Hengda Jin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Hengda Jin has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Suhas A. Sridharan
Emory University
3 shared publications - Dane M. Christensen
Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403
2 shared publications - Karen Ton
Villanova University
2 shared publications - Laura A. Wellman
University of Oregon Lundquist College of Business
2 shared publications - Anish Sharma
J.M. Tull School of Accounting, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, USA
1 shared publication Joshua A. Lee
Brigham Young University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 81 (1)
Unraveling the time-series dynamics between aggregate earnings and GDP
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 81 (1)
Open AccessUnraveling the time-series dynamics between aggregate earnings and GDP
- 8 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (3) , 307-332
Customer Shopping Behavior and the Persistence of Revenues and Earnings
Using GPS location data from customers’ mobile devices, we develop measures of customer shopping behavior intended to capture the likelihood that customers will shop again in the future, and we examine their associations with firms’ financial decisions and outcomes. We measure customers’ propensity to return using the frequency, distance, duration, and timing of their past visits to a firm’s retail locations. We find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the persistence of the firm’s revenues and earnings. We also find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the efficiency of investing and operating decisions among firms likely to incorporate customer data into their internal information systems. Our results illustrate conditions under which revenues and earnings are sustainable and when managerial decisions are consistent with insights provided by customer information. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M31; M41; G14; G31.
- 8 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (3) , 307-332
Customer Shopping Behavior and the Persistence of Revenues and Earnings
Using GPS location data from customers’ mobile devices, we develop measures of customer shopping behavior intended to capture the likelihood that customers will shop again in the future, and we examine their associations with firms’ financial decisions and outcomes. We measure customers’ propensity to return using the frequency, distance, duration, and timing of their past visits to a firm’s retail locations. We find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the persistence of the firm’s revenues and earnings. We also find a positive association between customers’ propensity to return and the efficiency of investing and operating decisions among firms likely to incorporate customer data into their internal information systems. Our results illustrate conditions under which revenues and earnings are sustainable and when managerial decisions are consistent with insights provided by customer information. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M31; M41; G14; G31.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (3) , 87-113
Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers
Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.
- 22 April 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (3) , 87-113
Open AccessCorporate Political Activism and Information Transfers
Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.
- 24 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 202-246
Customers’ response to firms’ disclosure of social stances: evidence from voting reform laws
- 24 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 202-246
Customers’ response to firms’ disclosure of social stances: evidence from voting reform laws
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4356-4379
Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?
We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced stock return volatility, particularly during periods of higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, greater political hedging is associated with reduced crash risk, investment volatility, and earnings volatility. Moreover, the reduction in earnings volatility appears to relate to both a firm’s taxes and its operating activities, as we find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced cash effective tax rate volatility and pretax income volatility. We further find investors are better able to anticipate future earnings for firms that engage in political hedging, suggesting that political hedging helps improve firms’ information environments. Lastly, we perform an event study using President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. We find that on the days this policy proposal was debated in Congress, energy and utility firms experienced heightened intraday return volatility (relative to other firms and nonevent days). However, this heightened volatility is mitigated for energy and utility firms that are more politically hedged. Overall, we conclude that political hedging is an effective risk management tool that helps mitigate firm risk. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4356-4379
Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?
We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced stock return volatility, particularly during periods of higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, greater political hedging is associated with reduced crash risk, investment volatility, and earnings volatility. Moreover, the reduction in earnings volatility appears to relate to both a firm’s taxes and its operating activities, as we find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced cash effective tax rate volatility and pretax income volatility. We further find investors are better able to anticipate future earnings for firms that engage in political hedging, suggesting that political hedging helps improve firms’ information environments. Lastly, we perform an event study using President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. We find that on the days this policy proposal was debated in Congress, energy and utility firms experienced heightened intraday return volatility (relative to other firms and nonevent days). However, this heightened volatility is mitigated for energy and utility firms that are more politically hedged. Overall, we conclude that political hedging is an effective risk management tool that helps mitigate firm risk. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.