience
Property insurers have long been heralded as potential leaders in driving adaptation and resilience to the accelerating impacts of climate change. In practice, however, insurers have largely fallen short of these expectations. Premiums frequently fail to reflect even near-term climate risks, discounts for climate-linked property hardening remain limited, and insurers regularly withdraw from the regions most exposed to climate change. Several structural features of contemporary property insurance markets help explain this disappointing track record, including annual policy terms, individualized underwriting, and purchasers’ informational, cognitive, and financial constraints. This Article argues that these structural barriers to insurers promoting climate adaptation and resilience can be mitigated through a largely overlooked legal reform: modernizing state insurance laws that prohibit insurers from providing group insurance coverage to homeowners living within geographically defined communities. Such group property insurance, this Article argues, could enable insurers and communities to better coordinate and finance climate adaptation and resilience strategies, while also producing more accurate and durable pricing signals. Historical experiments with group property insurance and the success of group models in health and life insurance demonstrate both the feasibility and potential benefits of such arrangements. Yet in most states, “fictitious group” laws and restrictive interpretations of state prohibitions against “unfair discrimination” render such group property insurance arrangements legally unworkable. Updating these laws would open the door to much-needed experimentation in homeowners insurance markets, creating the prospect of better aligning these markets with the urgent risks posed by climate change.
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCollective Coverage: How Group Homeowners Insurance Could Promote Climate Adaptation and Resilience
Property insurers have long been heralded as potential leaders in driving adaptation and resilience to the accelerating impacts of climate change. In practice, however, insurers have largely fallen short of these expectations. Premiums frequently fail to reflect even near-term climate risks, discounts for climate-linked property hardening remain limited, and insurers regularly withdraw from the regions most exposed to climate change. Several structural features of contemporary property insurance markets help explain this disappointing track record, including annual policy terms, individualized underwriting, and purchasers’ informational, cognitive, and financial constraints. This Article argues that these structural barriers to insurers promoting climate adaptation and resilience can be mitigated through a largely overlooked legal reform: modernizing state insurance laws that prohibit insurers from providing group insurance coverage to homeowners living within geographically defined communities. Such group property insurance, this Article argues, could enable insurers and communities to better coordinate and finance climate adaptation and resilience strategies, while also producing more accurate and durable pricing signals. Historical experiments with group property insurance and the success of group models in health and life insurance demonstrate both the feasibility and potential benefits of such arrangements. Yet in most states, “fictitious group” laws and restrictive interpretations of state prohibitions against “unfair discrimination” render such group property insurance arrangements legally unworkable. Updating these laws would open the door to much-needed experimentation in homeowners insurance markets, creating the prospect of better aligning these markets with the urgent risks posed by climate change.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Lawyering in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
We conduct the first randomized controlled trial of AI assistance’s effect on human legal analysis. We randomly assigned sixty students at the University of Minnesota Law School each to complete four separate legal tasks (drafting a complaint, a contract, a section of an employee handbook, and a client memo), either with or without the assistance of GPT-4, after receiving training on how to use GPT-4 effectively. We then blind-graded the results and tracked how long the students took on each task. We found that access to GPT-4 slightly and inconsistently improved the quality of participants’ legal analysis but induced large and consistent increases in speed. The benefits of AI assistance were not evenly distributed: in the tasks on which AI was the most useful, it was significantly more useful to lower-skilled participants. On the other hand, AI assistance reduced the amount of time that participants took to complete the tasks roughly uniformly regardless of their baseline speed. In follow up surveys, we found that participants reported increased satisfaction from using AI to complete legal tasks and that they correctly predicted the tasks for which GPT-4 would be most helpful. These results—which will likely serve as a lower-bound estimate on AI’s capacity to improve the efficiency of legal services—have important normative implications across the future of lawyering. For law schools, they suggest the importance of deliberately and holistically assessing when and how law students are trained to use AI. For lawyers and judges, they suggest that the time to embrace AI is now, though the contours of what that will mean can and should vary significantly by practice area, task, and the stakes of the underlying matters. And for purchasers of legal services, our results suggest that it is time to reconsider what types of legal matters should be sent to outside counsel rather than handled in-house, and how matters that are handled externally are managed and billed.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLawyering in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
We conduct the first randomized controlled trial of AI assistance’s effect on human legal analysis. We randomly assigned sixty students at the University of Minnesota Law School each to complete four separate legal tasks (drafting a complaint, a contract, a section of an employee handbook, and a client memo), either with or without the assistance of GPT-4, after receiving training on how to use GPT-4 effectively. We then blind-graded the results and tracked how long the students took on each task. We found that access to GPT-4 slightly and inconsistently improved the quality of participants’ legal analysis but induced large and consistent increases in speed. The benefits of AI assistance were not evenly distributed: in the tasks on which AI was the most useful, it was significantly more useful to lower-skilled participants. On the other hand, AI assistance reduced the amount of time that participants took to complete the tasks roughly uniformly regardless of their baseline speed. In follow up surveys, we found that participants reported increased satisfaction from using AI to complete legal tasks and that they correctly predicted the tasks for which GPT-4 would be most helpful. These results—which will likely serve as a lower-bound estimate on AI’s capacity to improve the efficiency of legal services—have important normative implications across the future of lawyering. For law schools, they suggest the importance of deliberately and holistically assessing when and how law students are trained to use AI. For lawyers and judges, they suggest that the time to embrace AI is now, though the contours of what that will mean can and should vary significantly by practice area, task, and the stakes of the underlying matters. And for purchasers of legal services, our results suggest that it is time to reconsider what types of legal matters should be sent to outside counsel rather than handled in-house, and how matters that are handled externally are managed and billed.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
AI Assistance in Legal Analysis: An Empirical Study
Can artificial intelligence (AI) augment human legal reasoning? To find out, we designed a novel experiment administering law school exams to students with and without access to GPT-4, the best-performing AI model currently available. We found that assistance from GPT-4 significantly enhanced performance on simple multiple-choice questions but not on complex essay questions. We also found that GPT-4’s impact depended heavily on the student’s starting skill level; students at the bottom of the class saw huge performance gains with AI assistance, while students at the top of the class saw performance declines. This suggests that AI may have an equalizing effect on the legal profession, mitigating inequalities between elite and nonelite lawyers. In addition, we graded exams written by GPT-4 alone to compare it with humans alone and AI-assisted humans. We found that GPT-4’s performance varied substantially depending on prompting methodology. With basic prompts, GPT-4 was a mediocre student, but with optimal prompting it outperformed both the average student and the average student with access to AI. This finding has important implications for the future of work, hinting that it may become advantageous to entirely remove humans from the loop for certain tasks.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAI Assistance in Legal Analysis: An Empirical Study
Can artificial intelligence (AI) augment human legal reasoning? To find out, we designed a novel experiment administering law school exams to students with and without access to GPT-4, the best-performing AI model currently available. We found that assistance from GPT-4 significantly enhanced performance on simple multiple-choice questions but not on complex essay questions. We also found that GPT-4’s impact depended heavily on the student’s starting skill level; students at the bottom of the class saw huge performance gains with AI assistance, while students at the top of the class saw performance declines. This suggests that AI may have an equalizing effect on the legal profession, mitigating inequalities between elite and nonelite lawyers. In addition, we graded exams written by GPT-4 alone to compare it with humans alone and AI-assisted humans. We found that GPT-4’s performance varied substantially depending on prompting methodology. With basic prompts, GPT-4 was a mediocre student, but with optimal prompting it outperformed both the average student and the average student with access to AI. This finding has important implications for the future of work, hinting that it may become advantageous to entirely remove humans from the loop for certain tasks.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
AI Tools for Lawyers: A Practical Guide
This Article provides lawyers and law students with practical and specific guidance on how to effectively use AI large language models (LLMs), like GPT-4, Bing Chat, and Bard, in legal research and writing. Focusing on GPT-4 – the most advanced LLM that is widely available at the time of this writing – it emphasizes that lawyers can use traditional legal skills to refine and verify LLM legal analysis. In the process, lawyers and law students can effectively turn freely-available LLMs into highly productive personal legal assistants.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAI Tools for Lawyers: A Practical Guide
This Article provides lawyers and law students with practical and specific guidance on how to effectively use AI large language models (LLMs), like GPT-4, Bing Chat, and Bard, in legal research and writing. Focusing on GPT-4 – the most advanced LLM that is widely available at the time of this writing – it emphasizes that lawyers can use traditional legal skills to refine and verify LLM legal analysis. In the process, lawyers and law students can effectively turn freely-available LLMs into highly productive personal legal assistants.
- 2 October 2019
- Published by JSTOR
- p. 165-180
Activities Are Not Enough!