Alan Thomas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alan Thomas has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
A. H. Jacobs
Cologne)
1 shared publication- Ana Cavalcanti
University of York, York, UK
1 shared publication - Beverley Townsend
University of York
1 shared publication - Colin Paterson
University of York
1 shared publication - Elke Kalbe
Medical Psychology | Neuropsychology and Gender Studies, Center for Neuropsychological Diagnostics and Intervention (CeNDI), Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital Cologne, University of Cologne Cologne Germany
1 shared publication - Gabriel Nemirovsky
University of York, York, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Society
- Vol. 61 (3) , 375-378
Thomas Nagel, Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Society
- Vol. 61 (3) , 375-378
Thomas Nagel, Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress
- Open Access
- 4 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (2) , 403-412
Virtue, Authenticity and Irony: Themes from Sartre and Williams
In the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this argument and relates it to similar claims in the work of Sartre. The inalienability of the first personal point of view represents a common theme and informs a further argument that an agent can only think of him or herself as merely one amongst others via a distinctive ethical use of the trope of irony.
- 4 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (2) , 403-412
Open AccessVirtue, Authenticity and Irony: Themes from Sartre and Williams
In the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this argument and relates it to similar claims in the work of Sartre. The inalienability of the first personal point of view represents a common theme and informs a further argument that an agent can only think of him or herself as merely one amongst others via a distinctive ethical use of the trope of irony.
- 23 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (530) , 619-622
In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester
Katrina Forrester’s book poses a problem for any reviewer that, I suspect, will be reflected in the experience of its readers. Unusually, the author is equally adept as a philosopher and as an historian. That poses the unique problem of establishing which theorist is speaking at any point in this narrative. The reason this is a problem is that, as the book develops, it is clear that Forrester the historian thinks that Rawls was at his most influential when his arguments were least understood. For those more sympathetic to Rawls, these historically influential arguments seem to bear little relation to Rawls’s work no matter how influential they were in the problematic ‘reception’ detailed here. Forrester the philosopher takes a more charitable view: she sympathetically engages with Rawls’s arguments in some of the most rewarding parts of this book. For long stretches, however, a reader sympathetic to Rawls is faced with the problem that a caricature of his views is, in this narrative, blamed for a great deal. Rawls’s influence has, in Forrester’s view, significantly diminished the political possibilities open to reflection no matter what the merits of his actual views.
- 23 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (530) , 619-622
In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester
Katrina Forrester’s book poses a problem for any reviewer that, I suspect, will be reflected in the experience of its readers. Unusually, the author is equally adept as a philosopher and as an historian. That poses the unique problem of establishing which theorist is speaking at any point in this narrative. The reason this is a problem is that, as the book develops, it is clear that Forrester the historian thinks that Rawls was at his most influential when his arguments were least understood. For those more sympathetic to Rawls, these historically influential arguments seem to bear little relation to Rawls’s work no matter how influential they were in the problematic ‘reception’ detailed here. Forrester the philosopher takes a more charitable view: she sympathetically engages with Rawls’s arguments in some of the most rewarding parts of this book. For long stretches, however, a reader sympathetic to Rawls is faced with the problem that a caricature of his views is, in this narrative, blamed for a great deal. Rawls’s influence has, in Forrester’s view, significantly diminished the political possibilities open to reflection no matter what the merits of his actual views.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Qeios Ltd
Review of: "Neoliberalism, Strong State and Democracy"
This is a timely, scholarly and interesting paper. I have two points to make in regard to it (a third may follow if the second concern is well placed. The first concerns framing in its lengthy introduction. When I wrote in 2017 that “if the reality...
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Qeios Ltd
Open AccessReview of: "Neoliberalism, Strong State and Democracy"
This is a timely, scholarly and interesting paper. I have two points to make in regard to it (a third may follow if the second concern is well placed. The first concerns framing in its lengthy introduction. When I wrote in 2017 that “if the reality...
- Open Access
- 29 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 32 (4) , 683-715
From Pluralistic Normative Principles to Autonomous-Agent Rules
With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural (‘SLEEC’) nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications of autonomous agents requires the refinement of normative principles into explicitly formulated practical rules. This paper develops a process for deriving specification rules from a set of high-level norms, thereby bridging the gap between normative principles and operational practice. This enables autonomous agents to select and execute the most normatively favourable action in the intended context premised on a range of underlying relevant normative principles. In the translation and reduction of normative principles to SLEEC rules, we present an iterative process that uncovers normative principles, addresses SLEEC concerns, identifies and resolves SLEEC conflicts, and generates both preliminary and complex normatively-relevant rules, thereby guiding the development of autonomous agents and better positioning them as normatively SLEEC-sensitive or SLEEC-compliant.
- 29 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 32 (4) , 683-715
Open AccessFrom Pluralistic Normative Principles to Autonomous-Agent Rules
With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural (‘SLEEC’) nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications of autonomous agents requires the refinement of normative principles into explicitly formulated practical rules. This paper develops a process for deriving specification rules from a set of high-level norms, thereby bridging the gap between normative principles and operational practice. This enables autonomous agents to select and execute the most normatively favourable action in the intended context premised on a range of underlying relevant normative principles. In the translation and reduction of normative principles to SLEEC rules, we present an iterative process that uncovers normative principles, addresses SLEEC concerns, identifies and resolves SLEEC conflicts, and generates both preliminary and complex normatively-relevant rules, thereby guiding the development of autonomous agents and better positioning them as normatively SLEEC-sensitive or SLEEC-compliant.
- 23 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of Social Economy
- Vol. 79 (3) , 528-553
Market socialism, labour market domination, and the state as employer of last resort
This paper assesses the claim that to avoid labour market domination we must be market socialists committed to an extensive sector of worker-owned firms. The labour republican tradition offers three perspectives on this argument: Ellerman argues that non-domination demands that all workplaces be worker owned. Hockett has argued that it demands a policy that the state function as the employer of last resort. Taylor argues that all that republicanism requires is a strengthened exit right for workers. This paper develops the claim that mandatory market socialism would be illiberal by thinning the market for labour and removing the fair value of exit rights. The most reasonable view, overall, accepts that the state must be the employer of last resort so as to eliminate labour market domination, but this is a macro-level commitment that does not place any meso-level restrictions on the nature of the firm.
- 23 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of Social Economy
- Vol. 79 (3) , 528-553
Market socialism, labour market domination, and the state as employer of last resort
This paper assesses the claim that to avoid labour market domination we must be market socialists committed to an extensive sector of worker-owned firms. The labour republican tradition offers three perspectives on this argument: Ellerman argues that non-domination demands that all workplaces be worker owned. Hockett has argued that it demands a policy that the state function as the employer of last resort. Taylor argues that all that republicanism requires is a strengthened exit right for workers. This paper develops the claim that mandatory market socialism would be illiberal by thinning the market for labour and removing the fair value of exit rights. The most reasonable view, overall, accepts that the state must be the employer of last resort so as to eliminate labour market domination, but this is a macro-level commitment that does not place any meso-level restrictions on the nature of the firm.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Basic Income Studies
- Vol. 15 (1)
Full Employment, Unconditional Basic Income and the Keynesian Critique of Rentier Capitalism
This paper compares and contrasts the basic income proposal with the alternative policy proposal of the state acting as employer of last resort. Two versions of the UBI proposal are distinguished: one is hard to differentiate from expanded welfare state provision. Van Parijs’s proposal is radical enough to qualify as major egalitarian revision to capitalism. However, while it removes from a capitalist class the power to determine the terms on which others labour, it leaves this class in place and able to exert other powers that distort the macro-economy. These include pecuniary emulation, demand pull inflation, and political resistance to full employment so that the rentier class does not have to contend with entrepreneurs *and* the working class over the distribution of the productive surplus. The state as employer of last resort proposal addresses these deeper issues while also claiming that inflationary pressure will undermine the UBI alternative.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Basic Income Studies
- Vol. 15 (1)
Full Employment, Unconditional Basic Income and the Keynesian Critique of Rentier Capitalism
This paper compares and contrasts the basic income proposal with the alternative policy proposal of the state acting as employer of last resort. Two versions of the UBI proposal are distinguished: one is hard to differentiate from expanded welfare state provision. Van Parijs’s proposal is radical enough to qualify as major egalitarian revision to capitalism. However, while it removes from a capitalist class the power to determine the terms on which others labour, it leaves this class in place and able to exert other powers that distort the macro-economy. These include pecuniary emulation, demand pull inflation, and political resistance to full employment so that the rentier class does not have to contend with entrepreneurs *and* the working class over the distribution of the productive surplus. The state as employer of last resort proposal addresses these deeper issues while also claiming that inflationary pressure will undermine the UBI alternative.
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Analyse & Kritik
- Vol. 39 (2) , 413-416
The Demands of Democratic Ownership
This paper considers an argument that justice as fairness requires liberal socialism as opposed to a property-owning democracy. It analyses the arguments for departing from Rawls’s principled agnosticism over the choice between liberal market socialism and property owning democracy. It questions the extension of Rawls’s fair value guarantee for the political liberties to all liberty and suggests an alternative interpretation of the kind of predistributive egalitarianism represented by a property-owning democracy.
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Analyse & Kritik
- Vol. 39 (2) , 413-416
The Demands of Democratic Ownership
This paper considers an argument that justice as fairness requires liberal socialism as opposed to a property-owning democracy. It analyses the arguments for departing from Rawls’s principled agnosticism over the choice between liberal market socialism and property owning democracy. It questions the extension of Rawls’s fair value guarantee for the political liberties to all liberty and suggests an alternative interpretation of the kind of predistributive egalitarianism represented by a property-owning democracy.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 249-272
Williams on Integrity, Ground Projects and Reasons to Be Moral
- 11 September 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 249-272
Open AccessWilliams on Integrity, Ground Projects and Reasons to Be Moral
- 13 June 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 124 (495) , 875-890
Prerogatives, Incentives, and Institutionalism: A Reply to Brian Berkey
I should begin by thanking Brian Berkey for his thoughtful discussion of my paper. As will be clear from what follows, I think that, in several instances, Berkey’s discussion goes beyond a consideration of anything I proposed. That is all to the good, however, as it prompts his searching claims about some fundamental issues concerning agent-centred prerogatives and egalitarianism. It seems to me, as I will explain further below, that what emerges from his discussion is not a ‘defence’ of Cohen, but rather a novel view that differs from both Cohen’s view and my own.
- 13 June 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 124 (495) , 875-890
Prerogatives, Incentives, and Institutionalism: A Reply to Brian Berkey
I should begin by thanking Brian Berkey for his thoughtful discussion of my paper. As will be clear from what follows, I think that, in several instances, Berkey’s discussion goes beyond a consideration of anything I proposed. That is all to the good, however, as it prompts his searching claims about some fundamental issues concerning agent-centred prerogatives and egalitarianism. It seems to me, as I will explain further below, that what emerges from his discussion is not a ‘defence’ of Cohen, but rather a novel view that differs from both Cohen’s view and my own.